Re: Paris Attacks Blamed on Strong Cryptography and Edward Snowden
Wheedling about crypto and Snowden diverts from CIA Director's full speech and broader critique. CIA version omits Q&A. https://t.co/d6tAq2PiZihttp://csis.org/files/attachments/151116_GSF_OpeningSession.pdf To be sure, commentators must promote their products to flatter their consumers as do spies, officials and armaments (crypto) producers. Officials buy the armaments to gain votes and post-service directorships, word artists blow wind to fan the flames. "This Is War!" Perfect for all consumers except the slaughtered, a few of which get ritual mourning (most ignored, unreported, unsacrelized, unheroricized, unencrypted). Hard to tell the difference between opportunistic warmongerers or anti-warmongerers, so ying and yang in complicity. At 10:03 AM 11/17/2015, you wrote:
1. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/11/paris_attacks_b.htmlhttps://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/11/paris_attacks_b.html 2. https://theintercept.com/2015/11/15/exploiting-emotions-about-paris-to-blame...
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On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 11:06 AM, John Young
Wheedling about crypto and Snowden diverts from CIA Director's full speech and broader critique. CIA version omits Q&A.
http://csis.org/files/attachments/151116_GSF_OpeningSession.pdf
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/11/paris_attacks_b.html https://theintercept.com/2015/11/15/exploiting-emotions-about-paris-to-blame...
fierce blame for the carnage is being directed toward American whistleblower Edward Snowden and the spread of strong encryption catalyzed by his actions. Now the Paris attacks are being used an excuse to demand back doors
http://www.wired.com/2015/11/paris-attacks-cia-director-john-brennan-what-he... DNI et al... looking and waiting for "the perfect example"... cue the 911 conspiracies... http://techcrunch.com/2015/11/17/the-blame-game/ So let’s not be taken in by false flags flown by anonymous officials trying to mask bad political decision-making. And let’s redouble our efforts to fight bad policy which seeks to entrench a failed ideology of mass surveillance — instead of focusing intelligence resources where they are really needed http://www.wired.com/2015/11/after-paris-encryption-will-be-a-key-issue-in-t... http://www.theverge.com/2015/11/16/9742182/uk-surveillance-paris-attacks http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3319037/We-spies-powers-need-says-LO... "We MUST now give our spies the powers they need", says LORD CARLILE. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enabling_Act_of_1933 The Enabling Act, when used ruthlessly and with authority, virtually assured that Government could thereafter constitutionally exercise dictatorial power without legal objection. They offered the possibility of friendly co-operation, promising not to threaten the Lawmakers, the President, the States or the Churches if granted the emergency powers. http://www.ibtimes.com/paris-terror-attack-intelligence-failure-not-snowdens... Intelligence Failure Is Not Snowden’s Fault But A Break Down Of Communication and Cooperation http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/world/europe/encrypted-messaging-apps-face... Encrypted Messaging Apps Face New Scrutiny Over Possible Role in Paris Attacks
In dealing with high level decision makers, the best strategy is always to provide three options and have the decision maker choose amongst them. Taking the American electorate as that high level decision maker, I would find it refreshing were Brennan to present said electorate with the choice between [1] content analysis (hence crypto side doors and the exposure of content), [2] traffic analysis (hence data retention at a level heretofore unseen and the cataloged exposure of real social networks), and [3] a willing resolve to tolerate the occasional terrorist success. It is a choice amongst losses. --dan
Dnia wtorek, 1 grudnia 2015 00:19:22 dan@geer.org pisze:
In dealing with high level decision makers, the best strategy is always to provide three options and have the decision maker choose amongst them. Taking the American electorate as that high level decision maker, I would find it refreshing were Brennan to present said electorate with the choice between [1] content analysis (hence crypto side doors and the exposure of content), [2] traffic analysis (hence data retention at a level heretofore unseen and the cataloged exposure of real social networks), and [3] a willing resolve to tolerate the occasional terrorist success. It is a choice amongst losses.
Aww, but you assume that these are three mutually exclusive options. That's quaint, seeing how right now we have [1] *and* [2] *and still* we have to tolerate occasional terrorist success (that being [3]). So the way I look at this is: unless it can be *proven* to me that [1] or [2] will significantly lower the occurence rate of [3], they should not even be considered valid options. Once somebody does prove that [1] or [2] actually do significantly lower the occurence late of [3], then and *only* then can we have informed debate about them, taking into account tangible and intangible costs of implementing them. In which case we still have to remember that [3] will always be there, from time to time. -- Pozdrawiam, Michał "rysiek" Woźniak Zmieniam klucz GPG :: http://rys.io/pl/147 GPG Key Transition :: http://rys.io/en/147
On Tue, Dec 01, 2015 at 12:19:22AM -0500, dan@geer.org wrote:
.... Taking the American electorate as that high level decision maker....
This is so unsound assumption, you can easily derive FALSE just from it, making the axiomatic system useless. The hamerican electorate is just a bunch of sheeple, by abuse of notation "almost all of them". They elected so much shit...
participants (5)
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dan@geer.org
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Georgi Guninski
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grarpamp
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John Young
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rysiek