----- Forwarded message from Jim Thompson <jim@netgate.com> ----- Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2013 15:07:00 -0500 From: Jim Thompson <jim@netgate.com> To: pfSense support and discussion <list@lists.pfsense.org> Subject: Re: [pfSense] [liberationtech] NSA Laughs at PCs, Prefers Hacking Routers and Switches X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1786.1) Reply-To: pfSense support and discussion <list@lists.pfsense.org> Read ‘em and weep: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html... My take is that most places don’t enable PFS (because it’s “hard”) in IPSec. In theory, Transport Layer Security (TLS) can choose appropriate ciphers since SSLv3, but in everyday practice many implementations have refused to offer PFS or only provide it with very low encryption grade. http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg02134.html I don’t know the situation on pfSense (I’ve not gone to look, as I’m elbows deep in an IPv6 IPsec issue atm.) In theory, OpenSSL supports perfect forward secrecy using elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman since version 1.0. Do we set "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128” on pfSense? Do we enable the DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA cipher suite? How about ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA? Do we build the 64-bit optimized version for 64-bit images? http://vincent.bernat.im/en/blog/2011-ssl-perfect-forward-secrecy.html Anyway, the ‘evidence’ is that there is some fundamental weakness in DH, since the NSA itself recommends EC crypto rather than DH in their “Suite B” offering. http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/ One would think that pfSense would follow suit. _______________________________________________ List mailing list List@lists.pfsense.org http://lists.pfsense.org/mailman/listinfo/list ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5