From eugen@leitl.org Fri Sep 6 07:23:28 2013 From: Eugen Leitl To: cypherpunks@lists.cpunks.org Subject: Re: [pfSense] [liberationtech] NSA Laughs at PCs, Prefers Hacking Routers and Switches Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2013 13:23:23 +0200 Message-ID: <20130906112323.GY29404@leitl.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============2016988395039341699==" --===============2016988395039341699== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable ----- Forwarded message from Jim Thompson ----- Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2013 15:07:00 -0500 From: Jim Thompson To: pfSense support and discussion Subject: Re: [pfSense] [liberationtech] NSA Laughs at PCs, Prefers Hacking Ro= uters and Switches X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1786.1) Reply-To: pfSense support and discussion Read =E2=80=98em and weep: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-mu= ch-internet-encryption.html?_r=3D0 My take is that most places don=E2=80=99t enable PFS (because it=E2=80=99s = =E2=80=9Chard=E2=80=9D) in IPSec. In theory, Transport Layer Security (TLS) can choose appropriate ciphers sinc= e SSLv3, but in everyday practice many implementations have refused to offer = PFS or only provide it with very low encryption grade.=20 http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg02134.html I don=E2=80=99t know the situation on pfSense (I=E2=80=99ve not gone to look,= as I=E2=80=99m elbows deep in an IPv6 IPsec issue atm.) In theory, OpenSSL supports perfect forward secrecy using elliptic curve Diff= ie=E2=80=93Hellman since version 1.0. Do we set "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128= =E2=80=9D on pfSense? Do we enable the DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA cipher suite? How about ECDHE-RSA-AES12= 8-SHA? Do we build the 64-bit optimized version for 64-bit images? http://vincent.bernat.im/en/blog/2011-ssl-perfect-forward-secrecy.html Anyway, the =E2=80=98evidence=E2=80=99 is that there is some fundamental weak= ness in DH, since the NSA itself recommends EC crypto rather than DH in thei= r =E2=80=9CSuite B=E2=80=9D offering. http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/ One would think that pfSense would follow suit. _______________________________________________ List mailing list List(a)lists.pfsense.org http://lists.pfsense.org/mailman/listinfo/list ----- End forwarded message ----- --=20 Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5 --===============2016988395039341699==--