Jim Bell's fiber-optic patent application.
To the list members of Cypherpunks: I, Jim Bell (yes, THAT Jim Bell) have just (re-) subscribed to the Cypherpunks list. (Pardon me if I don't immediately attempt to relate the numerous reason(s) for my unfortunate 15-year absence.) Of some relevance to the list is the recent publication (by the US Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO) of my fiber-optic patent application. See http://www.freepatentsonline.com/WO2013101261A1.html . No, the patent hasn't been granted yet. A brief description of the invention follows: A silica optical fiber in which the core and inner-cladding are made from silica in which the silicon-atom content is modified from the usual 92.23% (atom/atom) Si-28 content, 4.67% Si-29, and 3.2% Si-30. A few of the possible advantage are, increase of the velocity-factor of the fiber to over 90% of 'c' (as opposed to the 68% of 'c' of existing fibers); a reduction in optical loss by a factor of 10-20 compared to existing fiber's 0.19 db/km; a factor of 10-20 reduction in 'optical dispersion' compared to existing fibers; an optical bandwidth increase to about 1000-1800 nanometers wavelength. There is actually the prospect of some crypto-relevance here. There is the Bell's theorem (not me, but John Stewart Bell's) theorem to the EPR (Einstein Podolsky Rosen) paradox. See the Wikipedia article "Bell's Theorem. This led to experimentation where a single 'entangled photon' was sent down two optical fibers in opposite directions. Eventually (30 or so kilometers apart, I believe) these photons were detected. See http://www.cleoconference.org/library/images/cleo/PDF/2009/09-plenary-aspect... . My understanding is that the distance limitations of these experiments are determined primarily by the loss of the optical fiber. If so, then a reduction by a factor of 10-20 in optical loss will result in an increase of a corresponding factor of 10-20 increase in the maximum practical distance of these kinds of quantum-entanglement experiments. Presumably, this will lead eventually to the same degrees of increases in maximum distances over which quantum encryption could operate. Jim Bell
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 3:46 PM, Jim Bell <jamesdbell8@yahoo.com> wrote:
To the list members of Cypherpunks: I, Jim Bell (yes, THAT Jim Bell)
please authenticate yourself with NIST P-192; secp256r1 seeded via Dual_EC_DRBG,
have just (re-) subscribed to the Cypherpunks list.
note that the "Cypherpunks list" at al-qaeda.net is verboten, having sufficiently instilled fear across a subset of the subscriber base...
... (Pardon me if I don't immediately attempt to relate the numerous reason(s) for my unfortunate 15-year absence.)
pardon the decline in signal to noise ratio over the years as well, if you'd be so kind. ;)
Of some relevance to the list is the recent publication (by the US Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO) of my fiber-optic patent application.
your next task, should you choose to accept it, is to make a fiber that is passive tap protected, while remaining economically viable... good luck!
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:48 PM, coderman <coderman@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 3:46 PM, Jim Bell <jamesdbell8@yahoo.com> wrote:
To the list members of Cypherpunks: I, Jim Bell (yes, THAT Jim Bell)
please authenticate yourself with NIST P-192; secp256r1 seeded via Dual_EC_DRBG,
have just (re-) subscribed to the Cypherpunks list.
note that the "Cypherpunks list" at al-qaeda.net is verboten, having sufficiently instilled fear across a subset of the subscriber base...
... (Pardon me if I don't immediately attempt to relate the numerous reason(s) for my unfortunate 15-year absence.)
pardon the decline in signal to noise ratio over the years as well, if you'd be so kind. ;)
Of some relevance to the list is the recent publication (by the US Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO) of my fiber-optic patent application.
your next task, should you choose to accept it, is to make a fiber that is passive tap protected, while remaining economically viable... good luck!
*"Presumably, this will lead eventually to the same degrees of increases in maximum distances over which quantum encryption could operate."* Evidently he has made what he considers a step in this direction ;) -- Twitter <https://twitter.com/tbiehn> | LinkedIn<http://www.linkedin.com/in/travisbiehn>| GitHub <http://github.com/tbiehn> | TravisBiehn.com<http://www.travisbiehn.com>
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:48 PM, coderman <coderman@gmail.com> wrote: On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 3:46 PM, Jim Bell <jamesdbell8@yahoo.com> wrote:
To the list members of Cypherpunks: I, Jim Bell (yes, THAT Jim Bell)
please authenticate yourself with NIST P-192; secp256r1 seeded via Dual_EC_DRBG,
have just (re-) subscribed to the Cypherpunks list.
note that the "Cypherpunks list" at al-qaeda.net is verboten, having sufficiently instilled fear across a subset of the subscriber base...
... (Pardon me if I don't
immediately attempt to relate the numerous reason(s) for my unfortunate 15-year absence.)
pardon the decline in signal to noise ratio over the years as well, if you'd be so kind. ;)
Of some relevance to the list is the recent publication (by the US Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO) of my fiber-optic patent application.
your next task, should you choose to accept it, is to make a fiber that is passive tap protected, while remaining economically viable... good luck!
"Presumably, this will lead eventually to the same degrees of increases in maximum distances over which quantum encryption could operate."
Evidently he has made what he considers a step in this direction ;)
Yes, I understand that a dramatic reduction in loss could accomplish that. But, as is obvious (particularly recently, with the Snowden revelations) we have far more important, yet basic, vulnerabilities to worry about just now, particularly since the major Internet and telecommunications companies are now known to have been betraying us by letting the NSA keep 'every' email, and telephone metadata, and adding crypto back-doors into net encryption software. I propose that the public force such companies to sign what I'd call "Disloyalty oaths", promises to be disloyal to any and every government. This would include a promise that if subjected to any sort of court order (even and especially those requiring that the company keep silent as to the existence of said order) that the order would be 'leaked' shortly, say less than a week, to an organization (Cryptome; Wikileaks) that would publicize it. Primary methods as crude as leaving a few hundred copies of the order at the company water-cooler, or in the cafeteria, or by the copier, would probably induce volunteer leakers to mail copies to the leak-publication organizations. Governments and courts have little reason to issue such orders if their existence will be leaked, particularly if they are going to be very quickly leaked. Leaks, obviously, are very easy to do these days and the identity of the leaker would be very hard to know, and even harder to prove. Chances are good that such court-orders simply will cease. Jim Bell
Doesn't the bureaucracy just react to these shenanigans rather than quit? Cat + Mouse. They find other methods for coercion. They increase accountability. Make leaks punishable to the CEO directly. Better that it be made 'impossible' rather than part of policy. Since policy is 'worthless'... On Sep 20, 2013 8:53 PM, "Jim Bell" <jamesdbell8@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:48 PM, coderman <coderman@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 3:46 PM, Jim Bell <jamesdbell8@yahoo.com> wrote:
To the list members of Cypherpunks: I, Jim Bell (yes, THAT Jim Bell)
please authenticate yourself with NIST P-192; secp256r1 seeded via Dual_EC_DRBG,
have just (re-) subscribed to the Cypherpunks list.
note that the "Cypherpunks list" at al-qaeda.net is verboten, having sufficiently instilled fear across a subset of the subscriber base...
... (Pardon me if I don't immediately attempt to relate the numerous reason(s) for my unfortunate 15-year absence.)
pardon the decline in signal to noise ratio over the years as well, if you'd be so kind. ;)
Of some relevance to the list is the recent publication (by the US Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO) of my fiber-optic patent application.
your next task, should you choose to accept it, is to make a fiber that is passive tap protected, while remaining economically viable... good luck!
*>>"Presumably, this will lead eventually to the same degrees of increases in maximum distances over which quantum encryption could operate. "*
Evidently he has made what he considers a step in this direction ;)
Yes, I understand that a dramatic reduction in loss could accomplish that. But, as is obvious (particularly recently, with the Snowden revelations) we have far more important, yet basic, vulnerabilities to worry about just now, particularly since the major Internet and telecommunications companies are now known to have been betraying us by letting the NSA keep 'every' email, and telephone metadata, and adding crypto back-doors into net encryption software. I propose that the public force such companies to sign what I'd call "Disloyalty oaths", promises to be disloyal to any and every government. This would include a promise that if subjected to any sort of court order (even and especially those requiring that the company keep silent as to the existence of said order) that the order would be 'leaked' shortly, say less than a week, to an organization (Cryptome; Wikileaks) that would publicize it. Primary methods as crude as leaving a few hundred copies of the order at the company water-cooler, or in the cafeteria, or by the copier, would probably induce volunteer leakers to mail copies to the leak-publication organizations. Governments and courts have little reason to issue such orders if their existence will be leaked, particularly if they are going to be very quickly leaked. Leaks, obviously, are very easy to do these days and the identity of the leaker would be very hard to know, and even harder to prove. Chances are good that such court-orders simply will cease. Jim Bell
I'd say one problem is cultural amongst the security cleared and ex-TLA people with security people or current double agent security people on the telco payroll. Until they internalize that they are part of a dangerous to democracy and civilization STASI 2.0 system, the problem will continue, because these kind of gag order things are going to be handled by security cleared people only. In that way they can probably legally hide it from the CEO and the rest of the company, by gagging the intercept request handling people. And they can surely require, if they do not already, that the intercept handling people be security cleared. And in that environment its got to be easy on $250m/year black budget to stack the intercept handling departments in the important (large) telco's with not just security cleared, but true-believer ex-TLA types, or simply double agents. They dont hve to pay the full salary just an off the books loyalty bonus, as the telco is paying for its own subversion. So I think the main hope which is probably fairly slim, is that society views shift to make even those ex-TLA people start to question whether they are on the right side of history to the extent they have any ethics. Another thought you've got to wonder if people dieing is a problem. Whats to stop an extremely conservative risk mentality security cleared person, writing his memoirs spilling all in complete detail, parked with a lawyer for release on death. (Eg envelopes to be posted to NYT et al on his eventual death). Maybe that means old, and terminal people are going to find it hard to be employed in security cleared roles. Adam On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 04:28:44AM -0400, Travis Biehn wrote:
Doesn't the bureaucracy just react to these shenanigans rather than quit? Cat + Mouse. They find other methods for coercion. They increase accountability. Make leaks punishable to the CEO directly.
Better that it be made 'impossible' rather than part of policy. Since policy is 'worthless'...
On Sep 20, 2013 8:53 PM, "Jim Bell" <[1]jamesdbell8@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:48 PM, coderman <[2]coderman@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 3:46 PM, Jim Bell <[3]jamesdbell8@yahoo.com> wrote:
To the list members of Cypherpunks: I, Jim Bell (yes, THAT Jim
Bell)
please authenticate yourself with NIST P-192; secp256r1 seeded via Dual_EC_DRBG,
have just (re-) subscribed to the Cypherpunks list.
note that the "Cypherpunks list" at [4]al-qaeda.net is verboten, having sufficiently instilled fear across a subset of the subscriber base... > ... (Pardon me if I don't
immediately attempt to relate the numerous reason(s) for my unfortunate 15-year absence.)
pardon the decline in signal to noise ratio over the years as well, if you'd be so kind. ;)
Of some relevance to the list is the recent publication (by the
US
Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO) of my fiber-optic patent application.
your next task, should you choose to accept it, is to make a fiber that is passive tap protected, while remaining economically viable... good luck!
"Presumably, this will lead eventually to the same degrees of increases in maximum distances over which quantum encryption could operate." Evidently he has made what he considers a step in this direction ;) Yes, I understand that a dramatic reduction in loss could accomplish that. But, as is obvious (particularly recently, with the Snowden revelations) we have far more important, yet basic, vulnerabilities to worry about just now, particularly since the major Internet and telecommunications companies are now known to have been betraying us by letting the NSA keep 'every' email, and telephone metadata, and adding crypto back-doors into net encryption software. I propose that the public force such companies to sign what I'd call "Disloyalty oaths", promises to be disloyal to any and every government. This would include a promise that if subjected to any sort of court order (even and especially those requiring that the company keep silent as to the existence of said order) that the order would be 'leaked' shortly, say less than a week, to an organization (Cryptome; Wikileaks) that would publicize it. Primary methods as crude as leaving a few hundred copies of the order at the company water-cooler, or in the cafeteria, or by the copier, would probably induce volunteer leakers to mail copies to the leak-publication organizations. Governments and courts have little reason to issue such orders if their existence will be leaked, particularly if they are going to be very quickly leaked. Leaks, obviously, are very easy to do these days and the identity of the leaker would be very hard to know, and even harder to prove. Chances are good that such court-orders simply will cease. Jim Bell
References
1. mailto:jamesdbell8@yahoo.com 2. mailto:coderman@gmail.com 3. mailto:jamesdbell8@yahoo.com 4. http://al-qaeda.net/
On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 11:18:19AM +0200, Adam Back wrote:
I'd say one problem is cultural amongst the security cleared and ex-TLA people with security people or current double agent security people on the telco payroll.
Until they internalize that they are part of a dangerous to democracy and civilization STASI 2.0 system, the problem will continue [..] the main hope which is probably fairly slim, is that society views shift to make even those ex-TLA people start to question whether they are on the right side of history to the extent they have any ethics.
Hmm maybe the chances are not so slim that the NSA people, and/or their families are indeed starting to question their being on the right side of history (eg that building STASI 2.0 is not a fantastic idea for the future of society and democracy over this century). The NSA seems to be worried anyway (skip to the leaked letter, to literally 'employees and family of NSA', at the bottom of this article): http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2013/09/19/nsa-sends-letter-to-its-extended... Maybe public peer pressure and a call to ethics can achieve something after all! Adam
The NSA seems to be worried anyway (skip to the leaked letter, to literally 'employees and family of NSA', at the bottom of this article):
http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2013/09/19/nsa-sends-letter-to-its-extended...
I don't know if it is just me but the name of one of the writers of that letter reminds me of a movie character played by a certain mr Atkinson who unfoils a plot involved in turning the UK into a nation wide prison camp. But what's in a name.
From: Jim Bell To: Travis Biehn Generally, I'm not worried that government might 'react' to such things. Government generally 'reacts' slowly, poorly, inaccurately, and ineffectively. And, it generates enemies each time it acts. Look how the US Govt reacted to PGP1: Did they actually accomplish anything, other than pissing people off and giving useful publicity to Phil Zimmermann? How many people have been prosecuted in the last 20 years for 'exporting encryption'? How did the US Govt react to opposition to their Clipper-chip proposal? How many Clipper chips are in your devices? Zero. No. When the government seems to succeed, it is usually because it acted in secret, and thus avoided making enemies and stirring up the opposition. So generally, I conclude that fighting against the government is well worth the battle, despite the fact that some of us occasionally get heavily stepped-on. B^) ("ouch!!!") ________________________________ ..From: Travis Biehn <tbiehn@gmail.com>>
Doesn't the bureaucracy just react to these shenanigans rather than quit? Cat + Mouse. They find other methods for coercion. They increase accountability. Make leaks punishable to the CEO directly. Better that it be made 'impossible' rather than part of policy. Since policy is 'worthless'... On Sep 20, 2013 8:53 PM, "Jim Bell" <jamesdbell8@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:48 PM, coderman <coderman@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 3:46 PM, Jim Bell <jamesdbell8@yahoo.com> wrote:
To the list members of Cypherpunks: I, Jim Bell (yes, THAT Jim Bell)
please authenticate yourself with NIST P-192; secp256r1 seeded via Dual_EC_DRBG,
have just (re-) subscribed to the Cypherpunks list.
note that the "Cypherpunks list" at al-qaeda.net is verboten, having sufficiently instilled fear across a subset of the subscriber base...
... (Pardon me if I don't
immediately attempt to relate the numerous reason(s) for my unfortunate 15-year absence.)
pardon the decline in signal to noise ratio over the years as well, if you'd be so kind. ;)
Of some relevance to the list is the recent publication (by the US Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO) of my fiber-optic patent application.
your next task, should you choose to accept it, is to make a fiber that is passive tap protected, while remaining economically viable... good luck!
"Presumably, this will lead eventually to the same degrees of increases in maximum distances over which quantum encryption could operate."
Evidently he has made what he considers a step in this direction ;)
Yes, I understand that a dramatic reduction in loss could accomplish that. But, as is obvious (particularly recently, with the Snowden revelations) we have far more important, yet basic, vulnerabilities to worry about just now, particularly since the major Internet and telecommunications companies are now known to have been betraying us by letting the NSA keep 'every' email, and telephone metadata, and adding crypto back-doors into net encryption software. I propose that the public force such companies to sign what I'd call "Disloyalty oaths", promises to be disloyal to any and every government. This would include a promise that if subjected to any sort of court order (even and especially those requiring that the company keep silent as to the existence of said order) that the
order would be 'leaked' shortly, say less than a week, to an organization (Cryptome; Wikileaks) that would publicize it. Primary methods as crude as leaving a few hundred copies of the order at the company water-cooler, or in the cafeteria, or by the copier, would probably induce volunteer leakers to mail copies to the leak-publication organizations. Governments and courts have little reason to issue such orders if their existence will be leaked, particularly if they are going to be very quickly leaked. Leaks, obviously, are very easy to do these days and the identity of the leaker would be very hard to know, and even harder to prove. Chances are good that such court-orders simply will cease.
Jim Bell
On 09/20/2013 10:53 PM, Jim Bell wrote:
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:48 PM, coderman <coderman@gmail.com <mailto:coderman@gmail.com>> wrote:
Evidently he has made what he considers a step in this direction ;)
I propose that the public force such companies to sign what I'd call "Disloyalty oaths", promises to be disloyal to any and every government. This would include a promise that if subjected to any sort of court order (even and especially those requiring that the company keep silent as to the existence of said order) that the order would be 'leaked' shortly, say less than a week, to an organization (Cryptome; Wikileaks) that would publicize it. Primary methods as crude as leaving a few hundred copies of the order at the company water-cooler, or in the cafeteria, or by the copier, would probably induce volunteer leakers to mail copies to the leak-publication organizations. Governments and courts have little reason to issue such orders if their existence will be leaked, particularly if they are going to be very quickly leaked. Leaks, obviously, are very easy to do these days and the identity of the leaker would be very hard to know, and even harder to prove. Chances are good that such court-orders simply will cease.
I completely support the idea of disloyalty oaths. The only problem I see is that they simply wouldn't work. What we'd see is the government putting increased threat of criminal prosecution on the corporate chain and not enough corporate officers willing to risk going to jail in order to do the right thing. Marissa Mayer from Yahoo said as much in her Techcrunch interview last week. The only option I see is that the public simply refuse to do business with the offending companies and do business with their foreign counterparts; take the money out of the US and do real harm to the US economy in the process. When major companies start failing and everyone knows it's because they betrayed their customers, the government will have to respond. It's already starting to a degree. Microsoft and Google have already said they're experiencing real financial loss because of the NSA revelations. We need to vote with our money. And we need to be willing to accept 'less viable' solutions for a time while other companies ramp up their services. Are Americans willing to go that far? I'm not too sure. We want comfort and convenience. Often, principles take a back seat to those. CypherPunk
From: CryptoFreak <cryptofreak@cpunk.us> On 09/20/2013 10:53 PM, Jim Bell wrote:
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:48 PM, coderman <coderman@gmail.com <mailto:coderman@gmail.com>> wrote:
Evidently he has made what he considers a step in this direction ;)
I propose that the public force such companies to sign what I'd call "Disloyalty oaths", promises to be disloyal to any and every government. This would include a promise that if subjected to any sort of court order (even and especially those requiring that the company keep silent as to the existence of said order) that the order would be 'leaked' shortly, say less than a week, to an organization (Cryptome; Wikileaks) that would publicize it. Primary methods as crude as leaving a few hundred copies of the order at the company water-cooler, or in the cafeteria, or by the copier, would probably induce volunteer leakers to mail copies to the leak-publication organizations. Governments and courts have little reason to issue such orders if their existence will be leaked, particularly if they are going to be very quickly leaked. Leaks, obviously, are very easy to do these days and the identity of the leaker would be very hard to know, and even harder to prove. Chances are good that such court-orders simply will cease.
I completely support the idea of disloyalty oaths. The only problem I see is that they simply wouldn't work. What we'd see is the government putting increased threat of criminal prosecution on the corporate chain and not enough corporate officers willing to risk going to jail in order to do the right thing. Marissa Mayer from Yahoo said as much in her Techcrunch interview last week.
Consider: Let's suppose there's a person in the Justice Department, I'll call him "Ed Justice" (in honor of Ed Snowden) with access to that order, who decides to leak a copy of the court order to Cryptome, Wikileaks, etc, a couple of days after it is served on the target media corporation. (He may do so for reasons of malice, or perhaps benevolence: He WANTS the order to leak, because he doesn't agree with the practice.) The usual 9-by-12 brown envelope with no return address, only stamps, careful to avoid fingerprints, etc. The leak-publisher(s) publishes the order. How does the government prove that the lead was done by the target media corporation, and not by somebody else? A criminal prosecution requires evidence, and none will exist. In addition, there is an excellent argument that any order of secrecy is an obvious violation of the First Amendment to the US Constitution. I don't recall reading any justification for such orders in any legal cases, but I think that this would be on flimsy legal ground. Jim Bell
On 09/21/2013 06:46 PM, Jim Bell wrote:
*From:* CryptoFreak <cryptofreak@cpunk.us>
I completely support the idea of disloyalty oaths. The only problem I see is that they simply wouldn't work. What we'd see is the government putting increased threat of criminal prosecution on the corporate chain and not enough corporate officers willing to risk going to jail in order to do the right thing. Marissa Mayer from Yahoo said as much in her Techcrunch interview last week.
Consider: Let's suppose there's a person in the Justice Department, I'll call him "Ed Justice" (in honor of Ed Snowden) with access to that order, who decides to leak a copy of the court order to Cryptome, Wikileaks, etc, a couple of days after it is served on the target media corporation. (He may do so for reasons of malice, or perhaps benevolence: He WANTS the order to leak, because he doesn't agree with the practice.) The usual 9-by-12 brown envelope with no return address, only stamps, careful to avoid fingerprints, etc. The leak-publisher(s) publishes the order. How does the government prove that the lead was done by the target media corporation, and not by somebody else? A criminal prosecution requires evidence, and none will exist. In addition, there is an excellent argument that any order of secrecy is an obvious violation of the First Amendment to the US Constitution. I don't recall reading any justification for such orders in any legal cases, but I think that this would be on flimsy legal ground.
Perhaps I'm being overly pessimistic but I can't imagine this kind of thing happening on a routine basis. If anything, it looks like the government is closing ranks and increasing the indoctrination of their employees. I fear that we're going to see fewer and fewer people with the courage of Edward Snowden as we move forward. It's nice to think that conscience will win in the end but I honestly am starting to see just the opposite. This is why I think we're going to need groups like Anonymous and others who are willing to do straight infiltration in order to find the truth. We can't rely on those who are already in government to get a fit of conscience. CryptoFreak
On 09/21/2013 06:46 PM, Jim Bell wrote:
*From:* CryptoFreak <cryptofreak@cpunk.us>
I completely support the idea of disloyalty oaths. The only problem I see is that they simply wouldn't work. What we'd see is the government putting increased threat of criminal prosecution on the corporate chain and not enough corporate officers willing to risk going to jail in order to do the right thing. Marissa Mayer from Yahoo said as much in her Techcrunch interview last week.
Consider: Let's suppose there's a person in the Justice Department, I'll call him "Ed Justice" (in honor of Ed Snowden) with access to that order, who decides to leak a copy of the court order to Cryptome, Wikileaks, etc, a couple of days after it is served on the target media corporation. (He may do so for reasons of malice, or perhaps benevolence: He WANTS the order to leak, because he doesn't agree with the practice.) The usual 9-by-12 brown envelope with no return address, only stamps, careful to avoid fingerprints, etc. The leak-publisher(s) publishes the order. How does the government prove that the lead was done by the target media corporation, and not by somebody else? A criminal prosecution requires evidence, and none will exist. In addition, there is an excellent argument that any order of secrecy is an obvious violation of the First Amendment to the US Constitution. I don't recall reading any justification for such orders in any legal cases, but I think that this would be on flimsy legal ground.
Perhaps I'm being overly pessimistic but I can't imagine this kind of thing happening on a routine basis. If anything, it looks like the government is closing ranks and increasing the indoctrination of their employees. I fear that we're going to see fewer and fewer people with the courage of Edward Snowden as we move forward. It's nice to think that conscience will win in the end but I honestly am starting to see just the opposite. This is why I think we're going to need groups like Anonymous and others who are willing to do straight infiltration in order to find the truth. We can't rely on those who are already in government to get a fit of conscience. CryptoFreak
From: CryptoFreak <cryptofreak@cpunk.us> On 09/21/2013 06:46 PM, Jim Bell wrote:
*From:* CryptoFreak <cryptofreak@cpunk.us>
I completely support the idea of disloyalty oaths. The only problem I see is that they simply wouldn't work. What we'd see is the government putting increased threat of criminal prosecution on the corporate chain and not enough corporate officers willing to risk going to jail in order to do the right thing. Marissa Mayer from Yahoo said as much in her Techcrunch interview last week.
Consider: Let's suppose there's a person in the Justice Department, I'll call him "Ed Justice" (in honor of Ed Snowden) with access to that order, who decides to leak a copy of the court order to Cryptome, Wikileaks, etc, a couple of days after it is served on the target media corporation. (He may do so for reasons of malice, or perhaps benevolence: He WANTS the order to leak, because he doesn't agree with the practice.) The usual 9-by-12 brown envelope with no return address, only stamps, careful to avoid fingerprints, etc. The leak-publisher(s) publishes the order. How does the government prove that the lead was done by the target media corporation, and not by somebody else? A criminal prosecution requires evidence, and none will exist. In addition, there is an excellent argument that any order of secrecy is an obvious violation of the First Amendment to the US Constitution. I don't recall reading any justification for such orders in any legal cases, but I think that this would be on flimsy legal ground.
Perhaps I'm being overly pessimistic but I can't imagine this kind of thing happening on a routine basis. If anything, it looks like the government is closing ranks and increasing the indoctrination of their employees. I fear that we're going to see fewer and fewer people with the courage of Edward Snowden as we move forward. ...CryptoFreak
I guess you did not get my point. I'm not depending on, or even hoping, that such a person as "Ed Justice" would exist. (Although it would certainly be useful.) Rather, I am observing that the government would not likely be able to prove that "Ed Justice" DOESN'T exist. Any prosecution of somebody based on the charge that he leaked a court order would require that there be proof that the person charged leaked the document in question. The defense would argue, 'The prosecution hasn't excluded the possibility that the actual leak was secretly accomplished by a government employee for his own reasons. We can see that people like Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden do indeed exist. How do we know that the document in question wasn't leaked by yet another person?" Jim Bell
On 09/22/2013 05:25 PM, Jim Bell wrote:
*From:* CryptoFreak <cryptofreak@cpunk.us>
On 09/21/2013 06:46 PM, Jim Bell wrote:
*From:* CryptoFreak <cryptofreak@cpunk.us <mailto:cryptofreak@cpunk.us>>
I completely support the idea of disloyalty oaths. The only problem I see is that they simply wouldn't work. What we'd see is the government putting increased threat of criminal prosecution on the corporate chain and not enough corporate officers willing to risk going to jail in order to do the right thing. Marissa Mayer from Yahoo said as much in her Techcrunch interview last week.
Consider: Let's suppose there's a person in the Justice Department, I'll call him "Ed Justice" (in honor of Ed Snowden) with access to that order, who decides to leak a copy of the court order to Cryptome, Wikileaks, etc, a couple of days after it is served on the target media corporation. (He may do so for reasons of malice, or perhaps benevolence: He WANTS the order to leak, because he doesn't agree with the practice.) The usual 9-by-12 brown envelope with no return address, only stamps, careful to avoid fingerprints, etc. The leak-publisher(s) publishes the order. How does the government prove that the lead was done by the target media corporation, and not by somebody else? A criminal prosecution requires evidence, and none will exist. In addition, there is an excellent argument that any order of secrecy is an obvious violation of the First Amendment to the US Constitution. I don't recall reading any justification for such orders in any legal cases, but I think that this would be on flimsy legal ground.
Perhaps I'm being overly pessimistic but I can't imagine this kind of thing happening on a routine basis. If anything, it looks like the government is closing ranks and increasing the indoctrination of their employees. I fear that we're going to see fewer and fewer people with the courage of Edward Snowden as we move forward. ...CryptoFreak
I guess you did not get my point. I'm not depending on, or even hoping, that such a person as "Ed Justice" would exist. (Although it would certainly be useful.) Rather, I am observing that the government would not likely be able to prove that "Ed Justice" DOESN'T exist. Any prosecution of somebody based on the charge that he leaked a court order would require that there be proof that the person charged leaked the document in question. The defense would argue, 'The prosecution hasn't excluded the possibility that the actual leak was secretly accomplished by a government employee for his own reasons. We can see that people like Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden do indeed exist. How do we know that the document in question wasn't leaked by yet another person?"
You're right, I did miss the point of your email. I get it now. Thanks for the clarification! Cf
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 9/19/2013 9:48 PM, coderman wrote:
note that the "Cypherpunks list" at al-qaeda.net is verboten, having sufficiently instilled fear across a subset of the subscriber base...
And, a bit off topic, but along that note: Is everyone else getting duplicate posts over the past 3 or 4 days? I'm assuming it has something to do with the dual-lists changeover that occurred somewhat recently... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.21 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJSPJ6OAAoJEL6hlgkLoYcABboH/1foDduK6G/7bek1JYqv+zg4 NUNF1kIqnlYEkZljGYNJtWYORGu9HEnoNhTHVTc1ZkkWmJmfkGOSqIrct/I6aPM+ kx+UYb/TePLpYkR3yCAZOjWOhHgaZSC7Rvl5ip3numTop6CsclzZAlthJTEPPAx9 HCT9ufRGCAnjb4zw9g5u3tENcutSD64Qbfg+I/hujlKBzgP6atTpeAAsqblHmSVv e8LJbAfUSPbX9giQMxFRhh9d7cluyK0hEsi4RFPMh0IZuhr3SinYn8NvSTpCPoPl WDeEzEMzCJEeHIOt0kPC/TVJryyLM75IH7sjx7sctn9/gJUoVVt01aSka+1qxbg= =mzIL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (7)
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Adam Back -
b. brewer -
coderman -
CryptoFreak -
Guido Witmond -
Jim Bell -
Travis Biehn