On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:48 PM, coderman wrote:

On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 3:46 PM, Jim Bell wrote:

...

To the list members of Cypherpunks: I, Jim Bell (yes, THAT Jim Bell)

please authenticate yourself with NIST P-192; secp256r1 seeded via Dual_EC_DRBG,

...

have just (re-) subscribed to the Cypherpunks list.

note that the "Cypherpunks list" at al-qaeda.net is verboten, having sufficiently instilled fear across a subset of the subscriber base...

...

... (Pardon me if I don't immediately attempt to relate the numerous reason(s) for my unfortunate 15-year absence.)

pardon the decline in signal to noise ratio over the years as well, if you'd be so kind. ;)

...

Of some relevance to the list is the recent publication (by the US Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO) of my fiber-optic patent application.

your next task, should you choose to accept it, is to make a fiber that is passive tap protected, while remaining economically viable... good luck!

*"Presumably, this will lead eventually to the same degrees of increases in maximum distances over which quantum encryption could operate."* Evidently he has made what he considers a step in this direction ;) -- Twitter https://twitter.com/tbiehn | LinkedInhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/travisbiehn| GitHub http://github.com/tbiehn | TravisBiehn.comhttp://www.travisbiehn.com

Doesn't the bureaucracy just react to these shenanigans rather than quit? Cat + Mouse. They find other methods for coercion. They increase accountability. Make leaks punishable to the CEO directly. Better that it be made 'impossible' rather than part of policy. Since policy is 'worthless'... On Sep 20, 2013 8:53 PM, "Jim Bell" wrote:

On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:48 PM, coderman wrote:

On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 3:46 PM, Jim Bell wrote:

...

To the list members of Cypherpunks: I, Jim Bell (yes, THAT Jim Bell)

please authenticate yourself with NIST P-192; secp256r1 seeded via Dual_EC_DRBG,

...

have just (re-) subscribed to the Cypherpunks list.

note that the "Cypherpunks list" at al-qaeda.net is verboten, having sufficiently instilled fear across a subset of the subscriber base...

...

... (Pardon me if I don't immediately attempt to relate the numerous reason(s) for my unfortunate 15-year absence.)

pardon the decline in signal to noise ratio over the years as well, if you'd be so kind. ;)

...

Of some relevance to the list is the recent publication (by the US Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO) of my fiber-optic patent application.

your next task, should you choose to accept it, is to make a fiber that is passive tap protected, while remaining economically viable... good luck!

*>>"Presumably, this will lead eventually to the same degrees of increases in maximum distances over which quantum encryption could operate. "*

...

Evidently he has made what he considers a step in this direction ;)

Yes, I understand that a dramatic reduction in loss could accomplish that. But, as is obvious (particularly recently, with the Snowden revelations) we have far more important, yet basic, vulnerabilities to worry about just now, particularly since the major Internet and telecommunications companies are now known to have been betraying us by letting the NSA keep 'every' email, and telephone metadata, and adding crypto back-doors into net encryption software. I propose that the public force such companies to sign what I'd call "Disloyalty oaths", promises to be disloyal to any and every government. This would include a promise that if subjected to any sort of court order (even and especially those requiring that the company keep silent as to the existence of said order) that the order would be 'leaked' shortly, say less than a week, to an organization (Cryptome; Wikileaks) that would publicize it. Primary methods as crude as leaving a few hundred copies of the order at the company water-cooler, or in the cafeteria, or by the copier, would probably induce volunteer leakers to mail copies to the leak-publication organizations. Governments and courts have little reason to issue such orders if their existence will be leaked, particularly if they are going to be very quickly leaked. Leaks, obviously, are very easy to do these days and the identity of the leaker would be very hard to know, and even harder to prove. Chances are good that such court-orders simply will cease. Jim Bell

On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 11:18:19AM +0200, Adam Back wrote:

I'd say one problem is cultural amongst the security cleared and ex-TLA people with security people or current double agent security people on the telco payroll.

Until they internalize that they are part of a dangerous to democracy and civilization STASI 2.0 system, the problem will continue [..] the main hope which is probably fairly slim, is that society views shift to make even those ex-TLA people start to question whether they are on the right side of history to the extent they have any ethics.

Hmm maybe the chances are not so slim that the NSA people, and/or their families are indeed starting to question their being on the right side of history (eg that building STASI 2.0 is not a fantastic idea for the future of society and democracy over this century). The NSA seems to be worried anyway (skip to the leaked letter, to literally 'employees and family of NSA', at the bottom of this article): http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2013/09/19/nsa-sends-letter-to-its-extended... Maybe public peer pressure and a call to ethics can achieve something after all! Adam

From:  Jim Bell    To:  Travis Biehn Generally, I'm not worried that government might 'react' to such things.   Government generally 'reacts' slowly, poorly, inaccurately, and ineffectively. And, it generates enemies each time it acts.   Look how the US Govt reacted to PGP1:  Did they actually accomplish anything, other than pissing people off and giving useful publicity to Phil Zimmermann?  How many people have been prosecuted in the last 20 years for 'exporting encryption'?   How did the US Govt react to opposition to their Clipper-chip proposal?  How many Clipper chips are in your devices?  Zero.  No.  When the government seems to succeed, it is usually because it acted in secret, and thus avoided making enemies and stirring up the opposition.  So generally, I conclude that fighting against the government is well worth the battle, despite the fact that some of us occasionally get heavily stepped-on.    B^)       ("ouch!!!") ________________________________ ..From: Travis Biehn >

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Doesn't the bureaucracy just react to these shenanigans rather than quit? Cat + Mouse. They find other methods for coercion. They increase accountability. Make leaks punishable to the CEO directly. Better that it be made 'impossible' rather than part of policy. Since policy is 'worthless'... On Sep 20, 2013 8:53 PM, "Jim Bell" wrote:

On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:48 PM, coderman wrote:

On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 3:46 PM, Jim Bell wrote:

...

...

    To the list members of Cypherpunks:  I, Jim Bell (yes, THAT Jim Bell)

please authenticate yourself with NIST P-192; secp256r1 seeded via Dual_EC_DRBG,

...

have just (re-) subscribed to the Cypherpunks list.

note that the "Cypherpunks list" at al-qaeda.net is verboten, having sufficiently instilled fear across a subset of the subscriber base...

...

...  (Pardon me if I don't

...

immediately attempt to relate the numerous reason(s) for my unfortunate 15-year absence.)

pardon the decline in signal to noise ratio over the years as well, if you'd be so kind. ;)

...

    Of some relevance to the list is the recent publication (by the US Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO) of my fiber-optic patent application.

your next task, should you choose to accept it, is to make a fiber that is passive tap protected, while remaining economically viable... good luck!

...

...

"Presumably, this will lead eventually to the same degrees of increases in maximum distances over which quantum encryption could operate."

...

Evidently he has made what he considers a step in this direction ;)

Yes, I understand that a dramatic reduction in loss could accomplish that.  But, as is obvious (particularly recently, with the Snowden revelations) we have far more important, yet basic, vulnerabilities to worry about just now, particularly since the major Internet and telecommunications companies are now known to have been betraying us by letting the NSA keep 'every' email, and telephone metadata, and adding crypto back-doors into net encryption software. I propose that the public force such companies to sign what I'd call "Disloyalty oaths", promises to be disloyal to any and every government.  This would include a promise that if subjected to any sort of court order (even and especially those requiring that the company keep silent as to the existence of said order) that the

order would be 'leaked' shortly, say less than a week, to an organization (Cryptome; Wikileaks) that would publicize it.  Primary methods as crude as leaving a few hundred copies of the order at the company water-cooler, or in the cafeteria, or by the copier, would probably induce volunteer leakers to mail copies to the leak-publication organizations.  Governments and courts have little reason to issue such orders if their existence will be leaked, particularly if they are going to be very quickly leaked.  Leaks, obviously, are very easy to do these days and the identity of the leaker would be very hard to know, and even harder to prove.  Chances are good that such court-orders simply will cease.

     Jim Bell

From: CryptoFreak On 09/20/2013 10:53 PM, Jim Bell wrote:

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On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:48 PM, coderman mailto:coderman@gmail.com> wrote:

Evidently he has made what he considers a step in this direction ;)

...

I propose that the public force such companies to sign what I'd call "Disloyalty oaths", promises to be disloyal to any and every government.  This would include a promise that if subjected to any sort of court order (even and especially those requiring that the company keep silent as to the existence of said order) that the order would be 'leaked' shortly, say less than a week, to an organization (Cryptome; Wikileaks) that would publicize it.  Primary methods as crude as leaving a few hundred copies of the order at the company water-cooler, or in the cafeteria, or by the copier, would probably induce volunteer leakers to mail copies to the leak-publication organizations.  Governments and courts have little reason to issue such orders if their existence will be leaked, particularly if they are going to be very quickly leaked. Leaks, obviously, are very easy to do these days and the identity of the leaker would be very hard to know, and even harder to prove.  Chances are good that such court-orders simply will cease.

I completely support the idea of disloyalty oaths. The only problem I see is that they simply wouldn't work. What we'd see is the government putting increased threat of criminal prosecution on the corporate chain and not enough corporate officers willing to risk going to jail in order to do the right thing. Marissa Mayer from Yahoo said as much in her Techcrunch interview last week.

Consider:  Let's suppose there's a person in the Justice Department, I'll call him "Ed Justice" (in honor of Ed Snowden) with access to that order, who decides to leak a copy of the court order to Cryptome, Wikileaks, etc, a couple of days after it is served on the target media corporation.  (He may do so for reasons of malice, or perhaps benevolence:  He WANTS the order to leak, because he doesn't agree with the practice.)   The usual 9-by-12 brown envelope with no return address, only stamps, careful to avoid fingerprints, etc.  The leak-publisher(s) publishes the order.  How does the government prove that the lead was done by the target media corporation, and not by somebody else?  A criminal prosecution requires evidence, and none will exist. In addition, there is an excellent argument that any order of secrecy is an obvious violation of the First Amendment to the US Constitution.  I don't recall reading any justification for such orders in any legal cases, but I think that this would be on flimsy legal ground.        Jim Bell

On 09/21/2013 06:46 PM, Jim Bell wrote:

*From:* CryptoFreak

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I completely support the idea of disloyalty oaths. The only problem I see is that they simply wouldn't work. What we'd see is the government putting increased threat of criminal prosecution on the corporate chain and not enough corporate officers willing to risk going to jail in order to do the right thing. Marissa Mayer from Yahoo said as much in her Techcrunch interview last week.

Consider: Let's suppose there's a person in the Justice Department, I'll call him "Ed Justice" (in honor of Ed Snowden) with access to that order, who decides to leak a copy of the court order to Cryptome, Wikileaks, etc, a couple of days after it is served on the target media corporation. (He may do so for reasons of malice, or perhaps benevolence: He WANTS the order to leak, because he doesn't agree with the practice.) The usual 9-by-12 brown envelope with no return address, only stamps, careful to avoid fingerprints, etc. The leak-publisher(s) publishes the order. How does the government prove that the lead was done by the target media corporation, and not by somebody else? A criminal prosecution requires evidence, and none will exist. In addition, there is an excellent argument that any order of secrecy is an obvious violation of the First Amendment to the US Constitution. I don't recall reading any justification for such orders in any legal cases, but I think that this would be on flimsy legal ground.

Perhaps I'm being overly pessimistic but I can't imagine this kind of thing happening on a routine basis. If anything, it looks like the government is closing ranks and increasing the indoctrination of their employees. I fear that we're going to see fewer and fewer people with the courage of Edward Snowden as we move forward. It's nice to think that conscience will win in the end but I honestly am starting to see just the opposite. This is why I think we're going to need groups like Anonymous and others who are willing to do straight infiltration in order to find the truth. We can't rely on those who are already in government to get a fit of conscience. CryptoFreak

On 09/22/2013 05:25 PM, Jim Bell wrote:

*From:* CryptoFreak

On 09/21/2013 06:46 PM, Jim Bell wrote:

...

*From:* CryptoFreak mailto:cryptofreak@cpunk.us>

...

...

I completely support the idea of disloyalty oaths. The only problem I see is that they simply wouldn't work. What we'd see is the government putting increased threat of criminal prosecution on the corporate chain and not enough corporate officers willing to risk going to jail in order to do the right thing. Marissa Mayer from Yahoo said as much in her Techcrunch interview last week.

...

Consider: Let's suppose there's a person in the Justice Department, I'll call him "Ed Justice" (in honor of Ed Snowden) with access to that order, who decides to leak a copy of the court order to Cryptome, Wikileaks, etc, a couple of days after it is served on the target media corporation. (He may do so for reasons of malice, or perhaps benevolence: He WANTS the order to leak, because he doesn't agree with the practice.) The usual 9-by-12 brown envelope with no return address, only stamps, careful to avoid fingerprints, etc. The leak-publisher(s) publishes the order. How does the government prove that the lead was done by the target media corporation, and not by somebody else? A criminal prosecution requires evidence, and none will exist. In addition, there is an excellent argument that any order of secrecy is an obvious violation of the First Amendment to the US Constitution. I don't recall reading any justification for such orders in any legal cases, but I think that this would be on flimsy legal ground.

...

Perhaps I'm being overly pessimistic but I can't imagine this kind of thing happening on a routine basis. If anything, it looks like the government is closing ranks and increasing the indoctrination of their employees. I fear that we're going to see fewer and fewer people with the courage of Edward Snowden as we move forward. ...CryptoFreak

I guess you did not get my point. I'm not depending on, or even hoping, that such a person as "Ed Justice" would exist. (Although it would certainly be useful.) Rather, I am observing that the government would not likely be able to prove that "Ed Justice" DOESN'T exist. Any prosecution of somebody based on the charge that he leaked a court order would require that there be proof that the person charged leaked the document in question. The defense would argue, 'The prosecution hasn't excluded the possibility that the actual leak was secretly accomplished by a government employee for his own reasons. We can see that people like Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden do indeed exist. How do we know that the document in question wasn't leaked by yet another person?"

You're right, I did miss the point of your email. I get it now. Thanks for the clarification! Cf