On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:48 PM, coderman <coderman@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 3:46 PM, Jim Bell <jamesdbell8@yahoo.com> wrote:
>     To the list members of Cypherpunks:  I, Jim Bell (yes, THAT Jim Bell)

please authenticate yourself with NIST P-192; secp256r1 seeded via Dual_EC_DRBG,



> have just (re-) subscribed to the Cypherpunks list.

note that the "Cypherpunks list" at al-qaeda.net is verboten, having
sufficiently instilled fear across a subset of the subscriber base...


> ...  (Pardon me if I don't
> immediately attempt to relate the numerous reason(s) for my unfortunate
> 15-year absence.)

pardon the decline in signal to noise ratio over the years as well, if
you'd be so kind. ;)



>     Of some relevance to the list is the recent publication (by the US
> Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO) of my fiber-optic patent application.

your next task, should you choose to accept it, is to make a fiber
that is passive tap protected, while remaining economically viable...
good luck!
>>"Presumably, this will lead eventually to the same degrees of increases in maximum distances over which quantum encryption could operate."

>Evidently he has made what he considers a step in this direction ;)

Yes, I understand that a dramatic reduction in loss could accomplish that.  But, as is obvious (particularly recently, with the Snowden revelations) we have far more important, yet basic, vulnerabilities to worry about just now, particularly since the major Internet and telecommunications companies are now known to have been betraying us by letting the NSA keep 'every' email, and telephone metadata, and adding crypto back-doors into net encryption software.
I propose that the public force such companies to sign what I'd call "Disloyalty oaths", promises to be disloyal to any and every government.  This would include a promise that if subjected to any sort of court order (even and especially those requiring that the company keep silent as to the existence of said order) that the order would be 'leaked' shortly, say less than a week, to an organization (Cryptome; Wikileaks) that would publicize it.  Primary methods as crude as leaving a few hundred copies of the order at the company water-cooler, or in the cafeteria, or by the copier, would probably induce volunteer leakers to mail copies to the leak-publication organizations.  Governments and courts have little reason to issue such orders if their existence will be leaked, particularly if they are going to be very quickly leaked.  Leaks, obviously, are very easy to do these days and the identity of the leaker would be very hard to know, and even harder to prove.  Chances are good that such court-orders simply will cease.
     Jim Bell