-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 06/02/2016 12:29 PM, grarpamp wrote:
On 6/2/16, Allen <allenpmd@gmail.com> wrote:
Another alternative would be to re-architect the services of interest to use a message or packet store-and-forward protocol with a random delay to thwart traffic analysis.
Perhaps different terms for same derivative thing?
It seems to me that high capacity routers would take a performance hit from the number crunching and caching requirements of semi-anonymizing all network traffic. A proposal to redo the whole Internet in some such protocol would be hard to sell. People who "want" some measure of privacy are willing to make cost and performance trade-offs proportional to their motivation; but bulk data carriers and large hosting providers are more interested in shaving fractional pennies off data transactions than in end user privacy.
Fill / chaff seem needed, otherwise in an all wheat network, input traffic on one side seems to match output traffic on the other side at some point, regardless of storage / delay.
How much of the network can an adversary see, vs. how big a performance hit do you need to take to reduce your profile? Dummy traffic makes matching the ends of a hidden path orders of magnitude harder, so the numbers crunched and bandwidth consumed might be an overall performance tradeoff win. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJXUGzmAAoJEECU6c5XzmuqfgcH+QFak6wq83axLkDPVT7DQ2tK KbG5G/oaNdIijsv6iDGXeTw9c2HNB8LM16hFsZYvwAI4SECNn/b8knjxyS2xe4or qLI1GbTB/8dyO7rotIq9ZNzoJYL1HExYA/glMKO0dJZk3+6z4M/E6tE8y/aFlZ5N iYH7PcWpVypg9UFlAXpdVrqzaILD10hqi5w97rWFEAsJ7PZrdmQZn8mkzfHXq6Jh 0Q1c6G1P10MR5paNq8HMEcN7JJA7YBiTkjJrsrBdTcn0Qiskpqa4J2olqWBBLPvN wq4V84ArIcX8YvHTwXpUGIEuzafrxxMYlez4j/Kg4QvnJQsbahkl1+QJXgdUuJY= =Ol35 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----