Re: Council of Europe proposes to outlaw strong encryption (fwd)
The proposal would make telecoms operators responsible for decrypting traffic and supplying it to governments when asked. It would also `change national laws to enable judicial authorities to chase hackers across borders'.
However, `it remains possible that cryptography is available to the public which cannot be deciphered,' his document says. `This might lead to the conclusion to put restrictions on the possession, distribution, or use of cryptography.'
This should prove about as effective as the current French or Russian bans. What are they going to do when they figure out that there need no longer be such a thing as a telecoms operator. We do most of the message packaging ourselves. It will be a bit difficult for any connectivity supplier to tell what's going out via one of our encrypted IP sessions. Question for Perry -- I'm assuming that it will soon be possible to originate encrypted TCP/IP sessions with a distant "process" somewhere. Do you see technical problems with a TCP/IP laundry being established "somewhere" that strips trace info from one of my processes and prevents back tracing beyond the mouth of this encrypted pipe? Also Perry, what did you think of the article "How Anarchy Works" in the latest Wired on the IETF? DCF
I'll jump into this conversation for a second. I been wanting to set up and IP proxy using Linux. It was support for IP over IP tunnels, and IP Masquareding. Only thing is needed is to encrypt to IP over IP tunnel. Just my $0.02. Aleph One / aleph1@dfw.net http://underground.org/ KeyID 1024/948FD6B5 Fingerprint EE C9 E8 AA CB AF 09 61 8C 39 EA 47 A8 6A B8 01 On Fri, 22 Sep 1995, Duncan Frissell wrote:
This should prove about as effective as the current French or Russian bans. What are they going to do when they figure out that there need no longer be such a thing as a telecoms operator. We do most of the message packaging ourselves. It will be a bit difficult for any connectivity supplier to tell what's going out via one of our encrypted IP sessions.
Question for Perry -- I'm assuming that it will soon be possible to originate encrypted TCP/IP sessions with a distant "process" somewhere. Do you see technical problems with a TCP/IP laundry being established "somewhere" that strips trace info from one of my processes and prevents back tracing beyond the mouth of this encrypted pipe?
Also Perry, what did you think of the article "How Anarchy Works" in the latest Wired on the IETF?
DCF
Duncan Frissell writes:
Question for Perry -- I'm assuming that it will soon be possible to originate encrypted TCP/IP sessions with a distant "process" somewhere. Do you see technical problems with a TCP/IP laundry being established "somewhere" that strips trace info from one of my processes and prevents back tracing beyond the mouth of this encrypted pipe?
It can be done (in some sense its just an extension of the Socks protocol), but I'm not sure how easy it will be to prevent all traffic analysis on the thing. Also, if this gets done frequently, it sort of screws up our attempts to keep up the efficiency of traffic in the network.
Also Perry, what did you think of the article "How Anarchy Works" in the latest Wired on the IETF?
I haven't read it, although the IETF is certainly (whether it knows it or not) an organization run on anarchist lines. Perry
participants (3)
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Aleph One -
Duncan Frissell -
Perry E. Metzger