Mike McNally writes:

At <URL:http://www.osf.org/~loverso/javascript/track-me.html> find some interesting "surveillance" applications of Javascript.

Okay. We have some netscape people here on this list. When is the patch to let you disable JavaScript inside Netscape going to go out? Its more than time. Perry

| At <URL:http://www.osf.org/~loverso/javascript/track-me.html> find | some interesting "surveillance" applications of Javascript. I pointed to a need for configurability for Livescript in December (http://www.homeport.org/~adam/java.html). Now, it seems that Javascript a bigger security hole than Java. We can turn off Java, but only downgrade to version 1 to avoid Javascript. The problems in Javascript are due to (in no particular order) lack of design for security, lack of configurability, lack of authentication in scripts, and a lack of control over whose scripts are run. A design for security would have compartmentalized Javascript, so that it only ran with access to the browser main window. It would not have access to the screen, nor to disk, or memory owned by Netscape, except where parts of Netscape *explicitly grant* access to JavaScript. Configurability means Netscape OBEYS /etc/netscaperc, /usr/lib/netscape/security.cf, or some other file that allows me to turn off Java and JavaScript completely, as a security officer for a company. It would also accept restrictions from a gateway or proxy, which could add http and or headers such as <JAVA=off> and <Javascript=off> (and perhaps others.) Configurability also means that Java or Javascripts can be made, in a sitewide manner, to ask permission to run, announce themselves when running, log themselves, (source, output, interactions, etc), not do things such as shrink below a certain size, etc. The next needed feature is strong cryptographic authentication in the Java/JS engines, such that only digitally signed scripts can run. Again, the site needs to be able to configure this, to say 'Only scripts signed by the Dalai Lama or Perry Metzger can run at all. Only scripts signed by Perry and the bank security officer can get at my e-wallet.' The start of this is not complex. Create a set of standard headers that http-gw or other web proxies can add, so people behind a firewall can have sitewide policies. (Notice that this has the clever effect of making locally written scripts runnable, since they don't pass through the firewall, even if all we get is an on/OFF switch.) Add authentication services at several (site configurable) levels. Digital signatures, one time run tokens are easy to do. They're not even that tough to do right. (One time tokens would be nice for meter-ware as well). -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume