At 11:56 PM 3/31/96, Randy Catoe wrote:

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"Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com> writes:

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Or to people with access to scanning microscopy techniques like STMs or AFMs. I suspect that there are lots of techniques that can be successfully used. It used to be that using them required the sort of facilities only available at a large semiconductor manufacturer, but now I suspect that it would be easy for a student at a major university, and probably less easy, but still perfectly feasible, for a person working at home with lots of sophisticated but fairly available equipment like STMs.

The proof would be in the pudding, would it not? Are their documented cases of smartcard scavenging?

Intel produced an "encrypted EPROM," for use in coin-op game machines and in similar applications, in the early 80s. My voltage contrast lab was able to use our machine (which I invented and my group then developed and deployed to major sites within Intel) to read the internal data streams out from internal nodes, thus demonstrating that the system had only moderate security. Enough security to stop an attacker from attacking a specific instance of the chip, but enough security to prevent attacks completely. Does this qualify as a documented case, coming as it does directly from the guy who lead such a scavenging attack? --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."