Comments on binding cryptography (1)
Apologies for not reacting earlier; I have been away for six days. I found many reactions to the posting on binding cryptograhpy in my mail box, which I have read with interest. Here are my comments, excuse me if they are lengthy. First and foremost, I want to stress that the proposal primarily addresses the issue of providing information security. It does not want to solve the problem of criminals using encryption. I hope the following analogy may clear this (but please don't stretch the analogy too far). The government wants to offer citizens good transport, so they make public roads. Because some citizens endanger others through drunk driving, the government makes the rule that if you want to drive a car, you must be sober. If you want to drive on the public road, fine, don't drink. If you want to drink, fine, take a bike or cab or use public transport. Now, the binding cryptography proposal wants to provide law-abiding citizens with good crypto. (I'm currently not using any, because I don't have an easy to use and reliable system.) A government may establish an infrastructure for good crypto (like the public roads), with the requirement that you keep to the "binding" rule (like "don't drive drunk"). If you don't want to use the binding cryptography, fine, use another system (take a bike or cab). The system will not prevent criminals from using cryptography - it isn't meant to. Yes, criminals can use superencryption or other (mutually agreed upon) ways to use the system and yet be out of law-enforcement's reach, but they might as well use PGP in the first place. I do not want to see PGP outlawed, and I do not want to have PGP use be regarded as suspicious (just as I don't think it is suspicious if you take a cab late at night). Setting up a good information security structure can very well be compatible with having other means of information security. You ask why should the government offer good crypto, when it's already available? I think that cypherpunks are not average - they know about crypto and they can use it. The majority of the citizens, however, do not use crypto, because they don't understand it and because there's no easy-to-use and reliable standard. If the government were to offer this, it would make a difference to many people. Then, you say, it affects my privacy. As far as I see it, it does not. The binding cryptography system allows regular monitoring for compliance (like road police checking whether people are sober). It does not involve reading of messages. The only time messages are read is when law-enforcement agencies (LEAs) have a warrant and ask a TRP to hand over a session key. This is not fundamentally different from the present situation, where LEAs can wiretap with a warrant. Privacy will be protected more or less to the same extent as presently. If you don't agree with governments having the possibility of intercepting communications anyway, OK, that's your opinion. I have another opinion, and we needn't discuss further - this is not the issue. Then, if you say you don't trust your government, OK, I can see a point. Generally, I notice a difference between US and Europe in our views on the role of governments. That is legitimate, and something for each to discuss domestically. (Yes, Alex, IRT-gate is a good point, but at least it has led to a critical investigation by parliament and a more critical attitude with our judges in judging investigation methods.) (And Allen, if binding cryptography helps totalitarian governments in arbitrarily monitoring all communications, I oppose this. China uses video cameras in Lhasa to monitor potential demonstrations of Tibetans. I oppose this, and I blame the Chinese government for it, not the inventor of video cameras.) I feel at least that allowing TRPs to decrypt single communications if the LEA has a court warrant is better protection than escrowing my private key with the government. Also, choosing your own TRP allows you better protection than having to use a government-chosen one. On the other hand, I think there should be some regulation on TRPs, if only to address liability issues. I think a government certification of TRPs would not be a bad thing, if this is done in an open, flexible and preferably independent way - for instance a semi-govenmental "TRP approving authority" (the same way we have data protection authorities who monitor compliance with data protection legislation). Again, we may have different opinions on this given the difference between US and Europe. Someone pointed out that a TRP could be corrupted and collaborate with the law-enforcement agencies. Then, all sessions would be read by the LEA. Indeed, this is a threat to be taken into account. At least the binding alternative is better protection against collaborating TRPs than key-escrow, as at least it leaves communications from before the corruption unharmed. Moreover, the system allow easy change of TRP, so the moment you notice something weird about this TRP, you choose another one. It's really a matter of trust. Finally, I get the impression that some cypherpunks feel the law-enforcement problem to be a problem of "them" as opposed to us. I - and this is my personal opinion - feel it is "my" problem as well. I live in a society with which I am generally satisfied, not the least because we have a rule of law. Tracing criminals is my concern as well. I am not happy that, in some ways, I have to give up some freedom, but I think it is worth while. I would not mind using a government-offered crypto system that uses binding cryptography. All I want is that it is a good system and I want to be sure I trust my TRP. I would prefer it if no such system were needed, but if it helps in protecting me from criminals, I can live with it. Bert-Jaap --------------------------------------------------------------------- Bert-Jaap Koops tel +31 13 466 8101 Center for Law, Administration and facs +31 13 466 8149 Informatization, Tilburg University e-mail E.J.Koops@kub.nl -------------------------------------------------- Postbus 90153 | This world's just mad enough to have been made | 5000 LE Tilburg | by the Being his beings into being prayed. | The Netherlands | (Howard Nemerov) | --------------------------------------------------------------------- http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bertjaap.htm ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Bert-Jaap Koops wrote:
Apologies for not reacting earlier; I have been away for six days. I found many reactions to the posting on binding cryptograhpy in my mail box, which I have read with interest. Here are my comments, excuse me if they are lengthy.
[snip]
Then, you say, it affects my privacy. As far as I see it, it does not. The binding cryptography system allows regular monitoring for compliance (like road police checking whether people are sober). It does not involve reading of messages. The only time messages are read is when law-enforcement agencies (LEAs) have a warrant and ask a TRP to hand over a session key. This is not fundamentally different from the present situation, where LEAs can wiretap with a warrant. Privacy will be protected more or less to the same extent as presently.
Seems to me there's a difference between "the only time messages are read" and "the only time messages are *supposed* to be read". Since Bert says the former, you have to wonder... And as far as "regular monitoring for compliance" goes, does the Post Office monitor first class mail now ("regular monitoring")? Do they have a monitoring law besides the ability to open letters with a warrant? [snip]
(And Allen, if binding cryptography helps totalitarian governments in arbitrarily monitoring all communications, I oppose this.
I hate to be rude Bert, but for the zillionth time, what you oppose is entire irrelevant to this subject, unless you are *the* decision maker in designing binding crypto products and making attendant regulations.
China uses video cameras in Lhasa to monitor potential demonstrations of Tibetans. I oppose this, and I blame the Chinese government for it, not the inventor of video cameras.)
Well, Bert, who do you blame for the mass of cameras going up all over Los Angeles? (Not to mention small, neighborhood microwave transceivers)
I feel at least that allowing TRPs to decrypt single communications if the LEA has a court warrant is better protection than escrowing my private key with the government. Also, choosing your own TRP allows you better protection than having to use a government-chosen one. On the other hand, I think there should be some regulation on TRPs, if only to address liability issues. I think a government certification of TRPs would not be a bad thing, if this is done in an open, flexible and preferably independent way - for instance a semi-govenmental "TRP approving authority" (the same way we have data protection authorities who monitor compliance with data protection legislation). Again, we may have different opinions on this given the difference between US and Europe.
In the U.S., there's a thoroughly-implemented concept called co-opting, well described in senate hearings on intelligence circa 1974-1976. Fortunately, you were able in the above paragraph to get past the "choosing your own TRP" clause, and show the real cards. So where in the U.S. are you gonna get TRP's who will not *ever* "leak" your files to an interested agency without proper warrant?
Someone pointed out that a TRP could be corrupted and collaborate with the law-enforcement agencies. Then, all sessions would be read by the LEA. Indeed, this is a threat to be taken into account.
Whoops! Looks like I spoke too soon.
At least the binding alternative is better protection against collaborating TRPs than key-escrow, as at least it leaves communications from before the corruption unharmed. Moreover, the system allow easy change of TRP, so the moment you notice something weird about this TRP, you choose another one. It's really a matter of trust.
And which trust is that, Bert? They sure as hell don't trust us, now do they? And unless you can show exactly where and when the "corruption" occurred, how do you know what was compromised?
Finally, I get the impression that some cypherpunks feel the law-enforcement problem to be a problem of "them" as opposed to us. I - and this is my personal opinion - feel it is "my" problem as well. I live in a society with which I am generally satisfied, not the least because we have a rule of law. Tracing criminals is my concern as well. I am not happy that, in some ways, I have to give up some freedom, but I think it is worth while. I would not mind using a government-offered crypto system that uses binding cryptography. All I want is that it is a good system and I want to be sure I trust my TRP. I would prefer it if no such system were needed, but if it helps in protecting me from criminals, I can live with it.
How does it protect from criminals? Only non-criminals (or extremely stupid criminals) will submit their data to a third party. One principle you should keep in mind, Bert, and that is that cypherpunks are not merely paranoid (paranoia as a Way Of Knowing), they're very adept at telling you exactly how the criminals and terrorists will get around this hokum, and you're in denial about it.
participants (2)
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Bert-Jaap Koops -
Dale Thorn