Re: How to eliminate liability?

Secret Sharing is easy, and there are a number of implementations with useful properties like being able to read the original from K of N
The problem is how to implement it in ways that protect the server operators as well as the information providers. For instance, the author's client software can do the split and send the shares too different servers, and make sure the readers know how to find the
Bill, Thanks for your response. Such a simple idea, I kinda figgered (was hoping) that it was already thought of, but I hadn't heard of it. I have been meaning to buy Schneier's book... One of my points, however, is that if the division of the encrypted information is done properly, even if the private key were deduced by whatever means, all they would find is (for instance) the high order bits and some ECC, but nothing that could be used to regenerate any meaningful information without the other parts. Because of this, I have been asking myself, how could any one datahaven operator be held responsible for holding classified, porn, or other information if they only have a meaningless slice of it? Perhaps this is more a legal question (even more out of my league) than anything... Any comments? parts.* pieces;
this can even be automated enough to make it convenient. This not only makes it hard for the Bad Guys to find the pieces, it makes it impossible for the data haven provider to know what's being stored there, and even if the site is siezed it doesn't give up the critical information. This is a Good Thing, and we've discussed it.
On the other hand, what happens if a Bad Guy wants to entrap the operator, by planting child pornography, pirated software, and TOP SECRET data in the data haven, advertising on Usenet and then calling the cops. Anybody, including the cops, can retrieve the contraband and bust them. So what are the alternatives, besides obviously encrypting your disks so it's harder to determine what's on them besides the plant, and the ever popular "don't let them find your physical location"? Perhaps the data haven can do the split and farm the data out to other data havens - but how do they know the data they're receiving is really a slice of contraband data instead of Yet Another Plant? It gets pretty convoluted.
[* You can read about secret sharing in Schneier. ] Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, bill.stewart@pobox.com PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639
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At 02:07 PM 1/23/98 PST, John M wrote:
but I hadn't heard of it. I have been meaning to buy Schneier's book...
Still waiting for my Dobb's CDROM too..
meaningful information without the other parts. Because of this, I have been asking myself, how could any one datahaven operator be held responsible for holding classified, porn, or other information if they only have a meaningless slice of it?
Perhaps this is more a legal question (even more out of my league) than anything... Any comments?
I think the essential issue is to convince the courts that running a cryptoarchive background process (distributed Eternity server) makes you a "Common Carrier", with all the legal protection you get from that classification. I agree with you and Bill that this is feasible once the legal profession gets a clue.. maybe in our lifetimes :-) The worst-case situation is a very widely dispersed government denying that kind of common-carrier status. Imagine congress signing something giving the UN that power, then declaring all encrypted-anonymous-archives illegal. Send a few blue-hats or a cruise missile to take out the non-signers. Back home: "who cares, just the UN protecting the children, so what if a Cayman casino or Togo bank gets toasted. No one was hurt, and the world is safe for imbiciles" In such a scenario you could take other steps. Steganography helps keep you from being noticed. Bursty-communications patterns are harder to stop/trace. CDROMs are readily manufactured hidden, and disguised. Perhaps the cypherpunk edition of Netscape will include anonymous remailing / traffic mixing services by default :-) David Honig honig@alum.mit.edu --------------------------------------------------- If we can prevent the government from wasting the labours of the people under the pretense of caring for them, they will be happy. -TJ
participants (2)
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David Honig
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John M