At 10:17 AM 7/14/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote:

At 7:05 AM -0700 7/13/96, Deranged Mutant wrote:

...

This is particularly problematic... if the mainland Chinese gov't requested a key from a N.Amercian or European (or even UN controlled) escrow agency, who is to say it isn't really for political reasons (even though they may claim the persons are drug smugglers)?

Or what if the 'crime' was, say, discussing Mormon beliefs, which is illegal in Singapore (and I think Russia as well)?

Or what if some terrorist was using keys escrowed in a country that sponsered terrorist acts?

Your best shot would be to make sure the part about the system being voluntary was hard-wired into any legislation or rule-making.

Wrong. Our "best shot" is to ensure that no "key escrow" legislation is adopted, and moreover export restrictions on crypto are eliminated. _THAT_ is "our best shot." The obvious problem with writing "voluntary" into any legislation (and thinking it actually means something!) is that there is a vast difference between the dictionary definition of the word "voluntary", and the way the USG would like to interpret it. I think most people define "voluntary" as something which is a free choice, devoid of coersion. But that's already damaged when the government's involved. Aside from robbing us of our assets in the form of taxes, the fact that it was able to do things like harass Phil Zimmermann for a few years (when, if there had been a "regulation" concerning writing encryption, it would have said, "writing encryption is unrestricted and VOLUNTARY") clearly proves that the government tries to do manipulate us regardless of friendly terminology like "voluntary." Clipper was always claimed to be "voluntary," but more recently they added to the restrictions, for example saying that a Clipper-type crypto phone can't be allowed to operate when connected to a non-escrow telephone. Again, the government is getting further and further away from "voluntary" as most of us understand the term. More importantly, I believe that the most fundamental right the public has is to be able to REFUSE a benefit. Let's suppose, hypothetically, that we "all" could agree that that GAK would provide net advantages and benefits to the public. I assert that despite this, the public is and should still be completely free to _refuse_ these benefits, and to go without GAK. This position, the truth of which is obvious to most of the readers of CP, would astonish and frustrate government employees and their sympathizers. Today, it appears that the vast majority of those that are paying attention to this issue agree that GAK is NOT desirable, and in any case they don't want it. The simple conclusion is that as long as we aren't supposed to have a dictatorship in this country, the will of the public to _refuse_ the claimed benefit should be respected and followed. Under those conditions, GAK wouldn't and couldn't happen.

Unless and until ITAR is modified by Congress,

Congress didn't write ITAR, nor did it approve ITAR. However, the Burns crypto bill will, apparently, negate most if not all of the influence of ITAR on crypto.

the USG has what Mark Twain called "the calm confidence of a Christian with four aces" on this matter.

"A Smith and Wesson beats four aces." And if the government keeps pushing, it'll come to this.

That is--unless and until Congress acts, the Administration has absolute discretion with respect to the conditions under which they will liberalize the administration of ITAR.

That's not clear. The _constitutionality_ of the application of ITAR to encryption is challengeable in court, with or without any actions by Congress. So they DON'T have "absolute discretion." Furthermore, regulations must (at least theoretically) conform to law. Jim Bell jimbell@pacifier.com