Re: IP: - Biham/Shamir Differential Fault Analysis of DES, etc
Note that this attack requires physical access to the DES chip, to stress it so it will fail. It works great against "tamper-proof" devices such as smart cards. It doesn't work against encryption happening at any distance from the attacker (e.g. across the network). It doesn't work against stored information like PGP-encrypted email messages either.
However, it might be possible to use the attack by beaming disruptive energies (heat, electrons, microwaves, etc) at a computer which is doing a lot of encryption, while simultaneously monitoring that computer's activity across a network.
John
Although using physical/electrical attacks to cause circuit disruptions to ICs (like smartcard) may be feasible, it appears to be much more difficult to mount this sort of attack on specially hardened crypto modules, which can more effectively isolate themselves from invasive sources or detect them and take action (i.e., key clearance) before an attacker can pry out their secrets.
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