Re: "Trustworthy" PGP Timestamping Service ??
At 6:51 PM 1/21/96, Matthew Richardson wrote:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
I have recently setup a free PGP timestamping service which operates by email.
The objective of the service is to be able to produce "trustworthy" timestamps which cannot be backdated without detection. It achieves this by:-
(a) giving every signature a unique sequential serial number;
(b) every day making a ZIP file of that day's detached signatures and feeding the ZIP file back for signing (and hence the assignment of another serial number); ...
It sounds like a variant of the Haber and Stornetta work on digital timestamping, about which much has been written on our list (check the archives, and/or sections of my Cyphernomicon). They have a company, Surety, which is doing this (or was, last time I heard). www.surety.com will get you there. My hunch is that your scheme implements a version of a hash (the idea of hashing the doc and then publishing the hash as a "widely witnessed event," in Haber and Stornetta terms) that could infringe on their patents (assuming they applied, as I recall hearing they did). Before you go much further on this, it would behoove you to check on what they are doing and on what patents, if any, you might need to license. --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
On Sun, 21 Jan 1996 15:42:32 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote:
At 6:51 PM 1/21/96, Matthew Richardson wrote:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
I have recently setup a free PGP timestamping service which operates by email.
The objective of the service is to be able to produce "trustworthy" timestamps which cannot be backdated without detection. It achieves this by:-
(a) giving every signature a unique sequential serial number;
(b) every day making a ZIP file of that day's detached signatures and feeding the ZIP file back for signing (and hence the assignment of another serial number); ...
It sounds like a variant of the Haber and Stornetta work on digital timestamping, about which much has been written on our list (check the archives, and/or sections of my Cyphernomicon).
They have a company, Surety, which is doing this (or was, last time I heard).
They were a month ago, at least. Their patent was re-issued 5/30/95 (# R34,954).
www.surety.com will get you there.
My hunch is that your scheme implements a version of a hash (the idea of hashing the doc and then publishing the hash as a "widely witnessed event," in Haber and Stornetta terms) that could infringe on their patents (assuming they applied, as I recall hearing they did).
I would be very surprised if it did. Haber & Stornetta's work is based on building a tree of hashes for all documents within a given time period (1 second in their commercial service), and then chaining the hashes for successive time periods. Once a week they publish one hash from the chain in the New York Times, and have been doing so for many years. The certificate apparently consists of the hashes from the root of the tree to your document, plus one hash for each branch not taken along that route. This permits you to verify that the hash for the time period was indeed partially derived from the document in question. As I understand it you then have to check the chain of hashes for the week, and verify that the ending hash matches the published value. To make this whole process more secure, they use a 288 bit hash created by concatenating an MD5 hash and an SHA hash. There is no digital signature involved and no information which must be kept private -- only the hashes.
participants (2)
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lull＠acm.org -
tcmay＠got.net