Anonymous remailers are a virus spreading online! (Replies)
Forwarded from Computer Privacy Digest. These messages are in reply to the Strassmann/Marlow paper archived at: http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/fight-censorship/dl?num=1159 -Declan ---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- From: cnordin@vni.net (Craig Nordin) Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:02:16 -0500 Subject: Re: Anonymous Remailers are a Virus Spreading Online Organization: Virtual Networks References: <comp-privacy8.14.10@cs.uwm.edu> Note the SAIC name in the byline. Note that CIA folk have often published stuff and not fessed up to having a CIA background. Anonymous remailers are the number one threat to total control via government. If you read something anonymous you can discard it simply because the writer is unwilling to stand beside his words. Or, you can see if it is an apt piece of writing and decide that it does apply, even without an author. This thread is part of a "school" of such topics now reaching us through various media. Note the recent news made by an internet announcement that a girl was being abused by her mother. Kids are said to be making bombs from instructions via the Internet (and why were they making so many bombs learned from libraries and colleges before and not even making it past the local news?). Some people don't like utterly free speech. -- http://www.vni.net/ cnordin@vni.net Fly VNI: Send E-Mail to info@vni.net ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu> Date: 15 Feb 1996 16:22:41 -0600 (CST) Subject: Re: Anonymous Remailers are a Virus Spreading Online Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee My most serious question about anonymous remailers is this: How can we be sure that the operator of such a remailer is not a federal or other governmental agent? That person is trusted with our privacy and has all the data needed to identify a user. If I were the Feds I would already have set up such a "sting" operation, the temptation is just too great. -- Leonard P. Levine e-mail levine@cs.uwm.edu Professor, Computer Science Office 1-414-229-5170 University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Fax 1-414-229-6958 Box 784, Milwaukee, WI 53201 PGP Public Key: finger llevine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu ------------------------------ ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu | Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu levine@cs.uwm.edu | Web: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- ------------------------------ End of Computer Privacy Digest V8 #015 ******************************
Leonard P. Levine wrote somewhere:
My most serious question about anonymous remailers is this: How can we be sure that the operator of such a remailer is not a federal or other governmental agent? That person is trusted with our privacy and has all the data needed to identify a user.
If I were the Feds I would already have set up such a "sting" operation, the temptation is just too great.
You will be pleased to hear that this problem was anticipated at least 15 years ago (in David Chaum's paper on "digital mixes"). Briefly, the solution is to use multiple layers of encryption to distribute trust among several remailer operators. Before it is remailed, a message is encrypted with public keys belonging to each of a sequence of remailers. As each remailer receives a message, it removes the outer layer of encryption using its private key, revealing another encrypted message and the next address to which it should be sent. Cooperation of all the remailers in the chain is needed to link the originating address to the message that is eventually delivered to a recipient. For a longer exposition on the current state of the art in deployed mail anonymizers, see http://www.obscura.com/~loki/remailer/remailer-essay.html Note that the availability of strong anonymity critically depends upon the availability of strong cryptography. If the Department of the Treasury Automated Systems Division holds all the remailers' private keys, then it can easily determine the originators of all anonymously remailed messages. -Lewis "You're always disappointed, nothing seems to keep you high -- drive your bargains, push your papers, win your medals, fuck your strangers; don't it leave you on the empty side ?" (Joni Mitchell, 1972)
participants (2)
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Declan B. McCullagh -
lmccarth@cs.umass.edu