Money orders, debit cards, ...

Some court transcripts from the McVeigh case contain interesting information about real-life anonymous systems. See http://www.cnn.com/US/9703/okc.trial/transcripts/may/050697.eve.html Did you know that money orders are not so anonymous as you might think? On the order itself are digits identifying the post office where the order was purchased, as well as the date of purchase. Also, a private company testified on their money order service, and it comes out that they keep a computerized record of every money order purchase in a central database. Eek. And read about a real-life instance of traffic analysis of phone calls based on timing correlations. This one really happened, folks (though it was by mistake). Also, read about how a company offering prepaid debit cards searched through billions of records to find all phone calls to or from a certain number, etc. Read about how they entered a disk containing information on 100,000--200,000 phone calls (!) into evidence. (Note: contents of calls are protected by law, but traffic analysis specifically is allowed, far as I can tell.) And you value your privacy? Too bad!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 02:12 AM 5/11/97 -0700, David Wagner wrote:
(Note: contents of calls are protected by law, but traffic analysis specifically is allowed, far as I can tell.)
Correct. There is no (federal) constitutionally protected privacy interest in traffic-analysis data about phone calls, because (so the argument goes) that data is voluntarily disclosed to a third party (the phone company). An argument might be available (in state court) based upon a state's constitutional right to privacy/right to be free from unreasonable searches & seizures, if there are any states left whose state constitutions are more protective than the federal constitution. California and Oregon both used to be more protective, but the wise and far-seeing voters in both states changed that via the initiative process. Can't even blame that on the legislators. :( -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.5 iQEVAgUBM3WZg/37pMWUJFlhAQFUxQf/XjlD9a53YGoFFZRukCfl9sEo+se2pioH QgocIjr+QU/cLMSR99OwUnhGMeNAgAo4teMVwVdIol+I/EA2+WJ2Q1FWlGIW7TtD FTftPbXQQ8vNxTrni0sdi7YcYy2HsXK+Ll+qqyfe4HExvHcjs/FQn8zPtkh005Se Err3uvzfE+IgWGUTOa+wC7C4w7SDYtlx4elvpEwYAPtSvYr8HtHZgY5yYIaoXb15 BTi1gMTIbL3UNcNWwwl6Bvpki6OWlzhT5wzWSmMPoBG5g67BrctSyWTp4kDVc19K UQL5G9vNqelmfBkQ1MPUDgRCs4X57jvOjIz7BcdenQopjzbsaXDA/g== =BFJ5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles@netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |
participants (2)
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daw@cs.berkeley.edu
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Greg Broiles