Re: What the NSA is patenting

At 01:26 AM 9/3/96 -0500, Bruce Schneier wrote:
I just spent a pleasant hour or so searching a patent database for all patents assigned to the NSA. There's some interesting stuff:
"Self-locking, tamper-evident package" Method of retrieving documents that concern the same topic"
Fifty-Four patents total. (Used to be they just kept stuff secret; now they patent some of it.) Attached is the most interesting thing I found: a patent on techniques for reading data off overwritten magnetic media.
Bruce
From lots of experience gained from working with metalworking machinery, it sounds like some of the old magnetic data might be leaving traces behind by a process called "backlash". It happens because machines don't realign
[ Interesting patent deleted ] This method implies that they have the ability to scan the entire platter surface at resolution level that is basically atomic. themselves precisely, unless the lead-in steps are repeated every time. A fairly simple demonstration of this can be found on most dot-matrix printers. They usually have a mode called "uni-directional" printing, where the printhead puts dots on the paper only when travelling from left-to-right. This is used to improve the quality of a graphic image. Print a simple pattern of repeating vertical bars (||||||) across the page and down several lines with this mode turned off, and you'll probably notice the lines tend to not line up perfectly. Turn uni-directional printing on, and watch the behavior of the printhead. It will "home" itself to the far left side before printing the next line of bars. The bars will then be lined up "better" than in the bi-directional print. We should be able to use this feature to our advantage to write a "backlash- enhanced" wipedisk driver. The wipedisk utilities I've seen today primarily consist of repeatedly writing a pattern such as 0x55555555, then 0xAAAAAAAA, then 0xFFFFFFFF, then 0x00000000. While this will probably eradicate most of the traces of the original data, it's all happening "unidirectionally" -- starting at the first sector of the file, write this data till all the sectors have been overwritten. Given that the original data may have been written in reverse sector order, or reverse cylinder motion order, or after a large cylinder change, the wipedisk might still leave traces remaining on the disk. Using the above example of printing vertical bars, imagine having each line print three times using the unidirectional mode, and randomly picking one line out of the entire array to print bi-directionally. It'll stand out like a sore thumb. That's what I think they're looking for with their data recovery method. What would probably make for a more secure wipe utility would be to alter the "head approach path" prior to making each of the passes described above. So, before overwriting the sectors in order from 0 to EOF full of 0x55555555s, have the head move to the 0th cylinder first. Before overwriting the sectors in order from 0 to EOF with 0xAAAAAAAAs, have the head move to the last cylinder beforehand. Repeat for the 0xFFFFFFFF and 0x00000000 sectors, except overwrite the sectors in order from EOF to 0. All this pre-writing motion could theoretically reduce the repeatability of the drive head positioning arm as well as possibly hitting different rotational sync points, using the backlash effect to its fullest extent. Of course, the biggest problem will be that of overcoming intelligent disk controllers. No self-respecting SCSI drive is going to voluntarily swing the disk head around inefficiently, and I don't know enough about how IDE works to say anything different about it. I hope some hardware hacker who knows their low-level stuff will be able to write a secure disk wiper. John -- J. Deters "Captain's log, stardate 25970-point-5. I am nailed to the hull." +-------------------------------------------------------+ | NET: jad@dsddhc.com (work) jad@pclink.com (home) | | PSTN: 1 612 375 3116 (work) 1 612 894 8507 (home) | | ICBM: 44^58'36"N by 93^16'27"W Elev. ~=290m (work) | | PGP Key ID: 768 / 15FFA875 | +-------------------------------------------------------+
participants (1)
-
John Deters