FBI seeks huge wiretapping system
In today's San Jose Mercury, online edition. Forgive me if this has already been passed around. -=- FBI seeks huge wiretapping system BY JOHN MARKOFF New York Times The FBI has proposed a national wiretapping system of unprecedented size and scope that would give law enforcement officials the capacity to monitor simultaneously as many as one out of every 100 phone lines in some high crime areas of the country. Such a surveillance ability would vastly exceed the current needs of law enforcement officials around the country, who in recent years have conducted an annual average of less than 850 court-authorized wiretaps -- or fewer than one in every 174,000 phone lines. The plan, which needs congressional approval for the money to finance it, would still require a court warrant to conduct wiretaps. Still, the proposed expansion of the government's eavesdropping abilities raises questions among telephone industry executives as to why the FBI believes it may require such broad access to the nation's phone network in the future. And privacy-rights advocates see the specter of a Big Brother surveillance capability whose very existence might encourage law enforcement officials to use wiretapping much more frequently as an investigative tool. ``A proposal that envisions some form of electronic surveillance for one of every 100 telephone lines would be frightening to many people,'' said James Dempsey, deputy director at the Center for National Security, a public policy organization in Washington. ``I think law enforcement needs to be honest with the public about what its intentions are.'' Generally, FBI officials contend that an advanced, high-capacity monitoring system will be necessary as more of modern life and business -- and crime -- takes place as voice or computer conversations over digital phone lines. On digital lines, communications are transmitted in electronic pulses represented by the 1's and 0's of computer code. Such communications are harder to monitor than with the old-fashioned analog lines in which conversations are transmitted as electronic signals corresponding to audible sound waves. An FBI spokesman declined to elaborate on the bureau's perceived need for such an expansion of its wiretapping abilities. ``The full implementation is absolutely essential for law enforcement and public safety,'' said Mike Kortan, an FBI spokesman in Washington. ``We are in ongoing discussions with the communications industry. Therefore it would be inappropriate to comment further at this point.'' The plan, which was published in the Federal Register on Oct. 16 but has not drawn much attention yet outside law enforcement and industry circles, is the first comprehensive outline by the FBI of the surveillance capabilities it will require under the controversial Digital Telephony Act that was signed by President Clinton in 1994. The law was adopted in the closing hours of the previous Congress after the administration overcame telephone industry resistance to the extensive network equipment changes that will be required to permit digital wiretapping. In order to overcome that opposition, the administration promised that the government would allocate $500 million to help upgrade industry networks. Whether the law will ever go into effect is an open question, because it requires a federal appropriation, to be paid for out of criminal fines and penalties, that Congress has not yet authorized. The budget legislation now pending on Capitol Hill has no proviso for the digital wiretapping money, although the House budget bill included a wiretapping allocation until last week. The House measure was deleted after objections from several freshman Republicans, including Rep. Bob Barr of Georgia, a former federal prosecutor, who said that he objected to the way the money for wiretapping would be raised and that he had concerns about how the FBI might use such a sweeping surveillance ability. But some lawmakers say the Clinton administration, which has vowed to veto the current federal budget bill, saw little point in pushing for inclusion of the financing for the wiretapping at this time. And others note that money for the digital wiretapping plan, presented as a tough anti-crime measure, could be difficult for lawmakers of either party to oppose outright. The FBI and the Clinton administration are expected to continue seeking funds in the future. The scope of the FBI plan has startled telephone industry executives, who said it was difficult to estimate how much it would ultimately cost to carry out the capacity increases. The officials are worried, however, that if federal funds are not forthcoming, the government may attempt to shift the financing burden to the rates that businesses and consumers pay to use the telephone network. ``The difficulty in this process is going to come down the road when they ask us to redesign our entire systems and not pay us,'' said Larry Clinton, associate vice president for governmental affairs at the U.S. Telephone Association, an Washington-based industry lobbying group. ``If they try to make rate payers pay for this we will run into serious and perhaps even constitutional problems which we hope to avoid.'' The FBI plan, as filed in the Federal Register, calls for designating each local telephone as falling under one of three categories. Category I would be made up of urban areas, where most electronic surveillance currently takes place. In these regions, telecommunications carriers would be required to make available up to 1 percent of their network capacity when sought by law-enforcement officials. In lower-crime urban and suburban areas, designated Category II, phone companies would need to make available up to five-tenths of a percent of their network lines, while the predominantly rural low-crime Category III areas would require 0.25 percent. For many of the most densely populated metropolitan areas, like New York, Los Angeles and Chicago, there are tens of millions of phone lines. The FBI document contends that in such places, the demands of digital wiretapping may make it necessary to intercept tens of thousands of phone calls at once. Some industry officials said they were at a loss to understand how the government expected to make use of such requirements. At an industry gathering last year, telephone industry executives discussing the Digital Telephony Act could not think of an example of more than seven wiretaps ever being run from a single phone company office at any one time, according to Ron Peat, director of federal legislation analysis for the Pacific Telesis Group, the San Francisco-based regional Bell company. Some technology experts said that the FBI's projected needs, which the bureau said were based on historical records and on demographic data and market forecasts, reflect a growing belief by law enforcement that electronic surveillance will rapidly increase in importance in the digital age, where most communications will take place using an array of mobile computerized devices. ``These are staggering numbers,'' said Mark Rasch, director of information security law and policy for Science Applications International Corp. in McLean, Va. ``Either they do a lot more wiretaps than they now admit, or they plan on doing a significant larger number of wiretaps in the future because of the fear of domestic terrorism.'' -- Jay Campbell edge@got.net - Operations Manager -=-=-=-=-=-=- Sense Networking, Santa Cruz Node Jay@Campbell.net got.net? PGP MIT KeyID 0xACAE1A89 "On the Information Superhighway, I'm the guy behind you in this morning's traffic jam leaning on his horn."
On this topic... We had lunch with the deputy director of the NSA yesterday. In between agreeing to put backdoors in the Internet, help round up subversives and build a DES cracker :-) the topic of telephone tapping came up. One point that was quite clear, a lot of what happens in the federal government has more to do with the agency structure than common sense. When the NSA are being asked to comment on an export license they are being asked "is this thing dangerous", not "should it be exported". But when the response comes back to commerce "its dangerous" you can hardly expect the person on the other end to put their neck out on the line and risk allowing an export license. Out another way this is a beuracracy where the objective is to avoid the negative rather than gamble for a positive. Where risks are taken they are calculated beuracratic risks. What is needed is a federal task force to reevaluate the crypto export issue. This should look at whether the effect of the embargo is positive or negative. Of course the result would be known in advance but would provide a shield to hide behind. Would be useful if some other counterproductive policies were re-examined at the same time, like the persecution of Phil Zimmerman. On ITAR he did say that the policy met the desired objective. The particular objective concerned was not stated however. Probably if they could tell us the objective we could provide a solution but then again if they told us it would probably defeat the objective in itself. On telephone tapping the statement was made that they do not allow unauthorized taps and that technology was making wildcat taps by local officials harder. Which makes sense. If the taps are performed digitally they should be easier to monitor at a management level. It is a fair point that just because technology has changed the nature of the game it should not mean that wiretaps cease to be possible. What is very odd however is the FBI request for $500 million. This is a somewhat large quantity of money to say the least. The telephone switches are programmable these days, it should be possible to provide tapping at substantially less cost. Mind you the Federal government is not known for tight cost control. The NSA reconned that a DES cracker would cost substantially more than $1 million because the system costs would be much higher than the component costs. "And it would only be able to operate on one keystream at once", also note "DES is used more for authenticity than for confidentialty by banks". One reading, the NSA can get the info they need at less cost than breaking DES because the financial feeds are using DES to provide CBC residues for MACs rather than encryption. Anyway the NSA price estimate was "two or more orders of magnitude more in cost". I dispute that since we brought in the ZEUS trigger system at arround $40 million five years ago and it is vastly more complex than a DES cracker, this constitutes a system cost of about ten times the raw component cost. there was considerably more component diversity and system copmplexity than any cypher machine would need. The raw input bandwidth of 6 Terabytes/sec would chew up DEs keyspace very quickly (ie it is equaivalent to exhausting a 40bit keyspace in a second). If the NSA want a cheap DES cracker they have my number. I'll take 5% ot the difference between the actual cost and $100 million (their estimate of cost) as my fee. Phill
hallam@w3.org writes:
It is a fair point that just because technology has changed the nature of the game it should not mean that wiretaps cease to be possible.
No it isn't. If someone builds a "cone of silence", traditional audio surveillance becomes impossible. Why should wiretaps be any different? Strong crypto is the "cone of silence" for digital transmission.
hallam@w3.org writes:
It is a fair point that just because technology has changed the nature of the game it should not mean that wiretaps cease to be possible.
I disagree that this is a "fair point". That wiretaps are possible is an accident of design. Just because that slice of the salami appears gone, I see no reason to concede that it can't be re-attached. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Nobody's going to listen to you if you just | Mike McNally (m5@tivoli.com) | | stand there and flap your arms like a fish. | Tivoli Systems, Austin TX | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mike McNally writes:
hallam@w3.org writes:
It is a fair point that just because technology has changed the nature of the game it should not mean that wiretaps cease to be possible.
I disagree that this is a "fair point". That wiretaps are possible is an accident of design. Just because that slice of the salami appears gone, I see no reason to concede that it can't be re-attached.
Indeed, I have searched both the constitution and my collected works of Nietzsche and found no reference to the inalienable right of governments to listen in on any conversations, let alone the 1% of conversations the FBI wants access to. By the way, I believe the quantity in question exceeds the quantity tapped by the East German government at its height -- certainly it does if you take into account the fact that phones were more scarce there. Thank you, Louis Freeh, for taking another step towards the police state. Perry
Indeed, I have searched both the constitution and my collected works of Nietzsche and found no reference to the inalienable right of governments to listen in on any conversations, let alone the 1% of conversations the FBI wants access to.
Nietzsche is not a recognised authority on the US consititution nor are his works on ethical systems particularly definitive. At best he points out the deficencies in the ethical systems of Kant and hints at a limitation of reasoned approaches to ethics. His ethics of Will are hardly a fully finished system of ethics. If you want a contemporary system of ethics you would find Rorty, Habbermass or Singer a far better choice. Even within the Nietzschian system of ethics it is very clear that listening in on the telephone conversations of "the botched and the bungled" would lie well within the rights of super-man. Indeed he is very explicit that there is no logical need for these people to have rights of any sort. Their lives are at the disposal of the great leader. The justification the NSA relies upon is the fact of a Federal law that makes it lawful to conduct wiretaps. I think the FBI have gone off into gaga land with the magnitude of their request. This is a good thing. They are not likely to get anything as a result. Phill
hallam@w3.org writes:
Indeed, I have searched both the constitution and my collected works of Nietzsche and found no reference to the inalienable right of governments to listen in on any conversations, let alone the 1% of conversations the FBI wants access to.
Nietzsche is not a recognised authority on the US consititution nor are his works on ethical systems particularly definitive.
I was being facetious. The point is that the government has no inherent right to tap our phones -- indeed, it didn't do so for nearly the first 200 years of our existance, and we did just fine -- better, in fact. Who among us has felt SAFER since they gained the ability? Has anyone been feeling more and more safe with time, since the more and more draconian laws granting the government more and more authority should have been "fixing" things, right?
Even within the Nietzschian system of ethics it is very clear that listening in on the telephone conversations of "the botched and the bungled" would lie well within the rights of super-man. Indeed he is very explicit that there is no logical need for these people to have rights of any sort. Their lives are at the disposal of the great leader.
Actually, thats a complete misinterpretation of Nietzsche, but thats another story. Perry
Today's (11/2) NYT carries a Markoff story on The 1% Solution at the top left of the front page. The article mentions that the DT appropriation has been cut out of the current budget bill (last week ?). It points out that since the White House officially plans to veto the current bill anyway, they're unlikely to waste too much effort on sticking things into it. Supposedly they want three zones of wiretap capability: (roughly) 1% in cities, 0.5% in suburbs, 0.25% in the country. We've discussed the grave concern that digital equipment makes everything much easier to handle. I would like to know what sort of technological assurances we could possibly obtain that the arbitrary 1%/0.5%/0.25% figures couldn't trivially be bumped up to, say, 10%/5%/2.5% with a little bit of programming. Is this a legitimate worry ? If the FBI gets its way on this, how far will we be from the day when 1% is merely a parameter in a wiretap control program ? I don't know enough about telephone switches etc. (digital or otherwise) to know whether this is just idle speculation. -Futplex <futplex@pseudonym.com>
participants (6)
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futplex@pseudonym.com -
hallam@w3.org -
Jay Campbell -
m5@dev.tivoli.com -
Perry E. Metzger -
Scott Brickner