Re: PGP 2.6 is dangerous in the long term ?
What if (the cypherpunk community) comes out with a secure program that doesn't rely on RSAREF? Can it be done?
Bizdos and gang will _still_ hold the patent on RSA-style public key encryption. What you're suggesting is, in essence, exactly what Phil Zimmerman did with PGP 1.0. -- Lefty (lefty@apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.
On Wed, 25 May 1994, Lefty wrote:
What if (the cypherpunk community) comes out with a secure program that doesn't rely on RSAREF? Can it be done?
Bizdos and gang will _still_ hold the patent on RSA-style public key encryption. What you're suggesting is, in essence, exactly what Phil Zimmerman did with PGP 1.0.
Ah, ok. I wasn't sure if the patent covered just the use of the algorithm or also the use of public-key-like systems. As I said, I am most likely completely wrong :-) ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden@krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Political Correctness is \/ Finger for PGP Public Key <=> P.C. for "Thought Police" -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)
Earlier, Robert A. Hayden wrote:
Bizdos and gang will _still_ hold the patent on RSA-style public key encryption. What you're suggesting is, in essence, exactly what Phil Zimmerman did with PGP 1.0.
Ah, ok. I wasn't sure if the patent covered just the use of the algorithm or also the use of public-key-like systems. As I said, I am most likely completely wrong :-)
Not if you're referring to some form of "PGP:ng" or otherwise similar software that can interrogate and support several possible public key algorithms. The ASN.1 encoded PKCS packets are deliberately designed with algorithmic identifiers so that "smart" software can entertain not just RSA, but say El-Gamal or DSA algorithms -- in fact, anything you car to devise. The same applies to symmetric encryption and signature packets. One could piss off RSA entirely and go with DSA, whose only disadvantage being ciphertext doubling is so trivial it doesn't warrant a mention. Matthew. -- Matthew Gream Consent Technologies Sydney, (02) 821-2043 M.Gream@uts.edu.au
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lefty＠apple.com -
mgream＠acacia.itd.uts.edu.au -
Robert A. Hayden