Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
On Tue, 21 May 1996, Daniel R. Oelke wrote:
Ben Holiday <ncognito@gate.net> wrote:
At this point there are 2 options, which I havnt examined closely: The first is that you require them to send a request for their "consent-code" which can be used to decrypt the mail. Under this arrangment you could
This could be done with no "storage" as well, by a slightly different method and still require end reciepient acknowledgement. The end reciepient could be required to reply and include the encrypted message. The remailer would then decrypt the message and send back the plaintext. Only storage would be the key vs. a message id database.
Well, if we've gone that far, why not attach an encrypted copy of the key to the peice of mail, and eliminate all storage from the r-ops machine?
The second is to simply include the consent-code along with the encrypted peice of mail and a legal notice stating that decryption of the mail constitutes your consent to receive the mail, as well as your agreement to hold the remailer-operator harmless
By reduction - you could just do a rot13 on the message and append the "legal notice". If all the information for decoding a message is present in that message, is a different encoding mechanism really any different from straight ASCII text? (i.e. Netscape 9.13 might have auto decoding built it....) Then, the user doesn't do anything "extra" - does this invalidate the notice?
Donno. IANAL. :)
I might be wrong, but I don't think that this second method would gain you anything in the 2 situations where operators will get hassled. 1) Posting of copyrighted material - the lawyers will at least harass you no matter what kind of legal notice is up front. 2) Mailing of "harassing" information - the person still gets unwanted email, and has no way to stop it.
[RANT MODE ON- skip to the next paragraph if you dont like politiks] Here we are back at step one again. In the end, it would seem that there isn't much that can be done about the worst forms of abuse, without filtering mail for content. However, someone pointed out that other package delivery services have acheived freedom from responsibilty for the content of the packages they deliver - and I beleive that a part of the explanation for this lies in the fact that they /do/ make attempts to limit abuse in-so-far as they are able. Part of limiting the remailers liability is tied up with legitimizing them as a useful service, and establishing to the public that we are concerned with abuse. Too many people beleive that the whole point of a remailer is to facilitate illegal and abusive communication, and unless that changes we can expect to be dealt with as criminals at worst, or at best as purposfully negligent. I'm not certain what the solution is, but I am certain that doing nothing isnt it... [RANT MODE OFF--] One idea that came up a while back was a sort of limited tracking of mail -- an example would be keeping a hash of the email address where mail was received from for 48 hours, with the hash value being attached to the peice of mail as a header. This would accomplish two things: We could source block an address without knowing the source; and if push came to shove an address could be backtracked to its original source, provided a complaint was made in time, and that the Bad Guy sent another mail from the same address. I think that legally there would be a good argument that the remailer ops had made a reasonable attempt and holding lawbreakers accountable, while still preserving the anonymity of non-abusers. Just a thought.. Ben.
One idea that came up a while back was a sort of limited tracking of mail -- an example would be keeping a hash of the email address where mail was received from for 48 hours, with the hash value being attached to the peice of mail as a header.
This would accomplish two things: We could source block an address without knowing the source; and if push came to shove an address could be backtracked to its original source, provided a complaint was made in time, and that the Bad Guy sent another mail from the same address. I think that legally there would be a good argument that the remailer ops had made a reasonable attempt and holding lawbreakers accountable, while still preserving the anonymity of non-abusers.
This would have two problems (I think :): 1) How do you tell that the source address isn't a remailer? If things go to the disposeable remailer heads (Aren't those bad for the environment or something? :), you might wind up blocking part of the remailer chain. 2) Depending on the strength the hash function, there's a trail that you submitted traffic into the remailer network for that 48 hours. Not that sendmail/packet sniffing wouldn't show the same thing w/o IP layer encryption . . . . Now if there was a DC net you could submit traffic/noise into that would deliver into the remailer net . . . . --- Fletch __`'/| fletch@ain.bls.com "Lisa, in this house we obey the \ o.O' ______ 404 713-0414(w) Laws of Thermodynamics!" H. Simpson =(___)= -| Ack. | 404 315-7264(h) PGP Print: 8D8736A8FC59B2E6 8E675B341E378E43 U ------
On Tue, 21 May 1996, Ben Holiday wrote:
On Tue, 21 May 1996, Daniel R. Oelke wrote:
The second is to simply include the consent-code along with the encrypted peice of mail and a legal notice stating that decryption of the mail constitutes your consent to receive the mail, as well as your agreement to hold the remailer-operator harmless
By reduction - you could just do a rot13 on the message and append the "legal notice". If all the information for decoding a message is present in that message, is a different encoding mechanism really any different from straight ASCII text? (i.e. Netscape 9.13 might have auto decoding built it....) Then, the user doesn't do anything "extra" - does this invalidate the notice?
Donno. IANAL. :)
A person has notice of a fact if he knows the fact, has reason to know it, should know it, or has been given notification of it. Restatement, Second, Agency section 9. The important issue here is what constitutes constructive or implied notice (the second example above). Constructive notice exists where a party could have discovered a fact by proper diligence and where the situation casts a duty on him to inquire into the matter. A person who has _actual_ notice of circumstances which would set of the "alarm bells" of a prudent person has constructive notice of the issue itself where a notice clause was available and easily referenced. See F.P. Baugh, Inc. v. Little Lake Lumber Co., 297 F.2d 692, 696. Also comes the question what notice is adequate? Notice reasonably calculated, in all circumstances, to apprise all interested parties of actionm and opportunity to present their objections, says U.S. v San Juan Lumber Co., 313 F.Supp. 703, 709. I'm not going to discuss what constitutes a legal agreement here for the purposes of waiving rights to hold the remailer operater harmless. These are traditionally unnegotiated agreements that courts are not likely to want to enforce. (Back of a ski lift ticket, notice that the garage is not responsible for theft). If a court feels that the remailer operator is being negligent or some such, a notice like you are talking about is not likely to be very effective. I find that making the user decrypt the message as acceptance of the mail is clever, but what exactly does it accomplish? The user can still have his copyrights violated in the text, what does it matter that he did or did not accept the mailing?
This would accomplish two things: We could source block an address without knowing the source; and if push came to shove an address could be backtracked to its original source, provided a complaint was made in time, and that the Bad Guy sent another mail from the same address. I think that legally there would be a good argument that the remailer ops had made a reasonable attempt and holding lawbreakers accountable, while still preserving the anonymity of non-abusers
Let's call this the "hash policy." I'd be interested to see what the ration of volume between mailers with a hash policy and mailers without a hash policy would be. Simply the perception that records are being kept could have a chilling effect. The user is in no position to verify how secure those records are, or that they are indeed hashed at all. While the same is true with regards to logging at all (hash or no) I think the feeling that the existance of records somehow makes it more likely the the remailer operator will (with resistance) cooperate with the authorities is amplified. Either you do or do not believe that a remailer operator is keeping full and unhashed records. If you KNOW that records are being kept, well, to the user, what's the difference between this and the mailer logging all traffic fully and putting the information in a "Secure" directory? How precisely does hashing protect the user?
Just a thought..
Ben.
--- My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information Opp. Counsel: For all your expert testimony needs: jimbell@pacifier.com
participants (3)
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Ben Holiday -
Black Unicorn -
Mike Fletcher