Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:) [Classic Answer]
At 9:09 -0500 7/25/96, Igor Chudov wrote:
Here's a puzzle for our game theorists.
Twenty cypherpunks robbed a bank. They took 20 million bucks. Here's how they plan to split the money: they stay in line, and the first guy suggests how to split the money. Then they vote on his suggestion. If 50% or more vote for his proposal, his suggestion is adopted.
Otherwise they kill the first robber and now it is the turn of guy #2 to make another splitting proposal. Same voting rules apply.
The question is, what will be the outcome? How will they split the money, how many robbers will be dead, and so on?
igor
This is a variant on the normal distribution problem/game where you have a number of homogeneous/identical items that are either too numerous to distribute by the "one for you and one for me" method or are not equivalent to each other. The "goal" is to have a method of distributing so that each person feels that they got "their fair share". The classic solution is to have #1 divide the items into 20 piles (any of which he is willing to take as his share). Then number #2 is offered the choice of accepting #1's distribution or rearranging the distribution until he is happy to accept any of them. This accept/rearrange process goes on until #19 has made his decision. Then #20 is allowed to select any one pile as his share. The "choose a pile" option then goes back up the line (to #19, #18, etc) with each taking one of the remaining piles until it gets to whoever was before the person who did the last rearrangement. This person then has the option of doing a new rearrangement or approving the current distribution. After he does a rearrangement or approves the distribution, the option keeps going up the line until it gets to #1 (who selects a pile). You then keep going down [and up] the line until there are only two piles and the last approver/rearranger gets the last pile after the choice of piles is made by the other person. This is "fair" since at all times the person who is making a pile selection has already approved the distribution (or at the end is offered his choice of the two remaining piles).
Here's another: Twenty beautiful women are to pass before you, one by one (or 20 handsome men). You see only one at a time. You cannot speak to them. After seeing any one, you must pick her or reject her. If you reject her, you cannot change your mind. If you pick her the exercise terminates. What is the optimal strategy for insuring you get the most beautiful woman possible under the circumstances? David
participants (3)
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Alan Horowitz -
David Sternlight -
Robert A. Rosenberg