Re: "Going after Netscape"
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199509231914.MAA01326@infinity.c2.org>, sameer@c2.org (sameer) wrote:
So, keep on "attacking" Netscape (kudos to Ray, by the way, though I've seen Netscape bomb on certain sites, as with the Cypherpunks archive site, as several of us noted a few months ago...probably a different problem, but indicative that Netscape can be corrupted). But let's be careful not to convey any flavor of this being a vendetta.
I agree. The goal is not to kill Netscape but to make the net secure.
Absolutely. We aren't on a vendetta. We want to make the net secure for privacy. If hacking a Netscape server will help that goal, surely Netsape's own would be the most appropriate server to try, since it will generate the largest exposure in the press and thereby the strongest motivation for Netscape to fix the hole. - -- - -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMGRoHyoZzwIn1bdtAQHJCgF9FbuTP1VBbzGJANFX48hvje4V7pzhyEaQ ItXGdXHCPbxjKbQ0bLApkt4yTtHJREMk =wEyv -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Lucky Green writes:
So, keep on "attacking" Netscape (kudos to Ray, by the way, though I've seen Netscape bomb on certain sites, as with the Cypherpunks archive site, as several of us noted a few months ago...probably a different problem, but indicative that Netscape can be corrupted). But let's be careful not to convey any flavor of this being a vendetta.
I agree. The goal is not to kill Netscape but to make the net secure.
Absolutely. We aren't on a vendetta. We want to make the net secure for privacy.
Agreed. My main purpose in harrassing Netscape is that I have to live with customers who insist on using it and I want them to be safe. If that means having to attack it enough that the the press starts noticing and management starts paying attention as a result, so be it. Perry
There's one very important side-effect of the existence of a large number of compromised certificates accepted by navigator: the upgraded clients must either do CRL processing, or the roots used to sign all possibly compromised keys *must* be rejected by the fixed navigator. Simon
participants (3)
-
Perry E. Metzger -
shamrock＠netcom.com -
Simon Spero