Theory Behind USA v. Microsoft
John Cassidy writes in the January 12 New Yorker mag of the controversial economic theory which undergirds DoJ's antitrust action against Microsoft. He cites a seminal 1984 paper by Brian Arthur, "Competing Technologies and Lock-in by Historical Small Events: The Dynamics of Choice Under Increasing Returns." After years of disparagement the theory seems to have caught on, at least at Justice and with others who oppose the theory of free market determination of winners and losers. Arthur argues that market dominance by inferior products is possible, and cites MS-DOS as an example. Arthur is now a scientist at the Santa Fe Institute. He says his theory "stands a great deal of economics on its head." One critic said to Arthur, "If you are right, capitalism can't work." For those unable to get the magazine, we offer a copy of Cassidy's essay: http://jya.com/arthur.htm (33K) A side note: the same issue has a short piece noting that the early charges of militant conspiracy behind the OKC bombing have disappeared from the trials of McVeigh and Nichols, and proposes that an apology is due militants, militia and other paranoiac targets.
At 11:12 AM -0800 1/10/98, John Young wrote:
John Cassidy writes in the January 12 New Yorker mag of the controversial economic theory which undergirds DoJ's antitrust action against Microsoft.
He cites a seminal 1984 paper by Brian Arthur, "Competing Technologies and Lock-in by Historical Small Events: The Dynamics of Choice Under Increasing Returns."
I've followed Brian Arthur's work for a decade or so, and find much in it that seems quite accurate. One of his main observations is that size _does_ matter, that larger economic agents often tend to get larger. There are various plausible reasons for this, but it does seem to match reality. (I'm avoiding jumping to conclusions that Brian Arthur is anti-capitalist or any such thing. Just discussing reality as it is.) We see this in the "Intel-Cisco-Sun-Microsoft-Oracle" universe, where each of these players has about an 80% or better market share in its respective niche. Now Brian Arthur doesn't claim that such dominant market shares will last indefinitely--the dominant companies in 1900 are mostly no longer even in existence in any recognizable form, and even the dominant companies in 1950 have mostly been completely replaced by "upstarts." But size does matter, bringing economies of scale, the ability to set and enforce standards, and the ability to withstand competitive onslaughts for longer times (than smaller, less financially solid, companies).
After years of disparagement the theory seems to have caught on, at least at Justice and with others who oppose the theory of free market determination of winners and losers. Arthur argues that market dominance by inferior products is possible, and cites MS-DOS as an example.
Sure, there are many, many "non-optimal" products. Much of society is non-optimal, even in the infrastructure. Roads don't go where they "should," the wrong kind of electrical sockets were adopted, and so on, for examples I don't need to spend time listing. A way of viewing this is of _inertia_ or _sticking friction_. Once certain standars have been set, it is just not possible to roll back history and proceed down another path. For example, it might well be that the world would have been better off using the Motorola 68000 family in places where the Intel x86 dominated (for possibly accidental, local reasons, as anyone who has read the history of IBM's adoption of the x86 knows). And ditto for adoption of a better OS than MS-DOS was (same accidental decision). But we are not in that world, and the installed base of PCs and x86 systems and MS-DOS or Windows systems is so large that it is simply impossible to "jump tracks." Now eventually things will change. Some new paradigm will come along. There is no guarantee that in 2025 the dominant players today will still be dominant. Let's not forget that two years ago many were saying Microsoft would be wiped out by the advent of "Web browsers as operating systems and office suites," with Netscape Navigator being the Swiss army knife of programs. Recall that analysts were sagely predicting that Bill Gates had "missed out" on the Internet. Now we have the spectacle of Netscape demanding that the government give it back its dominant Web position! (Maybe then the University of Illinois can get the DOJ to sue Netscape to take away Netscape's dominant position!)
Arthur is now a scientist at the Santa Fe Institute. He says his theory "stands a great deal of economics on its head." One critic said to Arthur, "If you are right, capitalism can't work."
Which is nonsense. All Brian Arthur has done is to analyze some of the "physics of markets" (my name). Schumpeter said much the same thing when he talked about the "creative destructionism" of capitalism. --Tim May The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
John Cassidy writes in the January 12 New Yorker mag of the controversial economic theory which undergirds DoJ's antitrust action against Microsoft. He cites a seminal 1984 paper by Brian Arthur, "Competing Technologies and Lock-in by Historical Small Events: The Dynamics of Choice Under Increasing Returns." ... After years of disparagement the theory seems to have caught on, at least at Justice and with others who oppose the theory of free market determination of winners and losers. Arthur argues that market dominance by inferior products is possible, and cites MS-DOS as an example.
Two other examples - - Rockefeller's takeover of the oil industry in the late 1800s - the Anti-Trust laws that were intended to stop Rockefeller :-) Apparently a large part of Rockefeller's success was recognizing the critical resource in the industry and using control of it for economic advantage. The resource was railroad oil tank cars, which were immensely more economical for shipping oil than the competing technologies - transportation costs were substantial. Rockefeller cornered the market for them, using them to ship oil cheaper than other shippers, allowing his refineries to outbid competitors for crude oil from suppliers, cornering enough of that market to have a dominant position with the railroads, which didn't have an economic motivation to buy their own tank cars, and the tank car makers didn't have an incentive to make them on spec, especially with Rockefeller twisting their arms. The total amount of actual capital was pretty small - about 5000-6000 cars at $1000 each, back when that was still real money, but it was enough to leverage the industry. There were other factors involved - his control over the tank cars let him get away with ripping off his oil suppliers and the railroads on measurements of the quantities they were shipping, much corporate shuffling to hide the real ownership of the resources and evade regulators, kickbacks to avoid common carrier railroad tariffs, and heavy use of information technology (5000 cars only needed a couple of clerks with ledgers, but there were lots of people telegraphing shipping data back to them so it was near-real-time.) If the industry had been well-understood, rather than breaking up a billion-dollar business, the anti-trust folks could have subsidized (directly or through tax breaks) competing production of tank cars. They did try to control ownership of tank cars, so Rockefeller spun off the tank car company, but retained effective control for decades. Their choices have set us up for a century of bad law.... Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, bill.stewart@pobox.com PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639
participants (3)
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Bill Stewart
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John Young
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Tim May