While I perhaps would not have phrased things in quite the same colorful manner, John Youngs commentary here is substantially correct. The intent however was to hellp the developers develop systems that would preclude the need for K-Bars. PHM John Young wrote:

Paul Merrill, the author of "NOT the Orange Book," has provided a digital version of his "Guide to the Definition, Specification, Tasking, and Documentation for the Development of Secure Computer Systems -- Including Condensations of the Members of the Rainbow Series and Related Documents:"

http://jya.com/ntob.htm (385K)

Zipped:

http://jya.com/ntob.zip (92K)

This is Paul's 1992 manual prepared while working for DoD to evaluate and purchase secure computer systems, for ADP, C4I and weapons, and to compensate for the shortcomings of the official regulations.

It's still widely used, Paul says, for the unending conflict between DoD, NSA, DIA and defense contractors about how to develop and assure computer security from lab rat pipedream to the warfighter's "wha's this piece of shit."

Section IV, Case Studies, is a wonder at describing what to do when perfect design goes to hell in the field, and a pissed warrior who's comm's been compromised got a K-Bar sawing your apple, roaring "tech support, now!"