Re: Los Angeles Times article on Helsingius and anon.penet.fi
Before going into the merits of this, let me make two points: One I specifically asked the reporter (Amy Harmon) to quote me as an individual, not as a spokesperson for the EFF. (It was Amy Harmon, and the only address I have for her bounces, but as you can imagine I would like to get in touch with her! Anyone know it?) These are my personal views; EFF has no formal policy on this yet -- precisely because it's a complex issue. Now, speaking personally: I believe there are trade-offs -- which is what I told the LA Times. I assume I was quoted accurately (although the word "enforce" is awkward), but out of context. Anonymity can be dangerous -- as can traceability, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing anonymity -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap. Anyone who seriously needs anonymity because of a repressive government is likely to use a foreign (outside whatever jurisdiction he fears) server, so that this is not a matter of "local" laws. The tracer would have to pass through what I hope would be tighter hoops than we have now. Please note that this is not the same as the right to *private* conversations and the use of encryption; this is the issue of being accountable for what you publish in public. My assumption is that there will be a wide variety of Net communities with different rules/regulations/attitudes towards anonymity that would apply ex some kind of international sanctions; I think that's appropriate. Yes, I'm aware of the complexities, and of the possibilities for miscarriages of justice. The world isn't yet the way I want it to be. But I wanted to respond reasonably promptly. BTW, I would welcome a chance to read the whole article (or at least a *little* more of the context, under fair use). Speaking for myself, only (and publicly), Esther Dyson At 06:40 AM 9/1/96 -0400, Dave Farber wrote:
Posted-Date: Sun, 1 Sep 1996 14:59:53 +1000 (EST) Date: Sun, 1 Sep 1996 14:59:53 +1000 (EST) From: Charles Senescall <apache@quux.apana.org.au> To: cypherpunks@toad.com Cc: declan@well.com Subject: Re: Los Angeles Times article on Helsingius and anon.penet.fi Sender: owner-cypherpunks@toad.com
On Sat, 31 Aug 1996, Declan McCullagh wrote:
The attached article was reposted to fight-censorship with the permission of the Los Angeles Times, which ran it on the front page today. [snip] Note Esther Dyson's comments:
"The damage that can be done by anonymity is far bigger" than in any other medium, said Esther Dyson, chairwoman of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. "In the end, you need to be able to get at somebody's identity to enforce accountability, and the question is how do you also enforce freedom of speech and freedom from prosecution for unpopular opinions."
Is this _really_ the EFF policy on anonymopus remailers??
I will check with our local version of the EFF and see what they have to say.
If the EFF is not for anonymity it needs to be publicised. Perhaps the EFF has been in bed with the political pigs too long. *OINK*
-- .////. .// Charles Senescall apache@quux.apana.org.au o:::::::::/// Fuck TEL$TRA
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Esther Dyson Always make new mistakes! EDventure Holdings <edyson@edventure.com> 1 (212) 924-8800 1 (212) 924-0240 fax 104 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10011 USA www.edventure.com High-Tech Forum in Lisbon, October 27-29, 1996 PC Forum in Tucson, Arizona, March 23-26, 1997
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In message <19960901220323595.AAA208@Esther.edventure.com>, Esther Dyson writes :
Now, speaking personally: I believe there are trade-offs -- which is what I told the LA Times. I assume I was quoted accurately (although the word "enforce" is awkward), but out of context. Anonymity can be dangerous -- as can traceability, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing anonymity -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap. Anyone who seriously needs anonymity because of a repressive government is likely to use a foreign (outside whatever jurisdiction he fears) server, so that this is not a matter of "local" laws. The tracer would have to pass through what I hope would be tighter hoops than we have now.
Just a small parenthesis at this point: traceability can be dangerous even in non-repressive regimes; there is information about oneself which, although far from illegal or "top secret", is not exactly for the whole world to know; this sort of information includes, but is not limited to, financial transactions, product preferences, habbits, hobbies etc. My feeling is that it's better to devise ways to prevent a digital crime (for lack of better term) than try to find and punish the culprit(s). Of course, this applies to SOME services (i don't expect anonymous contracts to become very popular), for which anonymity makes sense. But the infrastructure has to be there, IMNSHO. Just my $0.02 (+tax). - -Angelos PS. An interesting thing to consider is whether traceability in a service should be inherent to it or enforced by policy. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.4, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCUAwUBMiovkL0pBjh2h1kFAQEt4wP4iBUomLacEjyTkrwme+0OjQnVcd+/Lok0 2l1tnNed/CgvgF5gHRoylWPK42HmmQ6vzWqsdihrTR9YWy/eQIT1W6VHoD/b0pBD aG7pXhy39aAHaMItIS8+3THcWhkcVLVEU/xk8nTyfm325OC7G9O25/EoRu80wr/N mtezdUBRUw== =Z5U4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
On Sun, 1 Sep 1996, Esther Dyson wrote:
Now, speaking personally: I believe there are trade-offs -- which is what I told the LA Times. I assume I was quoted accurately (although the word "enforce" is awkward), but out of context. Anonymity can be dangerous -- as can traceability, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing anonymity -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap. Anyone who seriously needs anonymity because of a repressive government is likely to use a foreign (outside whatever jurisdiction he fears) server, so that this is not a matter of "local" laws. The tracer would have to pass through what I hope would be tighter hoops than we have now.
Please note that this is not the same as the right to *private* conversations and the use of encryption; this is the issue of being accountable for what you publish in public.
I've left the attributation list open because I think my view a majority one. The inclinations I had to be involved with or financially support EFF are, after reading this, entirely quashed. What is or is not your personal or EFF's official position is meaningless. It is clear that the personal beliefs of those involved in EFF are those of compromise, present day politics, and a general lack of moral fiber. The political assumptions and the degree of technical invasion that would make the above scheme possible are either hopelessly naive, or insidiously invasive. A scheme to make every net goer traceable (albut with some undefined mechanism to "safeguard" against abuse) is, even in its core requirements, frightening. Whatever respect I had for EFF collectively and the individuals working within the organization is much deminished, if it survives at all.
Yes, I'm aware of the complexities, and of the possibilities for miscarriages of justice.
Yet you address this where exactly, even now in your "apology" or "explanation" statement?
Speaking for myself, only (and publicly), Esther Dyson
Perhaps you should have spoken publically but anonymously the first time? Having not done so, I think you have damaged yourself as well as EFF.
Esther Dyson Always make new mistakes!
I find the above amusing. -- I hate lightning - finger for public key - Vote Monarchist unicorn@schloss.li
On Sun, 1 Sep 1996, Esther Dyson wrote:
Now, speaking personally: I believe there are trade-offs -- which is what I told the LA Times. I assume I was quoted accurately (although the word "enforce" is awkward), but out of context. Anonymity can be dangerous -- as can traceability, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing anonymity -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap. Anyone who seriously needs anonymity because of a repressive government is likely to use a foreign (outside whatever jurisdiction he fears) server, so that this is not a matter of "local" laws. The tracer would have to pass through what I hope would be tighter hoops than we have now.
Please note that this is not the same as the right to *private* conversations and the use of encryption; this is the issue of being accountable for what you publish in public.
I've left the attributation list open because I think my view a majority one.
The inclinations I had to be involved with or financially support EFF are, after reading this, entirely quashed.
What is or is not your personal or EFF's official position is meaningless. It is clear that the personal beliefs of those involved in EFF are those of compromise, present day politics, and a general lack of moral fiber.
The political assumptions and the degree of technical invasion that would make the above scheme possible are either hopelessly naive, or insidiously invasive.
-- I hate lightning - finger for public key - Vote Monarchist unicorn@schloss.li
I agree with you whole-heartedly. I am stunned by the EFF's position on this matter and they no longer have my support. Here are some more of Dyson's statements on this subject. [http://bin-1.gnn.com/gnn/feat/dyson/index.html] [...] The EFF began very much as a civil rights "don't tread on me" kind of organization, and in a sense one of our major jobs was helping to educate law enforcement and the government. I wouldn't say that job is done, but now we also need to educate a broader population. If our motto was civil rights in cyberspace, it's now civil rights and responsibilities, because as more people come on to the Internet, they have to understand their responsibilities as well as their rights. If people don't do that, someone is going to try to come and regulate them. We are trying to create a civil society rather than a legal society in cyberspace. [...] We are strongly in favor of privacy, although there's some kind of balance required because of the need for a free press. Anonymity is a tougher one, and we actually don't have a formal position on that. The need for anonymity I agree with, but there are issues with accountability that mean it shouldn't be absolute. Examining in detail Dyson's interests it appears she maintains a sizeable and long-standing interest in Eastern European technology companies. She is also clearly very far to the right of the political spectrum (rampant capitalist would be putting it mildly). She also speaks Russian. I'm not saying she has been working for the CIA for the past decade, but I would be very surprised if the CIA has not exerted quite significant pressure (which they are easily able to do given the location of many of Dyson's assets) in order to bring her into their folds during that time period. -- "Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_ +---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+ |Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union | |proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = | |proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 | +---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
Examining in detail Dyson's interests it appears she maintains a sizeable and long-standing interest in Eastern European technology companies. She is also clearly very far to the right of the political spectrum (rampant capitalist would be putting it mildly). She also speaks Russian.
And all these would certainly be excellent reasons to denounce her as an enemy of liberty, now wouldn't they. [CIA snip]
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
So what's wrong with her being an Evil Capitalist(tm) again? -- http://yakko.cs.wmich.edu/~frogfarm ...for the best in unapproved information "We think people like seeing somebody in a uniform on the porch." -US Postal spokeswoman, quoted in AP, 1/27/96. I don't know about you, but most people I know who saw someone in uniform on their porch would pull out the shotgun...
Is this _really_ the EFF policy on anonymopus remailers??
EFF does not have an agreed-upon position on anonymity (or anonymopusity). Each of us speaks as individuals on the topic. Several EFF board members have experienced problems around anonymity. On the Well, there was an experiment in anonymity which ended poorly. I wasn't there so it's hard to critique it in hindsight. But it certainly convinced ex-EFF-board-member Stewart Brand of the dangers of anonymity. Personally I'm in favor of anonymity. I've researched the Supreme Court cases that support it, and spoken on panels in favor of it. I frequently point out that postal mail and telephones are anonymous, and the world has not disintegrated. Part of what started the cypherpunks in the first place was the anonymous remailer game, in which some players tried to figure out who was passing notes to who, while the others tried to conduct transactions anonymously under their noses. I was arrested at an airport a few weeks ago, and kept in custody for 2-1/2 hours, for refusing to identify myself (and failing to turn on my laptop on command!). If the ACLU is interested, I'd love to make a test case out of it. I think in America we have -- and should work to keep -- the right to travel within our borders without identifying ourselves or producing any kind of government "papers". But I sure can tell you I got mad when someone "anonymously" punctured the tires of the car I was driving, for many weeks in a row. The hardest part was that I had no way to figure out WHY they were doing it -- there was no way to communicate with them. (Perhaps I should've painted a message on the tires...) If you think the problem with anonymity is restricted to physical damage, think again; there are ways to do non-physical damage. "Outing" people who have secrets is one way; confronting people with ideas that they are unprepared to deal with is another. Not to mention theft of intellectual property, fraud, and other economic damage, that anonymity makes it harder to deter or punish. Like free speech and democracy, anonymity comes with its drawbacks; it's just better than the alternatives. Personally I think each person should have the right to choose how much to identify themselves and how much to be anonymous, in each situation. Without losing their civil rights (like the right to travel, or to speak or publish). John Gilmore PS: I would counsel against the kind of false anonymity provided by the Finnish server, though. Providing information under the promise that it will "never be revealed or misused" is a lot more dangerous than never providing it at all. E.g. "Anonymous cash" that is really based on dossiers or account-numbers isn't anonymous at all. Even physical cash is getting easier to trace; the British government has been tracking money by serial numbers for years, with custom machines in the banks, to de-anonymize Irish freedom-fighters (oops, I mean terrorists). Anonymity is another area, like privacy, where changes from technology can make big social differences.
Therefore I would favor allowing anonymity -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap. [...] Please note that this is not the same as the right to *private* conversations and the use of encryption; this is the issue of being accountable for what you publish in public.
A problem here is that the *same* services and capabilities that permit anonymous speech in private permit anonymous speech in public. Compromising the latter compromises the former as well.
Anyone who seriously needs anonymity because of a repressive government is likely to use a foreign (outside whatever jurisdiction he fears) server, so that this is not a matter of "local" laws. The tracer would have to pass through what I hope would be tighter hoops than we have now.
Unless chaining of remailers is made manadatory and automatic, this is unlikely to work. CoS had little difficulty getting anon.penet.fi's logs, and getting a preliminary ruling against online anonymity from the Finnish courts. You have to have an anonymizing system that crosses a dozen or so national boundaries to make such an attack infeasible for most large organizations. You'd need a system that crossed 50 or more widely disparate jurisdictions to make it infeasible to large intelligence or law enforcement agencies, and even then you'd have to NOT have broad international agreements, such as you'd called for or it would be trivial to force all the remailers in the chain to cough up personally identifiable information.
My assumption is that there will be a wide variety of Net communities with different rules/regulations/attitudes towards anonymity that would apply ex
This is already true.
some kind of international sanctions; I think that's appropriate.
That's what bugs me - if there are some kind of sanctions coming from a governmental body (I may be misinterpreting you here), that's probably enough to kill private and well as public anonymity on the Net. Incidentally, if something does happen from a governmental direction to kill online anonymity, it will probably be readily broadenable to all other media. -- <HTML><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/~mech/"> Stanton McCandlish </A><HR><A HREF="mailto:mech@eff.org"> mech@eff.org </A><P><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/"> Electronic Frontier Foundation </A><P> Online Activist </HTML>
participants (7)
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Angelos D. Keromytis -
Black Unicorn -
Damaged Justice -
edyson＠edventure.com -
John Gilmore -
Julian Assange -
Stanton McCandlish