Re: Why triple encryption instead of split+encrypt?
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From: <solman@MIT.EDU> Date: Tuesday, July 19, 1994 8:37AM
So now the meet-in-the-middle attack regains its earlier applicability: A known-plaintext attack would encrypt P with the splitter, decrypt C0 with DES, and attempt to meet in the middle to discover key K0; similarly, decrypting with C1 to get K1.
I don't believe this is true. You have C0 and C1, but you can not figure out P0 and P1 without the hash of the concatenation of both keys. Without this you can not do a meet in in the middle attack, right?
Wrong. (sorry to sound so authoritative; just wanted to make my position clear.) If you knew how to perform the split, there would be no need for a meet-in-the-middle attack; you could just attack each of the DES encryptions of the split data separately. Recall that a meet-in-the-middle attack is a method for cryptanalyzing a message that has been doubly encrypted, as the following: I = E0_K0(P) C = E1_K1(I) By this nomenclature, I mean to imply that not only the keys but also the algorithms may be different between the first and second encryptions. Meet-in-the-middle works by encrypting from P towards I, decrypting from C towards I, and attempting to meet in the middle. For algorithms with large keyspaces, this attack requires so much memory for storing intertext as to be almost absurd in today's world, but it is a valuable theoretical technique for demonstrating that double encryption provides little more computational security than single encryption. I am claiming that your technique: P0, P1, P2, ... Pn = S_KS(P) C0 = E_K0(P0) C1 = E_K1(P1) C2 = E_K2(P2) . . . Cn = E_Kn(Pn) Can be decomposed into parallel double encryptions, and is therefore just as vulnerable to a meet-in-the-middle attack as double DES (or more so, if your splitting algorithm is less secure than DES). NB: When I use the term "double encryption" here, I am not referring to your use of DES multiple times after the split; I am referring to the splitting itself as the first encryption, and the DES as the second encryption. Let us define the function Sx_KS(P) as the portion of the splitting algorithm which produces Px: P0 = S0_KS(P) P1 = S1_KS(P) . . . We now have a parallel set of double encryptions as follows: P0 = S0_KS(P) C0 = E_K0(P0) P1 = S1_KS(P) C1 = E_K1(P1) . . . Each of these double encryptions is vulnerable to a known-plaintext meet-in-the-middle attack from P to Cx.
Don't concatenate the negation of the two key hash to the hash. The point of that step was to split the cipher into two equal sized parts, but there is no reason to require that. In fact the possibility of different sized parts would add to the confussion. (The probability of an extreme imbalance in the size of the ciphers is extremelly small.)
I think that multiplexing based on the hash of the concatenated keys is as secure as the one way hash function is, no?
In my above argument, I assumed a splitting key which is completely independent of the DES keys. This will be more secure than a splitting key which is *any* function of the DES keys, since it increases the size of the keyspace.
the security of this scheme is significantly less than that of triple DES.
Well I don't believe that this is the case,
Perhaps you do now?
but there is one way to find out :). I believe that for messages longer than a couple of K, my algorithm provides substantially more security than its DES analog and is quicker. I'll write up a version of this that splits into 4 parts and post it here some time over the next week. I think that splitting into four parts should be about as quick as double DES while providing substantially more security than triple DES (which I will time it against).
If you still maintain this position, then either you have not understood my argument above, or I seriously misunderstand your algorithm. If you have not yet been convinced that you have not eliminated the meet-in-the-middle attack as triple encryption does, then I welcome your algorithm in code, so that I may see if I am missing something fundamental in your approach. However, I strongly suggest that you review meet-in-the-middle attacks as described by Merkle and Hellman and judge for yourself their applicability to and effectiveness against your algorithm.
The question of the security of the split is difficult to resolve so I would like some help with it. Is multiplexing based on the hash of the concat of the keys as secure as the hash?
The security of the generation of the splitting key from the DES keys is almost irrelevant. You can guarantee that the splitting key is completely uninferable from the DES keys by making them independent, yet the split+encrypt algorithm is still as weak as (or weaker than) double DES. JD -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLiwC4EGHwsdH+oN9AQFfIQP+MoNBMzrrZiTJYdF2eIuwLiprxTLeqBpR pxNfOrQ190Ugw+BGcjgbb7r1HZkpPtvNaXEtS/n0jBDasMalnwnPbNDM1rpl0ZkY qWsGcLXhb5MQr/sCN9E5Bud8QCRD1eF+OL3jLUxIq3fKVuECA1zk+4osE2bTw2Fv shX6vT8xZjg= =COAe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
I am claiming that your technique:
P0, P1, P2, ... Pn = S_KS(P)
C0 = E_K0(P0) C1 = E_K1(P1) C2 = E_K2(P2) . . . Cn = E_Kn(Pn)
Can be decomposed into parallel double encryptions, and is therefore just as vulnerable to a meet-in-the-middle attack as double DES (or more so, if your splitting algorithm is less secure than DES).
We thus far agree. Vulnerability is dependent on splitting it into parallel problems.
NB: When I use the term "double encryption" here, I am not referring to your use of DES multiple times after the split; I am referring to the splitting itself as the first encryption, and the DES as the second encryption.
AH! I hadn't been looking at it that way. I wish I had thought of it like that. You are then quite correct that meet-in-the-middle attacks can be done, but the key to the first encryption (the hashing multiplex) is 112 bits (for the split into two parts version) which would require 2^112 stored messages, substantially more than could possibly be stored by anybody ever (well, I guess ever is a bad word to use in this context).
Let us define the function Sx_KS(P) as the portion of the splitting algorithm which produces Px:
P0 = S0_KS(P) P1 = S1_KS(P) . . .
We now have a parallel set of double encryptions as follows:
P0 = S0_KS(P) C0 = E_K0(P0)
P1 = S1_KS(P) C1 = E_K1(P1)
. . .
Each of these double encryptions is vulnerable to a known-plaintext meet-in-the-middle attack from P to Cx.
When I am multiplexing based just on the hash of the keys and not hash followed by negated hash, the cryptanalyst does not know how to derive Ci (i=1...n) from C. This is even more true if I interleave the cipher texts instead of sending them one after the other (which makes more sense if I am doing them in parallel anyway). Of course this only increases security by a few powers of two (about n-2 where the length of the hash is 2^n and we constrain the keys slightly to avoid lopsided splits) if the opponent has the memory available to do a meet in the middle attack for n=2. For n=4 this increased security becomes substantial however. (Combinations of numbers that add up to the size of the hash as constrained by the binomial distribution and splits that the program determines to be acceptable.) It is still far less security than is provided by the rest of the algorithm, however. So I suppose I should consider this to negligible (even if it is around 2^10) and concede the point.
I think that multiplexing based on the hash of the concatenated keys is as secure as the one way hash function is, no?
In my above argument, I assumed a splitting key which is completely independent of the DES keys. This will be more secure than a splitting key which is *any* function of the DES keys, since it increases the size of the keyspace.
Certainly, but I figure that if using the hash of the keys stands up, then the stronger totally seperate version certainly will.
the security of this scheme is significantly less than that of triple DES.
Well I don't believe that this is the case,
Perhaps you do now?
Your point is unquestionably valid, but I still believe that the security of the scheme, even when just splitting into two parts and using the hash of the keys to multiplex the split, is much worse (by more than a couple of factors of two) than DES. I suppose I have merely created a new hash based symetric cipher. I will have to look up the other hash based symetric ciphers and see how they compare.
but there is one way to find out :). I believe that for messages longer than a couple of K, my algorithm provides substantially more security than its DES analog and is quicker. I'll write up a version of this that splits into 4 parts and post it here some time over the next week. I think that splitting into four parts should be about as quick as double DES while providing substantially more security than triple DES (which I will time it against).
If you still maintain this position, then either you have not understood my argument above, or I seriously misunderstand your algorithm. If you have not yet been convinced that you have not eliminated the meet-in-the-middle attack as triple encryption does, then I welcome your algorithm in code, so that I may see if I am missing something fundamental in your approach.
I don't think that meet in the middle attacks are relevant because nobody has 2^112 memory. Its just alot. Schneier claims that at 128 bits there probably isn't enough matter in the universe to meet an algorithm using IDEA in the middle. I would say that 112 bits is nearly as solid a line of defense.
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