Friday 8/28/98 10:07 AM J Orlin Grabbe You may have gotten it TOO RIGHT http://www.aci.net/kalliste/apocalyp.htm Morales and I met. We got a response from a deputy clerk to our attached letter. No form for 54(b) certification and no examples. We have a plan of what to include in our response to http://www.jya.com/chrysler98.htm AND 54(b) certification. We see that we can respond by e-mail. e-mail: vhardy@detroit.bozell.com But we'll use certified snail mail too. Reporter Spohn of the ABQ Trib 1990 Lawrence Spohn, Albuquerque Tribune http://www.aaas.org/AAAS/awards.html http://www.atiin.com/atiin/tribune.htm http://www.abqtrib.com told me he is going to make FOIA requests for the invoices NSA spent or wasted funding public key cryptography chips TOO. Morales and I also discussed our up-coming NSA fee waiver lawsuit. NSA deputy director Barbara McNamara's wrote me a letter dated 19 August 1998. http://www.nsa.gov:8080/mission.html McNamara wrote, The key issue I considered in my review is whether disclosure of the information is likely to contribute to the public understanding of the operations or activities of the government. ... This response may be construed as a denial of your appeal. Accordingly, you are hereby advised to your right to seek judicial review of my decision pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (B) in the United States District Court in the district in which you reside, in which you have your principal place of business, in which the Agency's records are situated (U.S. District Court of Maryland), or in the District of Columbia. We've learned a lot with our current NSA lawsuit. So the NEXT lawsuit should be more devastating for the government. But let's hope we get this UNFORTUNATE matter settled so that we can move on to other projects. I miss the economic articles you post from throughout the world. http://www.aci.net/kalliste/ What’s happening is not your fault. You are merely a message-deliverer. Later bill Tuesday 8/18/98 7:33 AM Certified Return receipt requested Robert M. March, Clerk United States District Court Office of the Clerk POB 2384 US Courthouse Santa Fe, NM 87504-2384 Dear clerk March: Purposes of this letter are to 1 request a copy of a UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO Rule 54(b) certification form if such form exists 2 request an example of a Rule 54(b) certification if such certification is submitted in non-standard form 3 ask for you to provide us with DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO case citations for others required by the Tenth circuit to seek Rule 54(b) certification. We could not find form referenced in 1 in LOCAL CIVIL RULES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO or at http://www.nmcourt.fed.us/dcdocs/ specifically http://www.nmcourt.fed.us/dcdocs/files/lcvrules.txt We ask that you respond to this letter by September 1, 1998. Nonresponse must be interpreted as 4 there is no Rule 54(b)form 5 there is no example of a Rule 54(b) non-standard form certification 6 there are no examples of Rule 54(b) certifications in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO. Sincerely William H. Payne Arthur R. Morales 13015 Calle de Sandias NE 1024 Los Arboles NW Albuquerque, NM 87111 Albuquerque, NM 87107 Friday February 27, 1998 11:18 AM By e-mail and US mail Lieutenant General Kenneth A Minihan, USAF Director, National Security Agency National Security Agency 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 Dear General Minihan: Purposes of the letter are to 1 request information under the Freedom of Information Act 2 explore settlement possibilities of our current lawsuit. In about 1986 Sandia National Laboratories assigned me the task of design and construction of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty seismic data authenticator. In the initial stages of the project, Sandia cryptographer Gustavus Simmons attempted to convince both Sandia management and NSA employees Tom White, Mark Unkenholtz, and Ed Georgio that a form of public key authentication should replace NSA employee Ronald Benincasa's National Seismic Station/Unmaned Seismic Observatory 11-bit data authentication algorithm. My Sandia supervisor John Holovka and project leader H B [Jim] Durham ordered me to write a paper explaining public key cryptography. This paper, RSA ENCRYPTION, along with my SAND report describing my implementation of Benincasa's algorithm and filings in our lawsuit, now appear on Internet at http://www.jya.com/index.htm, click CRYPTOME, then OpEd, then http://www.jya.com/whprsa.htm. Sandia explored the merits of switching from Benincasa's algorithm to a public key-based authentication method suggested by Simmons. For Sandia's evaluation of the merits of public key, electronic tagging, and Bureau of Engraving and Printing projects , I bought for Sandia samples both the Cylink CY1024 and AT&T A & B two chip sets for modulo m arithmetic computations. NSA employee Tom White sent me a copy of the SECRET classified NSA report on IBM's hardware public key chip FIREFLY. I wrote in my tutorial paper RSA hardware computations The slow speed of software RSA computations plus the potential wide use prompted several companies to build chips which compute modular arithmetic to at least several hundred bits. Most of these chips "cascade" to compute with a larger number of bits. Corporations involved in building these chips are 1 IBM Firefly 2 AT&T 3 Motorola (apparently a three chip set) 4 Cylink Pittway-First alert 5 Sandia Labs (Algorithm M and predecessor chip) Details of the IBM chip is classified. AT&T as of July 1987 has not released details of their chip. Little information is available on the Motorola chip set. The Cylink chip is commercially available. Its price dropped from $1,500 to $600 each in June 1987. Data is transferred to and from the chip with serial shift register communication. The early Sandia chip was limited in speed. The replacement chip is cascadeable, communicates with 8 or 16 bits parallel, matches the speed of the Cylink chip, but is not out of fabrication. Rumors circulate that there is about an order of magnitude performance difference between some of these chips. These hardware chips improve exponentiation speed about 3 orders of magnitude over software implementation benchmarked on an Intel 8086 family microcomputer. Whitfield Diffie writes about both the Cylink and Sandia chips. And is quoted at http://www.aci.net/kalliste/nukearse.htm. Sandia had terrible luck with its public key chips. I reported SOME of the troubles to Electronic Engineering Times editor Loring Wirbel [http://techweb.cmp.com/eet/823/] on March 23, 1994. Dr. John Wisniewski was a supervisor at Sandia's Center for Radiation-hardened Microelectronics. Wisniewski was a graduate student at Washington State University in about 1975. I was a professor at WSU. Wisniewski knows all about the failing Sandia chips in the nuclear arsenal. I took notes on February 13, 1993. Wisniewski reviewed the problems again for me. 1 No quality initiative. Each chip lot had a different process. 2 Overall yield - 40-50%. Down to 10% after packaging. 3 Metalization problems. No planarization. No flow of glass. Couldn't use high temperature. Step coverage problems. Layed down over tension. 100% field returns over several years. 4 Sandia would store lots of parts for replacements. Sandia management made the decision to place low yield parts in the nuclear arsenal. Sandia must meet DOD schedules management reasoned. Hundreds of millions spent on CRM. Sandia must show productivity. Wisniewski told me that low yield chip test survivors are those which the tests failed to detect failures. Wisniewski will talk. 503-625- 6408. Wisniewski now works for Intel in Oregon. Have Wisniewski tell you about the fire in the CRM clean room! Sandia supervisor Jerry Allen later told me it cost $300,000 each to remove Sandia's failing chips at Pantex from a nuclear bomb. NSA apparently is biased toward hardware implementations of cryptographic and authentication algorithms. As opposed to software implementation. NSA representatives and Sandia management decided not to use a public key authentication scheme for its CTBT seismic data authenticator because of all of the problems with implementing public key algorithms. But NSA surely has spent MUCH MONEY on public key chip implementations. NSA is promoting its Clipper crypto chips as described at http://cpsr.org/dox/clipper.html. And we get some information about technical specifications of NSA's Clipper chip at http://www.us.net/softwar/http://www.us.net/softwar/clip.html Clipper Chip Information MYK-78 CLIPPER CHIP ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION ON A CHIP 1 micron double level metal CMOS technology 0.35 watts power 28 pin plastic leaded chip carrier (PLCC) package Transistor to transistor logic (TTL) interface Chip ID, family key and device unique key are installed at programming. Chip ID, family key and device unique key are installed at programming facility and are completely transparent to the user. Therefore, Under the provision of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC 552, I am requesting access to: 1 Copies of all invoices from A AT&T B Motorola C IBM D Sandia National Laboratories to NSA for payments for developing ANY public key-related chips between January 1, 1980 and February 27, 1998. 2 Copies of all invoices to NSA from ANY corporation involved in development of ANY Clipper chip-related hardware between January 1, 1980 and February 27, 1998. The public has a right to know how much NSA spent on TRYING monoploize the crypto business. If there are any fees for searching for, or copying, the records I have requested, please inform me before you fill the request. As you know, the Act permits you to reduce or waive the fees when the release of the information is considered as "primarily benefiting the public." I believe that this requests fits that category and I therefore ask that you waive any fees. If all or any part of this request is denied, please cite the specific exemption(s) which you think justifies your refusal to release the information and inform me of your agency's administrative appeal procedures available to me under the law. I would appreciate your handling this request as quickly as possible, and I look forward to hearing from you within 20 working days, as the law stipulates. With respect to our current FOIA lawsuit, I feel that we should settle this unfortunate matter. I see from your biography at http://www.nsa.gov:8080/ and http://www.nsa.gov:8080/dirnsa/dirnsa.html that you are 1979 Distinguished Graduate Master of Arts degree in National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California One of my former M.S. and Ph.D students in Computer Science, Ted Lewis, is currently the chairman of Computer Science at Naval Postgraduate School [http://www.friction-free-economy.com/]. Small world. But I think that this emphasizes that WE SHOULD all be on the same side. Not engaged in a conflict in US federal court. Or on Internet. NSA attempts to withhold requested information are possibly unwise. In our wired world the aggrieved know what happened to them. http://www.wpiran.org/,http://www.netlink.co.uk/users/impact/namir/namirm.ht... And moderates in Iran, http://persia.org/khatami/biography.html, appear want settlement too. My family and I have been damaged by these crypto wars. I ask you that consider fair settlement of damages caused by the National Security Agency. I cannot find your e-mail address on Internet. Therefore I will forward the e-mail copy of this FOIA/settlement letter to Ray Kammer of NIST [http://www.nist.gov/], who along with the FBI [http://www.fbi.gov/, http://www.fbi.gov/fo/nyfo/nytwa.htmand], and NSA are trying to control the crypto business so that Kammer can possibly forward an e-mail copy of the FOIA/Settlement letter to you. Sincerely, bill William Payne 13015 Calle de Sandias Albuquerque, NM 87111 505-292-7037 [I am not reading e-mail] http://www.cylink.com/ http://www.jya.com/tis-p-bckrs.htm Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 13:53:33 -0500 From: nospam@synernet.com (Ed Stone) Subject: Re: Another Network Associates U-Turn on Key Recovery To: jy@jya.com PGP Inc's new owner, Network Associates, has announced it is acquiring Trusted Informations Systems, Inc. On the TIS web site, the following project is detailed, in which Dr. Dorothy Denning was a subcontractor, and in which policy-based crypto key release systems were explored, in collaboration with the NSA, FBI, etc.: Source: http://www.tis.com/research/crypto/crypt_krp_projsum.html Policy-Based Cryptographic Key Release Systems Cryptographic Key Release Language Design and Specification View the quad chart graphic for the Policy-Based Cryptographic Key Release System Project Summary ARPA Order Number: 8685 Contractor: Trusted Information Systems, Inc. 3060 Washington Road Glenwood, Maryland 21738 Phone: (301) 854-6889 FAX: (301) 854-5363 Subcontractors: Dr. Dorothy Denning Dr. Burton Kaliski Dr. Warwick Ford Russel Housley http://www.nsa.gov:8080/ http://www.nsa.gov:8080/dirnsa/dirnsa.html 1979 Distinguished Graduate Master of Arts degree in National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California http://www.friction-free-economy.com/ http://www.nist.gov/ CPSR Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility http://cpsr.org/dox/home.html Clipper Clipper Chip Information http://cpsr.org/dox/clipper.html MYK-78 CLIPPER CHIP ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION ON A CHIP http://www.us.net/softwar/http://www.us.net/softwar/clip.html 1 micron double level metal CMOS technology 0.35 watts power 28 pin plastic leaded chip carrier (PLCC) package Transistor to transistor logic (TTL) interface Chip ID, family key and device unique key are installed at programming. Chip ID, family key and device unique key are installed at programming facility and are completely transparent to the user. Dear General Minihan: Sincerely, William H. Payne 13015 Calle de Sandias NE Albuquerque, NM 87111 Books 1.Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency. 2.Hafner, Katie and John Markoff. Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer Frontier 3.Lapidus, Edith. Eavesdropping on Trial.. 4.Schneier, Bruce. Applied Cryptography 5.Sterling, Bruce. The Hacker Crackdown. General Periodicals 6.Slatalla, Michelle and Joshua Quittner. "Gangwars in Cyberspace. " Wired. 7.Baker, Stewart A. "Don't Worry, Be Happy." Wired. 8.Denning, Dorothy. "The Clipper Chip Will Block Crime." Newsday. 9.Dewitt, Philip Elmer. "Who Should Keep the Keys?" Time. 10.Lewis, Peter. "Now Congress gets to weigh in on Clinton's high-tech plan for wiretapping." New York Times. 11.Markoff, John. "Big Brother and the Computer Age." New York Times. 12.Markoff, John. "Flaw Discovered in Federal Plan for Wiretapping." New York Times. 13.Markoff, John. "Industry Defies U.S. on Data Encryption."New York Times. Specialized Journals 14.--. "Cylink Offers Triple-DES ICs for Civil Service Encryption." Electronic News. 15.Banisar, David and Ken Robinson. "Security and Privacy on the Information Highway." Educom Review. 16.Blackmon, Ric. "Data-Tapping Made Easy" Phrack. 17.Peterson, A. Padgett. "Clipper chip won't clip your wings, it will just protect the unprotected." Infoworld. 18.*Steal, Agent. "Tapping Telephone Lines Voice or Data for Phun, Money, and Passwords." Phrack. * Pseudonym Government Documents 19.Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Wiretap Report. 20.Department of Justice. "Attorney General Makes Key Escrow Encryption Announcements." 21.House Subcommitte on Technology, Environment and Aviation. "Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy, and Security." 22.House Subcommitte on Telecommunications and Commerce. "Telecommunications Network Security." 23.Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 24.U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1993". 25.White House Press Secretary. "Clipper Press Release." Institutional Sources 26.Association for Computing Machinery, U.S. Public Policy Committee. "Computer Policy Committee Calls for Complete Withdrawl of Clipper." 27.Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association. "CBEMA Recommendations on Encryption Policy." 28.Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. "Clipper Fact Sheet." 29.Hanson, Robin. "Can Wiretaps Remain Cost-Effective?"Communications of the ACM 30.Hoffman, Lance, et al. "Cryptography Policy." Communications of the ACM. 31.Hoffman, Lance. "Clipping Clipper." Communications of the ACM. 32.Landau, Susan, et al. "Crypto Policy Perspecitves." Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery. 33.Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. "Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Is There Cause for Concern?" Interviews 34.Lo, Virginia. Personal interview. 35.Schuman, David. Personal interview. 36.McClandish, Stanton. E-mail interview. Exclusive Internet Soucres 37.Rivest, Ron. "Re: Newsday Editorial." 38.Meeks, Brock. "Jacking in from the 'Sooner or Later' Port." CyberWire Dispatch 39.Gore, Al. "Letter to Representative Cantwell" Other 40.Delaney, Donald, et al. "Wiretap Laws and Procedures: What Happens When the U.S. Government Taps a Line." Purposes of this http://www.ihrwg.org/CP/ai82.htm During 1981 Amnesty' International received hundreds of allegations of torture of political prisoners, in particular in Evin Prison in Tehran. Some were supported by photographs and medical reports. The methods of torture described in these reports included beating, kicking, whipping with cables, banging heads against walls, burning with cigarettes, burning with an iron and mock executions. One report described a special room at Evin Prison called autog-e autoo (ironing room) in which prisoners were tied to a bed and their backs, buttocks and the soles of their feet were burned with an iron. In another place in Evin Prison called zire zamin-e haqiqat (basement of truth) it was alleged that prisoners were burned with cigarettes during interrogation.