PGP-out-only vs. hashcash aware remailers?
At 05:40 PM 12/30/1997 -0400, Privacy Admin <woz@privacynb.ml.org> wrote:
Since I've switched to type-I pgponly remailer I haven't had a problem with spammers. I've been wondering if hashcash makes sense for remailers, or [only] for mail2news gateways.
I guess I am looking for any means of controlling spammers using remailers and mail2news gateways.
Hashcash won't help mail2news, except by discouraging dumb spammers, because news spam only needs a few messages. PGP-only input will cut down on most spammers, though you'll still get a few, especially if they're spamming mailing lists (which makes the encryption both worth the effort and useful for safety.) If you modify your remailer to only _output_ PGP-encrypted messages, you get hashcash-equivalence, and cut abuse substantially. The cost is limiting recipients to pgp users (plus known exceptions), but it's tough to spam people when you need to look up their PGP key and encrypt to it (at least you'll only get spams for high-tech stuff), and it's tougher for random abusers to abuse people since most targets don't have PGP keys, and a mailbox full of PGP junk is less annoying to most people than a mailbox full of human-readable hate mail. In particular, it's harder to send death threats to politicians if they don't have published PGP keys. Is this a feature that makes sense? PGP-out-only remailers aren't as useful for anonymous tip lines (unless the tip line has a PGP address.) They're not as useful for inviting new people into your conspiracy, though they're fine for conspiring with people whose keys you already know (and they can be unlisted keys only used for the conspiracy.) If the Bank of Caribbean Cash Importers is interested in taking anonymous clients who contact them through remailers, they've probably got a PGP key handy to send to anyway. They're not transparently useful for mail2news, but the remailer could make exceptions for known mail2news sites, or could ignore the problem, which is fine for posting to alt.anonymous.messages, though not for posting to alt.whistleblowers. How would you implement it? Obviously you'd need to allow some unencrypted lines at the beginning, at least if they have remailer syntax( ::, ##, mail headers, etc.). Do you cut all lines after the "-----END PGP"? My first impression was yes, but after reading the Freedom Remailer source, it looks like this might kill messages using encrypted reply blocks, so maybe not. Detecting the PGP itself can be crude ("----- BEGIN PGP ENCRYPTED"...) or can be a bit fancier (make sure the lines are all the right length and limited to the correct character set), or much fancier (de-armor and look for PGP blocks). Even the fancy approaches can be spoofed, since you can't go very deep into the headers without the right keys, so a couple lines of real PGP material could be included, leaving possibilities like :: Request-Remailing-To: Your Mama ## Subject: My Guitar Wants to Kill Your Mama -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Comment: PGP allows arbitrary comments, so Decrypt This! hQCMAynIuJ1VakpnAQP+MWng0I6TnDf/U83KCttjYZQSnPQjS59rw+M+iSmTGLIs btqW5hn1HXheSb8GNifAWz2rqgdH3GqjZ5rRBDF5tZfQfV5kNNYE1XpT/CMgAsDh 3IkaeOumDKXON+8acl5X7NToSjml+mkxkF7kE9u5oxCEXErDjS3k2wOtv0krNfSk HeyChelseaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaBWAHAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHA MyGuitarWantsToKillYourMamaBWAHAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHA MyGuitarWantsToKillYourMamaBWAHAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHA MyGuitarWantsToKillYourMamaBWAHAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHA -----END PGP MESSAGE----- and your little dog, too! But at least it's a start. Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, bill.stewart@pobox.com PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639
On Sun, 4 Jan 1998, Bill Stewart wrote:
If you modify your remailer to only _output_ PGP-encrypted messages, you get hashcash-equivalence, and cut abuse substantially. The cost is limiting recipients to pgp users (plus known exceptions), but it's tough to spam people when you need to look up their PGP key and encrypt to it (at least you'll only get spams for high-tech stuff), and it's tougher for random abusers to abuse people since most targets don't have PGP keys, and a mailbox full of PGP junk is less annoying to most people than a mailbox full of human-readable hate mail. In particular, it's harder to send death threats to politicians if they don't have published PGP keys.
Is this a feature that makes sense?
It makes some sense. It's similar to what I proposed a few weeks ago with "casual" remailers. The smart middleman portion of coerce does something similar: If it looks like a PGP message (has the "BEGIN PGP MESSAGE" line), it doesn't chain through a random remailer but delivers directly. I'm not sure if anyone is actually using this, though (perhaps tea/mccain). What you seem to be proposing is sending non-encrypted messages to /dev/null. That may yet be an option if things get bad, but I don't think they are that bad yet. It does seem to achieve, in part, the goals of hashcash (although it generally takes longer to generate hashcash, depending on the collision length required).
How would you implement it?
You are correct that there are easy ways to spoof PGP messages well enough to fool a simple parser. One way around this would be to pipe any apparent PGP messages (start and end easily detected) through PGP to de-armor only. A couple problems: PGP (2.6.x) doesn't seem to have an option to only de-armor; a sophisticated spoofer could make the armor verify correctly anyway by generating the correct CRC (trivial if you know what you're doing). So it seems sensible to only consider some simple safeguards and not worry about actually decoding the armor. Andy Dustman / Computational Center for Molecular Structure and Design For a great anti-spam procmail recipe, send me mail with subject "spam". Append "+spamsucks" to my username to ensure delivery. KeyID=0xC72F3F1D Encryption is too important to leave to the government. -- Bruce Schneier http://www.athens.net/~dustman mailto:andy@neptune.chem.uga.edu <}+++<
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In <Pine.LNX.3.94.980105104829.6085O-100000@neptune.chem.uga.edu>, on 01/05/98 at 11:14 AM, Andy Dustman <andy@neptune.chem.uga.edu> said:
A couple problems: PGP (2.6.x) doesn't seem to have an option to only de-armor
PGP -da [filename] - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://users.invweb.net/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://users.invweb.net/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html - --------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a-sha1 Charset: cp850 Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 iQCVAwUBNLJZ9o9Co1n+aLhhAQHtGAP+LCyT+AGEcQoatO6vGAzj1qAInO9eSb9a Lhil7PdLxJFJO7FrkkpEkUSq+thIpKU5H+Kfo/qwq+fkeIKlgh8EAlog4bLTaTg8 yW2ZAOn1qVY5xZHppvIn946WE0/IxFCXee5EfzrnhchvpzVn4JXtYkWNf0wqP8it vPOsqKr3XQ4= =Vx+s -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Tue, 6 Jan 1998, William H. Geiger III wrote:
In <Pine.LNX.3.94.980105104829.6085O-100000@neptune.chem.uga.edu>, on 01/05/98 at 11:14 AM, Andy Dustman <andy@neptune.chem.uga.edu> said:
A couple problems: PGP (2.6.x) doesn't seem to have an option to only de-armor
PGP -da [filename]
Well that would help a lot, then. Find the begin and end headers for the PGP message, pipe it into pgp -da, throw away the output, check the exit code, which should be set if the armor was invalid (or perhaps look at stderr). Like I said, though, you could still make the armor valid by correctly calculating the CRC, or even make PGP generate the armor with the insult/flames/whatever in the output (just a matter of shifting some bits around before armoring, could be done in perl). But this is certainly not worth worrying about. Andy Dustman / Computational Center for Molecular Structure and Design For a great anti-spam procmail recipe, send me mail with subject "spam". Append "+spamsucks" to my username to ensure delivery. KeyID=0xC72F3F1D Encryption is too important to leave to the government. -- Bruce Schneier http://www.athens.net/~dustman mailto:andy@neptune.chem.uga.edu <}+++< -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: noconv iQEPAwUBNLJsUBOPBZTHLz8dAQFd8wfQhU4uMzLL8zHUXtHSeBLdHYPe66h6ZNw7 aMHntK3fz+6ZkpiTLb/iqGZKNm6pSueXz3CxbIytbTS+IwFpgRpZX/w2gz1Jw2hh tRiB9pCIXSlnV5E9K5fsREZRGlRyj82J6n2yjrTOQWLlW+piAopbBz20ShyELBaA HbygYVmbtqH0Q5aHXO6xVfz6odP0UQB3RblpVZr/Zl99tbbL9mZ5g8CMgcOf57Jq kORo+q4FTo8DhC7KfOs4oqIcsj+yKsX7qwANMd9RTl+6YXsqcV6A/jf2g3v1Q3wQ 1Oggz1gWNXn3+d2RSuIrCFEoUpLHIfMk4pMv8tH/Ikuaag== =869+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (3)
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Andy Dustman
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Bill Stewart
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William H. Geiger III