Re: Brute-forcing DES

At 3:06 AM 7/23/96, Steve Reid wrote:
Any one up for a distributed brute force attack on single DES? My back-of-the-envelope calculations and guesstimates put this on the hairy edge of doability (the critical factor is how many machines can be recruited - a non-trivial cash prize would help).
Count me in. I've got a couple of net-connected Pentiums that are mostly idle.
Did you consider the possibility of DES chips in your back-of-the-envelope calculations? They are hundreds of times faster than PCs. I don't know where to get them or how much they cost, though. I would expect they wouldn't be too expensive. The cash might be better spent on DES chips than on a prize.
Specialized DES-cracker chips have of course been considered. Diffie and Hellman's nearly 20-year-old paper on cracking DES considered this. Wiener's calculation of a few years ago did more that this: he also architected a basic system. And the "how many bits is enough?" (sorry I don't have the official name on the tip of my tongue) panel considered such designs last year. But actually building a DES cracker entails a level of commitment very difficult to achieve in an informal, volunteer effort. Not exactly something that 10 or 20 people can work on usefully. The advantage of the cracks done last year, the French and Australian cracks, and the MIT cracks, were that the "entry costs" for joining the project were low. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

"Peter Trei" <trei@process.com> writes:
Sadly, after further calculation, I'm not so sure if it's doable just yet.
...
The fastest general purpose, freely available des implementation I'm aware of is libdes. by Eric Young. With this, I can do a set_key in 15.8 us, and an ecb_encrypt in 95 us/block. That adds up to about 9,000 keytests/sec (this is on a 90 MHz P5, running NT).
What you really want to do to sweep the DES keyspace is to "schedule" the input and output block you are testing, performing any static operations, and do only enough computation to see that a given key fails. Special purpose assembler to do this particular function would probably run faster than any algorithm which could also be employed to encrypt data.
What will make this brute doable, if not now, then in the near future?
1. Faster Processors
2. More processors.
3. More interest
4. Better code. This is actually a problem I plan to analyze someday. Looking at single DES as a function of the key bits with the input and output fixed. This can be viewed as a boolean function, whose result depends upon whether the given key works to map the input onto the output. Viewing this function as a composition of single bit operations and optimizing it would perhaps lead to insights on how best to compute it on a typical 32 bit CPU with the usual collection of operations. A messy little project, but probably one worth doing if I get some free time. Single DES is certainly ripe for a spectacular public failure. A little analytic work could bring breaking it within range of available computing power. If you are going to use regular encryption code to brute force the keyspace, then it probably is just a tad beyond reach at this point. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd@netcom.com $ via Finger. $

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Mon, 22 Jul 1996, Mike Duvos wrote:
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 1996 23:33:58 -0700 (PDT) From: Mike Duvos <mpd@netcom.com> To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Brute-forcing DES
"Peter Trei" <trei@process.com> writes:
Sadly, after further calculation, I'm not so sure if it's doable just yet.
....
The fastest general purpose, freely available des implementation I'm aware of is libdes. by Eric Young. With this, I can do a set_key in 15.8 us, and an ecb_encrypt in 95 us/block. That adds up to about 9,000 keytests/sec (this is on a 90 MHz P5, running NT).
What you really want to do to sweep the DES keyspace is to "schedule" the input and output block you are testing, performing any static operations, and do only enough computation to see that a given key fails. Special purpose assembler to do this particular function would probably run faster than any algorithm which could also be employed to encrypt data.
What will make this brute doable, if not now, then in the near future?
1. Faster Processors
2. More processors.
3. More interest
4. Better code.
We also need to address the question of the code itself. Just crypting it won't work. We need a good way to test _to see if we have an answer_, for a non-known plaintext attack. --Deviant Whatever occurs from love is always beyond good and evil. -- Friedrich Nietzsche -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMfW4+DAJap8fyDMVAQECmAf+Le7kpXqvGDOSMhRdUG6qluP/RkBE9oeR 1O0pmeHPHtMU1qAgL1c9YJ3fHAdb+naLIhff1x8K2Nt4LsVYiNHY1va3ogg3P6mx G/1N+4iOtsL49XXhO+YnJfHxd8fYAdQKftWwcQc9DOpUbvHoD/yWIS94YHHnH6Zn Uly5cQqKtpNh20uq5gCC6GcJWj+Dm6BjaKrYuUgSwBNrnYBSQ6nui7W26zawA4vh GHtxKWIJQ9onBYWM025YuYhzTpRy852aLZifw1xPtAXXe1TypjcRojXcTtBL0iK0 oWVbtRWwxqKlzhmOiktec75jWjduREBoMve4OCE/3G0obILS84qxhA== =f9OL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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participants (4)
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mpd@netcom.com
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Phillip
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tcmay@got.net
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The Deviant