Bill Frantz writes:

At 4:57 AM 6/27/96 -0400, Vin McLellan wrote:

...

... The real threat is incompetent, poor-trained DoD system administrators -- and a class of computer-illiterate senior managers who define "system security" and routine administration as a marginal expenses and scorn readily available options like one-time passwords as too complex for the military mind.

Public key authentication could go a long way toward solving the military and contractor's security problems. However, they won't use public key authentication for unclassified systems until it is available in "COTS" (Commercial, Off The Shelf) software. And it won't be available there until it can be exported as well as sold domestically. Catch-22

So a Pentagon Computer Security Analyst might reasonably make the case that the ban on exportable crypto is hurting National Security just as much as, or more than, it helps. Why hasn't someone made that case? If they have, why hasn't it succeeded? -russ <nelson@crynwr.com> http://www.crynwr.com/~nelson Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | PGP ok 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | Corporations persuade; Potsdam, NY 13676 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | governments coerce.