The New York Times, October 11, 1996, p. A38. Clinton's Encryption Plan Fits Law and Market To the Editor: "A Flawed Encryption Policy" (editorial, Oct. 4) mischaracterizes the Clinton Administration's recent proposal on data-scrambling software, the proposal's impact and the results of a study by the National Research Council. This Administration has never proposed that United States citizens be limited in the type of encryption products they choose to use domestically. The current plan relates only to exports of encryption products that are, for all practical purposes, unbreakable in the commercial environment. Unbreakable encryption generates the need for "key" management among personal and business users of encryption products. Users may need a "spare key" to recover information that is lost or otherwise inaccessible, in much the same way that we give a trusted neighbor a spare key to our house. President Clinton's plan insures that the United States -- and not other countries -- will develop such a system, which both protects and is based on the rule of law, not the whim of governments or trade barriers masquerading as import restrictions. You assume that foreign buyers would not buy key-recovery products, but you ignore the trend -- especially in Europe -- to require use of key-recovery products and bar the import of stronger and stronger encryption products that do not take law enforcement into account. The number of companies that have expressed a willingness to work with the Administration to balance commercial and law enforcement issues belies your pronouncement that our proposal is unworkable. In fact, the number of companies that stand ready now to market such products will soon prove that there Is a market for encryption products that provide safeguards for both the owner and for society. The National Research Council did not say that we should allow the export of all encryption. It supported some export controls, while allowing the export of encryption up to the strength of 56 bits. Our plan allows the export of encryption up to 56 bits, but does so in a way that will encourage the production and marketing of products that both protect privacy and prevent crime. The United States is the world leader in information technology. Under the Administration's plan, we will remain so through a market-driven key-recovery system that both promotes the export of encryption products and protects our national security and the public safety. Mickey Kantor U.S. Secretary of Commerce Washington, Oct., 9, 1996
At 8:29 AM -0400 10/11/96, John Young wrote:
The New York Times, October 11, 1996, p. A38.
Unbreakable encryption generates the need for "key" management among personal and business users of encryption products. Users may need a "spare key" to recover
As businesses and others point out, if there's a need, let private industry fill the need. Let the users decide on who, if anyone, holds the spare keys. The USG proposal takes this choice away and allows access to others.
You assume that foreign buyers would not buy key-recovery products, but you ignore the trend -- especially in Europe -- to require use of key-recovery products and bar the import of stronger and stronger encryption products that do not take law enforcement into account.
So, because some countries will not allow import into _their_ countries of non-GAK software, this means GAK must be mandated on U.S. _exports_? Since when it is our responsibilty to enforce other nation's import laws? (Because Iran will not allow the import of blasphemous literature, should the USG ban all export of such material from the U.S.?)
The number of companies that have expressed a willingness to work with the Administration to balance commercial and law enforcement issues belies your pronouncement that our proposal is unworkable. In fact, the number of companies
This conveniently ignores the substantial bludgeon the USG holds over the heads of all high-tech companies. Their "willingness to work with the Administration" is comparable to the willingness of a kidnap victim to "work with" his kidnapper.
Mickey Kantor U.S. Secretary of Commerce Washington, Oct., 9, 1996
The real goal is obviously domestic GAK and domestic limits on encryption, else all this is mostly worthless. --Tim May "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." [NYT, 1996-10-02] We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
On Fri, 11 Oct 1996, Timothy C. May wrote:
At 8:29 AM -0400 10/11/96, John Young wrote:
You assume that foreign buyers would not buy key-recovery products, but you ignore the trend -- especially in Europe -- to require use of key-recovery products and bar the import of stronger and stronger encryption products that do not take law enforcement into account.
So, because some countries will not allow import into _their_ countries of non-GAK software, this means GAK must be mandated on U.S. _exports_? Since when it is our responsibilty to enforce other nation's import laws? (Because Iran will not allow the import of blasphemous literature, should the USG ban all export of such material from the U.S.?)
Note that Mickey Kantor is doing _exactly_ what has been predicted on this very list: he is using the (very limited) response the US received from other countries by strongarming said countries into supporting a pro-GAK position to manipulate the American public into accepting GAK by pretending the US must respond to the requests of the world market. --Lucky, who hopes everybody on this list will vote for Harry Browne.
participants (3)
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John Young -
Lucky Green -
Timothy C. May