Re: CYPHERPUNKS TO THE RESCUE
I think Norm gets the prize for the best garage door opener:
...How about the car unit signing successive numbers....
But this raises an idle question: how much easier is it to break a DES key given a sequence of (n, DES(n)) where the n's are successive numbers, than it is if the n's are random (but still known)? I doubt this is a practical threat for garage doors. - -Steve - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - nutritional information per serving: less than one (1) bit -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvt3niQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2tPEot1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hSnC1R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
In message <9407261944.AA04628@smds.com> FutureNerd Steve Witham writes:
But this raises an idle question: how much easier is it to break a DES key given a sequence of (n, DES(n)) where the n's are successive numbers, than it is if the n's are random (but still known)? I doubt this is a practical threat for garage doors.
This would be a known plaintext attack, well suited to differential cryptanalysis. Though the lifetime of the average garage door opener is probably small enough that it would die before you had enough plaintext/ciphertext pairs for a good attack
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