Andrew Loewenstern commented: > No more Steve Jackson Games cases. I hope this happens. Computer > theft and unreasonable seizure is a real problem. As far as I know, a system like SecureDrive, KFS, or CFS, is really only as secure as the running machine is. Generally, when a BBS is 'seized' (forfeited? ;), it is running when the feds get there. Right now, if they have any clue (and from what I hear, the FBI has much more of a clue than the SS when it comes to this type of investigation), they usually take pictures of the setup to make sure they can put the machine back together when they get it to wherever they are taking it to. If encrypting file-systems become a problem, a disk could be developed (probably pretty easily) to retrieve the key from memory before they power it down. andrew "Touch that keyboard and die!!" It's fairly easy to provide a TSR on MSDOS systems to either block booting from the keyboard or force a memory clear on reboot. I found these examples on local BBS's: NOFBOOT.ZIP 2647 08-28-91 Version 1.0 of Padgett Peterson's NOFBOOT. NoFBoot is a small (500 byte) TSR designed to prevent inadvertant booting from a floppy disk. It will intercept warm boot requests (Ctrl-Alt-Del) and check for a floppy in drive A: before continuing. If a floppy is found in drive A, the request will be aborted with a warning message. With NoFBoot, a cold start (reset button or cycle power) will be necessary to boot from a floppy. BLK213.ZIP 17931 09-22-93 BootLock 2.13 09/06/93 BootLock allows you to lock out the use of [CTRL][ALT][DEL], [CTRL]C, and/or [CTRL][BREAK]. New version can be loaded as a Device Driver or TSR. You can also define a "user defined" key to lock out. BootLock can be unloaded and Loaded into Hi Memory. Shareware registration form and manual included. From Foley Hi-Tech Systems (ASP). (Files: 6 Newest: 09-06-93 Oldest: 03-05-92) NOCADEL.ZIP 24234 07-07-93 No Boot on control-alt-delete. Simple util helps disable key boot sequence. Source included. (Files: 6 Newest: 02-07-93 Oldest: 02-06-93) The BBS program should also be patched to re-boot instead of returning to MSDOS on exit, and should not provide a DOS Shell. If the FBI agent is allowed access to an MSDOS command line, he can run a program which will "fish" out the Secure Drive encryption key from memory. Note that the pass phrase cannot be reconstructed from the key in memory and its crypto difficult to reconstruct -any- pass phrase which would duplicate the key (MD5 is a 1-way function). But it would be easy to construct an alternate to LOGIN which would insert the key into SECTSR directly using hex input. So it would be a good security practice to provide for an "emergency" power-off in event of a "surprise" raid. A foot switch is good for situations when the operator is present. This can be activated while one's hands are in the air. Turning off power upon activation of a burglar alarm is a good solution for unattended situations. -- edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca