Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
At 03:46 PM 3/28/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote:
On Tue, 26 Mar 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote:
At 09:46 PM 3/25/96 -0500, Michael Froomkin wrote:
An interesting issue, likely to be addressed in future judicial assistence treaties...
However, future judicial assistance treaties are meaningless if you store your keys anonymously (domestically or internationally) so that even the keeper doesn't know he has them or exactly where they are in his pile of keys.
Given the significant contempt charges that can follow a refusal to produce items (anonymous or not) this still depends on the absence of initial detection.
You clearly don't understand. You're making the ASSumption that the organization keeping the keys can produce them in a form that is "useful" to the cops. Escrowing encrypted keys makes them useless to subpoena, and in fact it helps the key owner because the escrow agent can (and, in fact, must!) be obligated to inform the key owner if his key is requested. You also seem to assume that "contempt charges" will be able to operate world-wide, which is a highly dubious proposition. (Read Froomkin's paragraph above CAREFULLY. He said "internationally.") And in any case, I consider it highly doubtful that anybody would contract with an escrow agent and identify himself by name. It would be a simple matter to operate "escrow agents," just glorified data-holders, who would receive data anonymously and send it out just as anonymously, to the person who can identify themselves via some sort of encrypted ID system. Even "detecting" such a transfer is useless because the cops won't be able to figure out what the data is, since it's encrypted in both directions while being transferred, in addition to being encrypted while being held, with a code the escrow agent doesn't know. In short, you need to comprehend what you're responding to before you express your opinions. You're living down to my expectations.
In fact, I suppose that government operation of the identification system (drivers' licenses, passports, etc.) in general is also horribly inefficient and should be attacked on efficiency grounds.
You might not like what you get in response. Streamlined and uniform identity documents generated at birth and renewed with tax filings would be the likeliest efficiency improvement. An inefficient government identification system is to the advantage of the privacy seeker.
You seem to be ASSuming that an "efficient identification system" is one that will ALSO operate to the benefit of the government, as opposed to the individual who wants to be identified for only limited purposes. I don't think so. Chaum's encrypted ID system described in the August 1992 Scientific American makes it clear that identification can occur without the ability to cross-reference databases. Chaum's system, if implemented with current microprocessor technology, would be extremely "efficient," at least from the standpoint of the amount of human effort involved. It would, however, be extremely hostile to the government. Jim Bell jimbell@pacifier.com
On Thu, 28 Mar 1996, jim bell wrote:
At 03:46 PM 3/28/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote:
On Tue, 26 Mar 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote:
At 09:46 PM 3/25/96 -0500, Michael Froomkin wrote:
An interesting issue, likely to be addressed in future judicial assistence treaties...
However, future judicial assistance treaties are meaningless if you store your keys anonymously (domestically or internationally) so that even the keeper doesn't know he has them or exactly where they are in his pile of keys.
Given the significant contempt charges that can follow a refusal to produce items (anonymous or not) this still depends on the absence of initial detection.
You clearly don't understand. You're making the ASSumption that the organization keeping the keys can produce them in a form that is "useful" to the cops. Escrowing encrypted keys makes them useless to subpoena, and in fact it helps the key owner because the escrow agent can (and, in fact, must!) be obligated to inform the key owner if his key is requested.
You clearly don't understand. You are an ass making an assumption that a court cares or believes that the witness can actually produce the requested information or not. Fines tend to be imposed regardless.
You also seem to assume that "contempt charges" will be able to operate world-wide, which is a highly dubious proposition. (Read Froomkin's paragraph above CAREFULLY. He said "internationally.")
Contempt charges do operate world wide. The reach of U.S. jurisdiction is very extensive and the United States generally doesn't care what the foreign jurisdiction thinks of it. See my large note on asset concealing.
And in any case, I consider it highly doubtful that anybody would contract with an escrow agent and identify himself by name
The same way no one creates Panamanian companies with their own name. So what? Third parties are still fined heavily. It would be a simple
matter to operate "escrow agents," just glorified data-holders, who would receive data anonymously and send it out just as anonymously, to the person who can identify themselves via some sort of encrypted ID system.
And simpler for courts to fine them out of existance (which happened to several banks, trust companies and agents in Cayman and Panama). Even
"detecting" such a transfer is useless because the cops won't be able to figure out what the data is, since it's encrypted in both directions while being transferred, in addition to being encrypted while being held, with a code the escrow agent doesn't know.
They need only suspect or have reason to suspect it might be exculpatory. Practically speaking this means convincing a judge. Not hard when the words "offshore holding company" are mentioned in a brief or hearing.
In short, you need to comprehend what you're responding to before you express your opinions. You're living down to my expectations.
In short, go to law school, then try to talk about legal issues.
In fact, I suppose that government operation of the identification system (drivers' licenses, passports, etc.) in general is also horribly inefficient and should be attacked on efficiency grounds.
You might not like what you get in response. Streamlined and uniform identity documents generated at birth and renewed with tax filings would be the likeliest efficiency improvement. An inefficient government identification system is to the advantage of the privacy seeker.
You seem to be ASSuming that an "efficient identification system" is one that will ALSO operate to the benefit of the government, as opposed to the individual who wants to be identified for only limited purposes.
Without getting into semantics, and "efficient identification system" implies one that identifies people efficently. Blocking government use, or limiting it to certain circumstances is not efficiency.
I don't think so.
Opinions are like assholes....
Chaum's encrypted ID system described in the August 1992 Scientific American makes it clear that identification can occur without the ability to cross-reference databases. Chaum's system, if implemented with current microprocessor technology, would be extremely "efficient," at least ^^^^^^^ from the standpoint of the amount of human effort involved. It would, however, be extremely hostile to the government.
Hedge just a bit more and your argument will be completely underground.
Jim Bell jimbell@pacifier.com
--- My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information
On Thu, 28 Mar 1996, jim bell wrote:
Escrowing encrypted keys makes them useless to subpoena, and in fact it helps the key owner because the escrow agent can (and, in fact, must!) be obligated to inform the key owner if his key is requested.
I thought I would take the time to let everyone know that this is baseless as well. Most jurisdictions forbid third parties to reveal prosecution inquries to the principal for which they are holding documents or other information. A VERY few have laws on the books that require this disclosure. Switzerland is no longer one of them. Even if a judge was convinced by the defense not to levy heavy fines against a third party who pleaded that he or she was simply unable to comply, informing the principal would literally assure such fines would be imposed regardless. Criminal charges of obstruction could easily attach. Obstruction in connection with narcotics cases or other major felonies are generally extraditable offenses as well. Once again Mr. Bell pulls legal analysis out of his rectum rather than basing it in fact or research. With Mr. Bell as a defense attorney, who needs prosecutors?
Jim Bell jimbell@pacifier.com
--- My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information
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