Re: Anonymous Anonymous ftp
:Jim Miller asks for an example: : : :> > - prepaid mailers, good for sending a packet to a :> > destination. With the final address nested insided a :> > series of encrypted packets, no mix along the way can :> > identify Bob without extensive collusion with other :> > mixes. :... :> I understand how you can do 2-way anonymous communication via message :> pools and Penet-style systems, but I don't "get" prepaid mailers. Could :> you post an example showing how two people can converse anonymously via :> prepaid mailers. : :I'll use Lisp-like notation to encapsulate the sending of a packet to :a remailer "Bob." If Alice wishes to send a packet to Bob, she creates :this packet: : :(Bob (more stuff)) : :I'm assuming encryption, which several remailers support and which all :users and all remailers should be using. : :Bob gets this packet, decrypts with his private key and recovers the :"more stuff." He may discover "more stuff" contains some digital money :for his troubles, instructions on how much latency (number of :messages, for example) to use, and where to send the resulting packet. :All kinds of stuff can fit in here. But that's not the point. : :If Alice wanted to send a message to Zeke, through a bunch of :remailers, she might create this initial message: : :(Bob (Charles (Doris (Ed (........ (Zeke (final stuff))))....))) [Lots of stuff removed] : :Well, enough for now. There could be some fatal flaws, but this is the :direction I've been thinking about. Eric Messick and Hugh Daniel had :some ideas about "onions" about a year ago, but I never fully grokked :--Tim May : : : :-- :.......................................................................... :Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, This will not work if Yancy is not trustworthy. She could then send the message through a chain of compromised remailers, to create the prepaid mailer packet. This would also happen, though less harmfully, any time the chain hit a bad node. Letting the nodes choose the other nodes is fatal. ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki@nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.3 key available by finger or server. "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------
The Other Lance writes:
This will not work if Yancy is not trustworthy. She could then send the message through a chain of compromised remailers, to create the prepaid mailer packet. This would also happen, though less harmfully, any time the chain hit a bad node. Letting the nodes choose the other nodes is fatal. ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD
Good points, and I'm sure there are other weaknesses and points of attack. Zeke may be able to mitigate the risks somewhat by providing Yancy with an acceptable list of remailers, ones he trusts. Cut-and-choose, etc. Or his prepaid mailer may split the message into n pieces, for added resistance to compromise. The main thing I wanted to get across with reopening the debate on this (and if it inspires Eric Messick, this will be reward enough) is that the web of remailers may have many modes of use. Some in which the nodes are known and named and the sender picks a route to the receiver, others in which the receiver picks the route and arranges for this kind of "prepaid mailer" which the sender simply drops into the system. The use of pools makes this more elegant, I believe. Some messages could be copied out of these pools (or "digital dead drops," in crypto-spy lingo) and then routed onward. Thanks for the comments! And, again, I really wish we had some blackboards to iron out some details and fix whatever flaws pop up. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power:2**859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
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