Re: 090498_crypto
Ying:
From: Jim Choate <ravage@EINSTEIN.ssz.com>
Tauzin: FBI won't get crypto key and more on high-tech and Capitol Hill September 3, 1998 5:55 PM PT Updated at 6:58 PM PT
SAN FRANCISCO -- An influential Congressman says Congress is close to resolving the bitter dispute over encryption software, and it looks as though it will be decided in favor of the high-tech industry.
U.S. Rep. Bill Tauzin, R-La., said flatly that "we're not going to give the FBI the keys to the encryption system." The remark came as part of a wide-ranging interview with ZDNN.
Yang: Subject: Terrorist FBI, on Terrorism Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1998 09:58:23 EDT Statement for the Record FBI Director Louis J. Freeh before the Senate Judiciary Committee, September 3, 1998 Good morning Chairman Hatch and members of the judiciary committee. I am pleased to be with you this morning as you explore the U.S. Government's response to international terrorism. [snip] THE FUTURE Would like to close by talking briefly about steps we can take to further strengthen our abilities to prevent and investigate terrorist activity. ENCRYPTION One of the most important of these steps involves the FBI's encryption initiative. Communication is central to any collaborative effort -- including criminal conspiracies. Like most criminals, terrorists are naturally reluctant to put the details of their plots down on paper. Thus, they generally depend on oral or electronic communication to formulate the details of their terrorist activities. For this reason, the law enforcement community is very concerned about the serious threat posed by the proliferation of encryption technology. Current standards do not allow for law enforcement access or the timely decryption of critical evidence obtained through lawful electronic surveillance or search and seizures. The FBI supports a balanced encryption policy that satisfies fourth amendment concerns for privacy, the commercial needs of industry for robust encryption, and the government's public safety and national security needs. The encryption capabilities available to criminals and terrorists today effectively thwart the ability of law enforcement agencies to implement the court-ordered surveillance techniques that have helped put some of the nation's most dangerous offenders behind bars. Whether a state police department is racing the clock to find a kidnapped child or the FBI is attempting to track and prevent the destructive ambitions of an international terrorist group, the need for timely access to legally obtained electronic surveillance cannot be overstated. [snip] EXPANSION OF FBI LEGATS Likewise, the expansion of the number of FBI LEGATS around the world has enhanced the ability of the FBI to prevent, respond to, and investigate terrorist acts committed by international terrorists against U.S. Interests worldwide. As evidenced by developments in the embassy bombing cases in East Africa, the ability to bring investigative resources to bear quickly in the aftermath of a terrorist act can have significant impact on our ability to identify those responsible. I encourage Congress to support our efforts to counter the international terrorist threat by continuing to support expansion of our LEGAT program. [snip]
Crypto came up a couple times during Q&A as well. -Declan On Sun, 6 Sep 1998, Information Security wrote:
Ying:
From: Jim Choate <ravage@EINSTEIN.ssz.com>
Tauzin: FBI won't get crypto key and more on high-tech and Capitol Hill September 3, 1998 5:55 PM PT Updated at 6:58 PM PT
SAN FRANCISCO -- An influential Congressman says Congress is close to resolving the bitter dispute over encryption software, and it looks as though it will be decided in favor of the high-tech industry.
U.S. Rep. Bill Tauzin, R-La., said flatly that "we're not going to give the FBI the keys to the encryption system." The remark came as part of a wide-ranging interview with ZDNN.
Yang:
Subject: Terrorist FBI, on Terrorism Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1998 09:58:23 EDT
Statement for the Record FBI Director Louis J. Freeh before the Senate Judiciary Committee, September 3, 1998
Good morning Chairman Hatch and members of the judiciary committee. I am pleased to be with you this morning as you explore the U.S. Government's response to international terrorism.
[snip]
THE FUTURE
Would like to close by talking briefly about steps we can take to further strengthen our abilities to prevent and investigate terrorist activity.
ENCRYPTION
One of the most important of these steps involves the FBI's encryption initiative. Communication is central to any collaborative effort -- including criminal conspiracies. Like most criminals, terrorists are naturally reluctant to put the details of their plots down on paper. Thus, they generally depend on oral or electronic communication to formulate the details of their terrorist activities.
For this reason, the law enforcement community is very concerned about the serious threat posed by the proliferation of encryption technology. Current standards do not allow for law enforcement access or the timely decryption of critical evidence obtained through lawful electronic surveillance or search and seizures.
The FBI supports a balanced encryption policy that satisfies fourth amendment concerns for privacy, the commercial needs of industry for robust encryption, and the government's public safety and national security needs.
The encryption capabilities available to criminals and terrorists today effectively thwart the ability of law enforcement agencies to implement the court-ordered surveillance techniques that have helped put some of the nation's most dangerous offenders behind bars. Whether a state police department is racing the clock to find a kidnapped child or the FBI is attempting to track and prevent the destructive ambitions of an international terrorist group, the need for timely access to legally obtained electronic surveillance cannot be overstated.
[snip]
EXPANSION OF FBI LEGATS
Likewise, the expansion of the number of FBI LEGATS around the world has enhanced the ability of the FBI to prevent, respond to, and investigate terrorist acts committed by international terrorists against U.S. Interests worldwide. As evidenced by developments in the embassy bombing cases in East Africa, the ability to bring investigative resources to bear quickly in the aftermath of a terrorist act can have significant impact on our ability to identify those responsible. I encourage Congress to support our efforts to counter the international terrorist threat by continuing to support expansion of our LEGAT program.
[snip]
Tim asks:
Freeh and Company continue to mumble about "meeting the legitmate needs of law enforcement." What can they be speaking of? ... Obviously his side is contemplating domestic crypto restrictions.
Threat of terrorism will be the impetus for applying national security restrictions domestically, for relaxing cold war limitations on spying on Americans, for dissolving barriers between law enforcement and military/intelligence agencies. Technical means for access to encrypted data will probably come first in communications, then to stored material. There will be an agreement for increased CALEA wiretap funding, which is what the two cellular and wired suits against the FBI intend, (paralleling what the hardware and software industries want from federal buyers of security products). This will provide the infrastructural regime for the gov to monitor and store domestic traffic as NSA does for the global, using the same technology (NSA may provide service to domestic LEA as it now does for other gov customers for intel). Other access will come through hardware and software for computers, paralleling technology developed for telecomm tapping, tracking and monitoring. Most probably through overt/covert features of microprocessors and OS's, as reported recently of Wintel and others, but also probably with special chips for DSP and software for modular design -- why build from scratch when these handy kits are available. As noted here, the features will appear first as optional, in response to demand from commerce, from parents, from responsible institutions, to meet public calls for protection, for privacy, for combating threats to the American people. Like wiretap law, use of the features for preventative snooping will initially require a court order, as provided in several of the crypto legislative proposals. Like the wiretap orders, gradually there will be no secret court refusals for requests to use the technology in the national interest. A publicity campain will proclaims that citizens with nothing to hide will have nothing to fear. Assurance of safety will be transparent, no clicks on the line. In a digital world, home-office devices will send lifestyle data to the device manufacturers over the always monitoring transparental Net. Personal privacy will evaporate almost unnoticeably, as with the tv remote control, cp/defcon/bar brag, telephone, fax and forever-lovers pillowtalk.
Subject: Terrorist FBI, on Terrorism Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1998 09:58:23 EDT
Statement for the Record FBI Director Louis J. Freeh before the Senate Judiciary Committee, September 3, 1998
The FBI supports a balanced encryption policy that satisfies fourth amendment concerns for privacy, the commercial needs of industry for robust encryption, and the government's public safety and national security needs.
For the Nth time, let me restate the obvious: all current crypto restrictions being discussed involve _exports_. There are no domestic restrctictions whatsoever on domestic use of crypto. Any of us, even resident aliens, tourists, terrorists, etc. are perfectly free to use PGP, one time pads, stego, and even Meganet Snake Oil Unbreakable Crypto. There are, officially, no proposals on the table to limit speech within the U.S. by limiting the types and forms of language may use. There is the SAFE bill, which stands zero chance of passing, but this involves relaxing export requirements (though I expect compromises added, such as the felonization of crypto use in a crime, are an unwelcome step toward domestic restrictions). But it bears constant repeating, especially to the skeptical, that there are NO DOMESTIC CRYPTO LAWS. Unlike some other countries, the fascists have not yet managed to get a foothold in the attempt to limit use of crypto by the citizen-units. We all know this, but Freeh and Company continue to mumble about "meeting the legitmate needs of law enforcement." What can they be speaking of? And since the Fourth Amendment is an internal U.S. thing (not counting limited applicability to some foreigners, and of course to U.S. citizens abroad who encounter U.S. offices, etc.), what can Louis possibly be referring to when he speaks of the Fourth Amendment? Surely he is not referring to satisfying the Fourth Amendment concerns for privacy amongst the Russians, Afghans, and so forth? Obviously his side is contemplating domestic crypto restrictions. We all know this, but it sometimes bears repeating what the Constitution says, what the status quo is, and what they are proposing. They are planning domestic crypto restrictions, GAK, and all the rest of what we have long expected. When that comes, anyone will be full jusfified in taking action by any means necessary to halt the onset of the total state. --Tim May "The tree of liberty must be watered periodically with the blood of tyrants...." ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments.
On Sun, 6 Sep 1998, Tim May wrote:
There are, officially, no proposals on the table to limit speech within the U.S. by limiting the types and forms of language may use. There is the SAFE bill, which stands zero chance of passing, but this involves relaxing export requirements (though I expect compromises added, such as the felonization of crypto use in a crime, are an unwelcome step toward domestic restrictions).
Every version of SAFE includes crypto-in-a-crime as a key component. The thinking of its drafters and backers like Reps. Goodlatte, Eschoo, Lofgren, CDT, and some corporate lobbyists is that it would be too politically controversial to pass Congress without it. There is, offically, a proposal on the table to limit speech within the U.S. by restricting sale, manufacture, distribution, import of non-GAK'd crypto. A House committee approved that one year ago. -Declan PS: Note to DC cypherpunks. There's a meet/party 9-19 in Adams Morgan.
At 8:39 AM -0700 9/7/98, John Young wrote:
It would be fitting for this list to be distinguished as the place where crypto-in-a-crime was first committed.
What might that be? A match of the crime committed to prevent widespread strong crypto?
Crypto-criminal anonymity in the national interest (governmental secrecy) fighting to prevent crypto-criminal anonymity in the public interest (private secrecy).
This is not a troll, but query on what could be done to to tip the hand and identify those unnamed who are most fearful of strong cryptography, not their public rougers in the 3 divs of gov.
Well, there are just so many things that are now called "crimes" in these Beknighted States, that it's really a matter of what the Authorities decide to prosecute. For example, do they prosecute J. Random Cypherpunk for his support of the freedom fighters of Hezbollah, which is on the State Department's list of "terror"-supporting organizations? (Meaning that citizen-unit sheeple are breaking the law if they provide any financial or technical support to Hezbollah.) If they prosecute J. Random Cypherpunk, and can show he used PGP to send messages to the freedom fighters, or even supplied them with a copy of PGP.... Or how about the religious organization known as Aum Shinretsu. Apparently I am breaking a U.S. law by tithing to the Aum religion, as it is also on this list. And then there are those RICO laws. Arranging cutout organizations to let foreign nationals consult and write code is probably a violation of various laws. I can think of lots of "crimes" in the eyes of the burrowcrats that many of us are committing constantly. However, "crypto in a crime" has not become law yet. And if we can keep those pesky "civil rights" lobbyists in D.C. neutralized, maybe it never will be. With any luck, these curriers of favor are inside the fallout pattern from Bin Laden's nuke. --Tim May "The tree of liberty must be watered periodically with the blood of tyrants...." ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments.
On Mon, 7 Sep 1998, Tim May wrote:
However, "crypto in a crime" has not become law yet. And if we can keep those pesky "civil rights" lobbyists in D.C. neutralized, maybe it never will be. With any luck, these curriers of favor are inside the fallout pattern from Bin Laden's nuke.
Taking no position on "public interest" groups for this post, I'd still note that such lobbyists don't really drive legislation in this area. It's business groups, especially the Americans For Computer Privacy alliance, that are drafting the bills and twisting the arms. And their E-PRIVACY bill has crypto-in-a-crime in it. -Declan
It would be fitting for this list to be distinguished as the place where crypto-in-a-crime was first committed. What might that be? A match of the crime committed to prevent widespread strong crypto? Crypto-criminal anonymity in the national interest (governmental secrecy) fighting to prevent crypto-criminal anonymity in the public interest (private secrecy). This is not a troll, but query on what could be done to to tip the hand and identify those unnamed who are most fearful of strong cryptography, not their public rougers in the 3 divs of gov.
True that governmental dietary laws are immensely flexible when the dogs are hungry. Given that moral and financial and political betrayal and treachery do not qualify for grave natsec threat, and only those acts which aim at snatching the very best technology for political control, it's the NBC toys that attract most of the serious searchers for terrorists under the global bed. For crypto-in-a-crime that might mean sending here an encrypted message with an explanatory note that it contains, say: How to tell the difference between decoys and the real tranporters of nuclear components among the national labs and/or to Pantex for disassembly. Or where the recovered Pu and triggers are stored in the TX panhandle, helpfully describing what's fake and what's not, what the security plan is, not disinfo, what tools are needed to pick up emanations, how to weed the spoofs. Or what and where BW or CW armaments are being refreshed, repaired, deactivated, or invented in top secrecy just in case some rogue violates a treaty, what tools are needed to sniff precursors, how to weed the spoofs, and how to avoid seeded soil in your backyard. Or where key targeters of foreign terrorists live, their childrens' school, their favorite places to get away from the terrible responsibility for USG assassination politics. Or, could one encrypt a message to oneself claiming to contain such information, post it here, see who wants your heart and mind. Or, create a PK pair, encrypt such a message, then post it, both keys and PW here. Would the pacesetter be traced? Would anyone notice, though? Would waiting for the disaster be better strategy? Thousands of threats pour in, State says, Secret Service says, IC says, way too many to fully investigate, until one proves blessedly true, ah yes, the likely suspect, then marshal the targeters to cruise congress whispering look at this, to OK cleansweeping CDR, according to immensely flexible menus long set.
If anyone does it with an eye to civil disobedience, let me know. But the bill isn't law yet, and one might reasonably hope that it won't be. The details vary. First it was crypto in the commission of a felony. Now it's been narrowed considerably, though not all bills have the "better" version. -Declan On Mon, 7 Sep 1998, John Young wrote:
It would be fitting for this list to be distinguished as the place where crypto-in-a-crime was first committed.
What might that be? A match of the crime committed to prevent widespread strong crypto?
Crypto-criminal anonymity in the national interest (governmental secrecy) fighting to prevent crypto-criminal anonymity in the public interest (private secrecy).
This is not a troll, but query on what could be done to to tip the hand and identify those unnamed who are most fearful of strong cryptography, not their public rougers in the 3 divs of gov.
At 6:53 AM -0700 9/7/98, Declan McCullagh wrote:
There is, offically, a proposal on the table to limit speech within the U.S. by restricting sale, manufacture, distribution, import of non-GAK'd crypto. A House committee approved that one year ago.
I'd forgotten about that little one. Of course, it has not gone anywhere (no Senate version or committee markup, right?), so I'm not yet ready to say there's official action on its way. And, fortunately, the session is over but for the shouting about Clinton and his cigars. --Tim May "The tree of liberty must be watered periodically with the blood of tyrants...." ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments.
We even make an illusion to Monica's Cigar in a story in this week's Time. A Microsoft story I was working on died at the last moment, unfortunately. As for the crypto bills, there is no comparable Senate bill. Certainly this is not for lack of sponsors: Kyl and Feinstein would be glad to introduce it, and Kyl chairs a relevant subcommittee. But they wanted to see how far they'd get with McCain's bill, and now it's too late to do much, as Tim said. -Declan On Mon, 7 Sep 1998, Tim May wrote:
At 6:53 AM -0700 9/7/98, Declan McCullagh wrote:
There is, offically, a proposal on the table to limit speech within the U.S. by restricting sale, manufacture, distribution, import of non-GAK'd crypto. A House committee approved that one year ago.
I'd forgotten about that little one. Of course, it has not gone anywhere (no Senate version or committee markup, right?), so I'm not yet ready to say there's official action on its way. And, fortunately, the session is over but for the shouting about Clinton and his cigars.
--Tim May
"The tree of liberty must be watered periodically with the blood of tyrants...." ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments.
I've been politely corrected in email. I meant "allusion" of course. I seem to find myself doing this more often lately... --Declan On Mon, 7 Sep 1998, Declan McCullagh wrote:
We even make an illusion to Monica's Cigar in a story in this week's Time. A Microsoft story I was working on died at the last moment, unfortunately.
Actually, Tim, the way the Men in Black work is that they keep their bans on domestic crypto under wraps until the last moment and then get them adopted with no public hearings in the crisis atmosphere of a heavily lobbied markup session at some critical point in the legislative calendar. They know that the more people actually understand what they are up to, the less they are likely to get what they want. But do not underestimate the power of having useful stooges like Jerry Solomon and the shamefully clueless Jon Kyl in positions where they can do last-minute switcheroo on bills that are being moved to the floor. One of the major reasons why we didn't get the Goodlatte bill on the floor this year is that moving it to the Floor would have resulted in putting Oxley Manton or the House Intelligence Committee bill on the Floor at the same time. -----Original Message----- From: owner-cypherpunks@cyberpass.net [mailto:owner-cypherpunks@cyberpass.net] On Behalf Of Tim May Sent: Monday, September 07, 1998 8:55 AM To: Declan McCullagh Cc: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net Subject: Re: What we are Fighting At 6:53 AM -0700 9/7/98, Declan McCullagh wrote:
There is, offically, a proposal on the table to limit speech within the U.S. by restricting sale, manufacture, distribution, import of non-GAK'd crypto. A House committee approved that one year ago.
I'd forgotten about that little one. Of course, it has not gone anywhere (no Senate version or committee markup, right?), so I'm not yet ready to say there's official action on its way. And, fortunately, the session is over but for the shouting about Clinton and his cigars. --Tim May "The tree of liberty must be watered periodically with the blood of tyrants...." ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments.
participants (6)
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Declan McCullagh -
Declan McCullagh -
Information Security -
James Lucier -
John Young -
Tim May