Re: Response to Uni's "Lawsuit" Message
At 8:07 am 5/24/94 -0700, Sandy Sandfort wrote:
How about this, instead: A company called "ID Anonymous, Ltd." sets up in a business secrecy jurisdiction. It buys Internet access accounts in bulk from DGS, Netcom, etc. (ID1, ID2, ID3, . . .). It then resells them to people living in the service territories of the various access providers. ID Anonymous, Ltd. collects monthly fees from all of its sub-users. It pays the Internet provider a single check each month for the monthly fees of all its anonymous account. Under such a system, there is no weak link. If a user misbehaves, DGS or Netcom can cut off the offending account, but nobody can reveal the identity of the underlying user. By being located in an offshore jurisdiction, ID Anonymous, Ltd. is not susceptible to lawsuits or rubber hose techniques. QED.
I like it. I'd be willing to participate and refer users to the service. dave
C'punks, On Wed, 25 May 1994, Dave Del Torto wrote:
At 8:07 am 5/24/94 -0700, Sandy Sandfort wrote:
How about this, instead: A company called "ID Anonymous, Ltd." sets up in a business secrecy jurisdiction. It buys Internet access accounts in bulk from DGS, Netcom, etc. (ID1, ID2, ID3, . . .). It then resells them to people living in the service territories of the various access providers. . . .
I like it. I'd be willing to participate and refer users to the service.
dave
When I wrote my original message, I was doing it more as an academic exercise than anything else. However, I will be moving to Hongkong sometime in July or August. I'll look into the possibility of starting such an anonymity service. In the meantime, though, anyone living in an appropriate jurisdiction should feel free to do something like this for themselves. Basically, it's just a mailbox operation. If you get your monthly charges paid up-front, your risk is very low. Go for it. S a n d y
At 8:07 am 5/24/94 -0700, Sandy Sandfort wrote:
How about this, instead: A company called "ID Anonymous, Ltd." sets up in a business secrecy jurisdiction. It buys Internet access accounts in bulk from DGS, Netcom, etc. (ID1, ID2, ID3, . . .). It then resells them to people living in the service territories of the various access providers.
If I were in law enforcement, and I were faced with the problem of getting a truename for an account like this, I'd trace back the contact with the access provider. No need to try to serve an overseas subpoena; the user has to access the system somehow. If FBI's Big Brother Bill goes through, I can probably do this in fifteen minutes. There may also be problems in trying to buy blocks of anonymous accounts, since the access provider will take the heat for anything coming out of the account. If Netcom is willing to drop Cashier and Scumball, they may not be happy about this whole plan. Eli ebrandt@hmc.edu
C'punks, On Thu, 26 May 1994, Eli Brandt wrote:
At 8:07 am 5/24/94 -0700, Sandy Sandfort wrote:
How about this, instead: A company called "ID Anonymous, Ltd." sets up in a business secrecy jurisdiction. It buys Internet access accounts in bulk from DGS, Netcom, etc. (ID1, ID2, ID3, . . .). It then resells them to people living in the service territories of the various access providers.
If I were in law enforcement, and I were faced with the problem of getting a truename for an account like this, I'd trace back the contact with the access provider. No need to try to serve an overseas subpoena; the user has to access the system somehow. If FBI's Big Brother Bill goes through, I can probably do this in fifteen minutes.
But if it doesn't go through, I don't see how they could trace it. My call to CRL is a local call. It might be recorded on my end, but I don't think CRL's phone bill would show it. What did you have in mind?
There may also be problems in trying to buy blocks of anonymous accounts,
And maybe not. Let's not borrow trouble. I'm sure they will tell us if they don't want our business.
. . . since the access provider will take the heat for anything coming out of the account. . .
Not necessarily. Remember, they want the status of common carriers. Open access to all, but no control of content. S a n d y
overseas subpoena; the user has to access the system somehow. If FBI's Big Brother Bill goes through, I can probably do this in fifteen minutes.
But if it doesn't go through, I don't see how they could trace it. My call to CRL is a local call. It might be recorded on my end, but I don't think CRL's phone bill would show it. What did you have in mind?
Maybe a telephony sort can answer this authoritatively, but I think the phone company's logs record this information even for flat-rate local calls. If not, you can do almost anything with access to a modern switch...
. . . since the access provider will take the heat for anything coming out of the account. . .
Not necessarily. Remember, they want the status of common carriers. Open access to all, but no control of content.
This may apply to some providers -- apparently not Netcom. Eli ebrandt@hmc.edu
Date: Thu, 26 May 94 23:27:10 PDT From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.cs.hmc.edu> Maybe a telephony sort can answer this authoritatively, but I think the phone company's logs record this information even for flat-rate local calls. If not, you can do almost anything with access to a modern switch... The #5ESS running version 5E8 can log, as a matter of course, the last sixteen numbers dialed on a phone line. But as you note, it's all software. -russ <nelson@crynwr.com> ftp.msen.com:pub/vendor/crynwr/crynwr.wav Crynwr Software | Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | ask4 PGP key 11 Grant St. | +1 315 268 1925 (9201 FAX) | Quakers do it in the light Potsdam, NY 13676 | LPF member - ask me about the harm software patents do.
participants (4)
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ddt＠lsd.com -
Eli Brandt -
nelson＠crynwr.com -
Sandy Sandfort