PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've made my PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM) available via anonymous FTP on H.GP.CS.CMU.EDU in /usr/rfb/pem/. This is free software available under the terms GNU Public License. I'm enclosing some information from the +Read.Me+ file for the distribution archive (ftp://h.gp.cs.cmu.edu/usr/rfb/pem/) as well as the one for the the software itself. Changes since the most recent distributed version include: - New keybindings that meet RMS specifications. - Some fine tuning related to generating and verifying `header signatures' for messages that include lines starting with either "From " or ">From ". If you pick this up, please send mail to me <rfb@cmu.edu> to let me know. Rick ====================================================================== This is a distribution archive for PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM). The files contained here are: +Read.Me+ This file pem.tar.gz compressed (with gzip) archive pem.tar.gz.asc PGP signed and armored compressed archive pem.tar.gz.sig detached signature for pem.tar.gz rfb@cmu.edu my public key block Notes: - There is no uuencoded file. pem.tar.gz.asc can be mailed safely. - If you're concerned about tampering at this archive site, you should fetch my public key block from elsewhere. The public key server at pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu is a good place to get it. ====================================================================== PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM) should not be confused with the Privacy Enhanced Mail standard (PEM). Information on integrating PEM into your GNU Emacs environment is included at the end of this file. The idea behind PEM is to provide a set of Emacs Lisp functions to augment common mailers and newsreaders with PGP related operations. PEM is implemented in layers. There are customization variables defined at each level. They are described later in this document. At the highest level, each supported messaging package has a file that implements the functions that are specific to that package. Currently there are: pem-mhe.el For use with mh-e.el, and Emacs interface to the MH mailer. pem-gnus.el For use with the GNUS newsreader. Appropriate hook functions are defined which add standard function bindings to the various modal key maps. Typically, the following bindings will be in place in any message related buffer: C-c C-d Decrypt next PGP block in current message C-c C-e Encrypt current message C-c C-i Insert a public key into a message C-c C-n sign aNd encrypt current message C-c C-s Sign current message C-c C-v Verify next PGP signed block in current message C-c C-x Extract next public key from message [ Note: This is a change from previous versions where, for example, C-c d and C-c D would be defined. RMS says to do bindings this way and leave those other bindings for users ] Where possible, in buffers which are for composing messages, the standard mechanism for committing (sending or posting) a message will be augmented to support signing and/or encrypting. In buffers which are not for composing messages, the upper case versions are also defined without the C-c prefix, e. g. "D" will decrypt the current message. A notable exception to this is the GNUS *Summary* buffer which has the following default bindings: D gnus-summary-mark-as-read-backward N gnus-summary-next-article V gnus-version X gnus-summary-delete-marked-with Note that in some contexts, some of these bindings don't make sense. They are still bound, however, the function to which they are bound signals an error indicating the operation is inappropriate. For example, it does not make sense to insert your public key into the body of a news article that you are reading. However, some `obvious' restrictions are relaxed when dealing with mail. When you attempt to encrypt a mail message which you are reading, it may be `self encrypted', that is, the message body will be encrypted such that only you can decrypt it. Each of the package specific files are built on functions defined in pem.el. It contains generic message operations and deals with issues like parsing headers and addresses, and identifying PGP armored regions. At the core is npgp.el -- New pgp.el -- so named as to avoid conflicts with the pgp.el, maintained by Gray Watson <gray@antaire.com> and Jack Repenning <jackr@wpd.sgi.com>, which is available through various elisp archives. This runs PGP asynchronously and is able to deal with the erratic prompting that PGP sometimes does. For example, the first time that you use an untrusted key, PGP will prompt asking if you're sure that you want to use it. npgp.el passes the question on to you, using standard Emacs prompting to get the answer from you. PEM also uses passwd.el by Jamie Zawinski <jwz@mcom.com> to read passphrases. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLttV6JNR+/jb2ZlNAQF26AP/fyq+fxLEeqlpaP7bu5oBakgDhkm4pTlf ejo6kmlm052y+g+ax/5LF3ZsHZw0GFKyg4ltL2C8rDcgPo8dPOqv49GfHeeuS1lE HsL/wWBmhwWqijw1bOu0KAogL1I0mumSx+oeYP0Rlea9rRb2cyYYta7X5r0dGFuDWwGoXOIb9yc= =7/tF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAi3iH2wAAAEEAMjRQMS6OEvdPUFX0HwxA0kYGAXUOde0Kklbdj/Gsf6QCgrA vfrLlW2jIv6Gqn345NZXQ5S45z+m4YlEZV78Ln3G1alxd22lXlo8RChs8QVdxgCX dkfVKJlcpJQfNWfrNHLMtaAB9+22p8nhGjBmTnuX5K0BQgMLCZNR+/jb2ZlNAAUR tB1SaWNrIEJ1c2RpZWNrZXIgPHJmYkBjbXUuZWR1PokAVQIFEC3iIcaIwD3rAd2b uQEBF4UB/iCxzTUBT+eAJCINmk9qkZYNWFhtt12zfyPSK9Ub2ruK6PGkjqE5HQ/b a7Fz49FX9Z70LOpJz11P9pPEmQ8CW3aJAJUCBRAt4iD6Fpk0o882PjUBATWEA/wP +WGx6GKaSHmEdtfNfGQPF70FPFRYKpugAwI/wZBHjtvNnsgTcI92Oby+b9QQDzgJ oXlerHeeoqeGpi8ZiKwIXproR5JBkB/4UuVkmIS1pP5T1D6BIUH27K6k87Yvz8JW GAqHfinoN3YOW4Fx9qZdo46aoRCGcYhTzTuXwyKxTIkAlQIFEC3iIIaTUfv429mZ TQEBmo8EAIHrwdeJ9sFb6Ro4iWxlED1OEMD+KYxfB2vu39uKGXEP1SB488uR1N7z jxcFHqZPliZ0tc2DhrUPpBY85JmI1IjtXXhS8Fbqc5Dp1Pnua+XjndaRpSSD29VH CgNvkf1S35w33GBAh8bVSgjvl8kZKOoDBV4v9ZbqG39+raZ+imAVtCBSaWNrIEJ1 c2RpZWNrZXIgPHJmYkBsZWhtYW4uY29tPokAlQIFEC48n6yTUfv429mZTQEBVwwD /iXo9pv/wFISdSwNKniNcHqogQLHjnZryzvjXNkDTvi0miBlzayozl/Q21a2nMEc 1MI8K3gNv/mP98Qw7xw5FD8F5zuY3XiFYr0GK4m0bqwixUfxkjBacb67mflCvaFS h8+K2k7Db6V0/MpV9t/VOzqjF4h5CFkoWAd+1Cr21OuQ =ruN3 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
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Rick Busdiecker