SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 621 Wed Dec 17, 1997 T.TELENKO [MilTech Bard] at 08:05 EST The Autumn 1997 issue of MILITARY HISTORY QUARTERLY had an article by Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen on U.S. military plans to gas Japan during Operation Olympic. They ran accross references and put in a FOIA request. Eventually they got a copy of a document labeled "A Study of the Possible Use of Toxic Gas in Operation Olympic." The word "Retaliatory" was PENCILED in between possible and use. Apparently there were only five of these documents circulated during WW2. After the war in 1947 the document was requested by the chemical corp for historical study. In an attempt to "Redact" history, another document was issued to change all the copies to emphisis "Retaliatory" rather than the reality of the US planning to use it offensively in support of the invasion of Japan. The plan called for US heavy bombers to drop 56,583 tons of gas in the 15 days before the invasion of Kyushu than another 23,935 tons every 30 days after that -- and that was just the STRATEGIC bombing campaign. Tactical air support was in addition to that. The ground weapons would contribute 1,400 tons of gas shells. At the time of the invasion, 144,762 tons of gas shells were available. Another 9,356 tons would arrive every 30 days after the invasion. Chemical Corps casualty estimates for this attack plan were 5 million dead with another 5 million casualties. Ultimatly, it looks like the plan was not approved, but prepared for since the gas to impliment it was sent to the Pacific -- Likely as a back up to the A-bomb. Had the Japanese carried out their plan to kill Allied POW's and civilians, the Allied responce would have been horrific. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 622 Wed Dec 17, 1997 T.HOLSINGER [Tom] at 09:53 EST I wasn't aware there was an _offensive_ plan, but I knew of the scale of the planned "retaliatory" use of gas. These things have a tendency to snowball. Trent doesn't mention that the plan called for mass spraying of mustard gas over urban areas _at the beginning_ of this attack. That isn't retaliation. It is extermination. My estimate of 25-30 million Japanese dead during the US conquest of Japan was based on such a use of chemical warfare, though most of the dead, IMO, would have been from starvation and malnutrition- boosted disease. Trent's discovery here shows some elements of the US government planned overt genocide on Japan. The coverup makes it appear that someone at least felt guilty about it. I'd be a lot more comfortable if there was evidence that these planners were then aware, via SIGINT, of the orders the Imperial Japanese Army had already given, when the invasion of Japan started, to murder all Allied POW's, all interned Allied civilians, and every Allied civilian they could catch in areas occupied by the IJA. My estimate is that the IJA could have murdered at least several million Allied civilians a week for months. The A-bomb, IMO, saved more lives than were lost in all of WWII. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 623 Wed Dec 17, 1997 T.ZBARASCHU1 [Tony] at 10:28 EST I believe that the U.S. considered using gas at Iwo Jima, but decided not to. Trent, any evidence that this was a seriously considered plan, as opposed to a staff study that the planners drew up just to see what the necessary requirements would be? ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 624 Wed Dec 17, 1997 JOHN.BARNES [John Barnes] at 11:35 EST Moving poison gas in those quantities strikes me as reasonably good evidence that somebody was doing more than playing paper games. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 625 Wed Dec 17, 1997 T.TELENKO [MilTech Bard] at 13:12 EST According to Allen and Polmar, the June 18, 1945 meeting where Harry Truman was briefed on Operation Downfall -- the over all plan to invade Japan -- by Adm King, Gen Marshall and the rest of the Joint Chiefs was probably when the topic was broached. We know now that the decision to drop the atomic bomb was made then, although the notes for the meeting only refered to "undisclosed topics.". On 21 June 1945, orders were issued by the Army to produce and ship the necessary quantities of war gas to the Pacific Theater to impliment the plan. The key passage from that Gas Attack Plan was: "Gas is the one single weapon hitherto unused which we can have readily available which assuredly can greatly decrease the cost in American lives and should materialy shorten the war." I'd say that this meeting decided that the US was unwilling to take the kind of mass casualties, using Okinawa as a model, that a conventional landing would cost and any available WMD would be used to reduce American casualties. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 626 Wed Dec 17, 1997 T.HOLSINGER [Tom] at 21:43 EST Trent, Your 625's logic is convincing. The timing makes it look as though there was a Presidential decision on June 18 to conduct a strategic gas attack on Japan in preparation for the invasion, if the A-Bomb didn't work. This presents a completely different picture than what I had imagined. I thought the Japanese would have initiated genocide in the event of invasion. Instead there is fair evidence that we would have started it. My recollection is that Imperial Headquarters gave the genocide orders to Field Marshal Teruachi in July. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 627 Wed Dec 17, 1997 T.TELENKO [MilTech Bard] at 22:39 EST The thing that sticks out for me is that Truman's choice was not Invasion or the A-Bomb. It was Gas, Invasion and the A-Bomb. Any way promised a great deal of dead. Truman chose the route that was most likely to shock the Japanese into surrendering with the least loss of life. History will judge him differently in the long term because of the finding of this document. This also explains his expressed strong faith in having taken the correct corse of action. Still, we don't know exactly what was said on the subject of gas in that meeting. I suspect the full, genocidal, aspects of the gas attack plan would not have been implimented until Operation Coronet. That is, after the Japanese started murdering Allied POW's and interned/occupied civilians. Operation Olympic -- the invasion of Kyushu -- would probably have been limited to gasing the beaches and air fields after a series of raids by the carrier fleets. To lay the proper political ground work for the use of gas, the US Government would have released the newsreels of the Kamikazi attacks on the US Navy off of Okinawa and Japan. The shock that would have delivered to the American public would have prepared them for the arguement that gas was needed to win. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 628 Wed Dec 17, 1997 L.TILTON [Lois] at 23:18 EST I wonder if there were not contingency plans for gassing Berlin. The A-bomb was originally proposed to be used against Berlin, but it wasn't ready in time. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 629 Wed Dec 17, 1997 JOHN.BARNES [John Barnes] at 23:26 EST There was also some hope, in late '43 when things looked like they were coming together faster than they did, of either using the bomb to create a no-resistanc e landing area, or using it on a rail center to prevent reinforcement for D-Day. I think the biggest hope was really just to get it before Hitler, who, had the Nazis not been such nitwits, had what looked like overwhelming odds of getting there first. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 630 Thu Dec 18, 1997 T.ZBARASCHU1 [Tony] at 00:43 EST Orders to produce and ship that much gas? OK, I'll accept that as evidence that this was more than a "staff plan". OTOH, we did keep a fair amount of gas on hand in the European theater for retaliatory purposes, but this particular document does look like it was a bit more than retaliatory. Thank God for the atom bomb. Thank God I didn't have to make that decision. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 631 Thu Dec 18, 1997 T.TELENKO [MilTech Bard] at 12:48 EST The American Army in WW2 carried around huge amounts of war gas as a matter of course. In Early 1943, MacArther had at his disposal in the South West Pacific area the following: o 15,000 gas Howitzer shells o 19,000 gas mortar shells o 22,500 five inch rocket shells o 18,000 aerial bombs of various sizes o 6,500 aerial spray tank kits. By the end of 1945, the US had 4.4 million gas artillery shells, 1 million mortar rounds, 1.25 million gas aerial bombs and 112,000 aerial spray tank kits. What counts is policy and the intent to follow it. The article mentions that Gen Marshall brought up the use of gas in a 29 May 1945 meeting with War Sec. Stimpson. He wanted to use gas against the "outer japanese islands" with less than our best war gas (Mustard gas) to "take the fight out of" the Japanese soldier and reduce American casualties. He then commissioned a the study I have been quoting using chemical warfare officers and USAAF targetiers -- one Col and three Capt. -- who introduced the major strategic gassing angle. I got the impression that they wanted to use their toy to the fullest, rather than smooth the invasion via reduced American casualties. I suspect my idea of military gassing only -- landing beaches and airfields -- during Operation Olympic was the most likely policy result. After the Japanese Army went on its killing spree, all bets are off. ------------