Re: Your editorial in the 10/14 PCWeek
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At 03:37 PM 10/16/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote:
A) This is not a change in the law. There is no law regarding export of encryption software. Congress has never passed any such law. These are State Department regulations, and presidential decrees. These regulations, which have the force of law to you and me, were never debated or voted upon by our elected representatives. They can be changed tomorrow the same way. In fact, they can be changed and the public need not even be notified.
Actually, as Greg Broiles pointed out in an article (on the Cypherpunks list) several weeks ago, Congress deliberately chooses to delegate much regulatory authority to other agencies. There just is not enough time or expertise for them to pass specific laws covering the number and size of trashcans in the national parks, the type of equipment to be used on Navy ships, and so on. The State Department--and soon to be transferred to Commerce--has the regulatory authority to decide which exports are covered by the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations, the ITARs. These rules effectively have the full force of law, as many tens of thousands of laws not specifically passed by Congress have.
I think this is more than a little misleading. While I don't recall the specific note from Greg Broiles you mention, as I recall from other sources so-called "government regulations" were not considered binding on ordinary citizens before the 1930's. The examples you gave ("number and size of trashcans in the national parks [public property], and type of equipment to be used on Navy ships...") are both issues of controlling the activities government employees and departments, not ordinary citizens! It's hard for me to imagine how anyone could consider this distinction sufficiently ignorable as to provide examples as if they were interchangeable. It seems pretty obvious that governments should be able to control their own employees and departments, at least while they're on the job, in the same way that essentially every other employer does. Yet, it is equally obvious that ordinary citizens aren't in the same position as government employees, and there is no reason to assume that the former are to be bound by rules which had applied only to the latter. For just one example, government employees can resign; citizens cannot. It will be claimed that citizens do have to obey the rules: Yes, but they're called "laws," they are passed by legislators who are voted in or out of office by the citizens. (And laws apply to government employees too, or at least they should...) Laws are also publicly debated before they are passed, generally. On the whole, I would say that there is an excellent reason for this healthy distinction between "laws" and "regulations." You stated that it would be difficult for Congress to debate a large number of rules, and you cited "national parks" and the Navy as examples. It wouldn't be easy for Congress to handle this. My answer is, yes, delegation of these matters is reasonable precisely because they are NOT binding on ordinary citizens. And further, I'd point out that assuming you have respect for freedom, you have every reason to fear allowing things with the force of laws to be passed as "easily" as regulations. Some people who say they are REAL LAWYERS (TM) will probably claim, as if on schedule, that I am re-writing the law. No, I am well aware that the SC may have, at some point, have disagreed. Rather, I think we should treat the Supreme Court, on this issue as well as many others, as we would a schizophrenic person that we happen to meet on a city street: We don't think his mumbling is making any sense, but we are well aware of the danger of provoking him so we hold our tongues while in his earshot. Nevertheless, we don't for a minute adopt the opinion that anything we've heard is somehow more worthy of belief, simply because we felt uncomfortable about expressing our opposition for a moment, which is analogous to the SC being able to temporarily enforce its opinion. I certainly sympathize with the REAL LAWYERS (TM). They are, in effect, chained 24 hours per day (so to speak) to that schizophrenic, and can never get away, so they've decided to make a virtue (and, in fact, a business) out of a necessity by adjusting their beliefs to correspond, continuously, to the ravings of that madman. Naturally, they pride themselves on being able to slowly, gently, carefuly change the opinions of that madman, and they succeed occasionally at this task.
(It is true that the ITARs may well end up being overturned by the courts, as the Bernstein and Junger cases proceed, but this could happen to laws passed by Congress, and does.) Also--and I am not an expert on this--some of the basis of the ITARs is closely related to the "Munitions Act," which was, I am almost certain, an actual Act of Congress, some decades back.
OTOH, one of the big complaints we have against ITAR is that it seems to be constantly re-interpreted. While I certainly won't claim that this is never true of Congress-made laws, it tends to be more difficult to pass a law, and once passed, to sneak a new interpretation in. Somehow, I don't think that it would have been possible to stretch a "Munitions Act" into a rule which would prohibit the export of a a Web-browser like Netscape that happens to have a hole in it for crypto.
Certainly Congress knows full well what the ITARs are about, and could change them if it thought the State Department or Commerce Department were overstepping their bounds. (As it may do, some day. Not this term, obviously. "Pro-Code" got tabled, so Congress effectively spoke.)
(Understand that I am not arguing in favor of the ITARs, nor their application to crypto, just taking issue with Marshall's opening point that the ITARs are not real laws. I mostly believed they were real laws before, but Greg Broiles' analysis several weeks ago cinched it for me.)
How did I miss that miraculous revelation? B^) Jim Bell jimbell@pacifier.com
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At 03:37 PM 10/16/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote:
I wrote:
A) This is not a change in the law. There is no law regarding export of encryption software. Congress has never passed any such law. These are State Department regulations and presidential decrees. These regulations, which have the force of law to you and me, were never debated or voted upon by our elected representatives. They can be changed tomorrow the same way. In fact, they can be changed and the public need not even be notified.
Actually, as Greg Broiles pointed out in an article (on the Cypherpunks list) several weeks ago, Congress deliberately chooses to delegate much regulatory authority to other agencies. There just is not enough time or expertise for them to pass specific laws covering the number and size of trashcans in the national parks, the type of equipment to be used on Navy ships, and so on. The State Department--and soon to be transferred to Commerce--has the regulatory authority to decide which exports are covered by the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations, the ITARs. These rules effectively have the full force of law, as many tens of thousands of laws not specifically passed by Congress have.
I never argued that these regulations did not have the force of law. In fact, I conceded that they did. Nevertheless, they are not laws. They were neither debated nor voted upon by our elected representatives. They can be changed at a moment's notice by the State Department, which takes its' orders from the President. The announcement that prompted Mr. Gibson's editorial did not come from the State Department, who putatively has authority over the ITAR. Instead, the announcement was made from the office of the Vice President, and begins "President Clinton and I" and speaks throughout of "The Administration's initiative". _That_ was the distinction that I was making. FWIW, I was unable to find the announcement on the White House's web server, but it is availiable at <http://www.epic.org/crypto/key_escrow/clipper4_statement.html> Here is another example (taken from the Clipper debate): In a paper about privacy and the original Clipper proposal (in 1994) A. Michael Froomkin of the University of Miami School of Law pointed out that since the entire key-escrow infastructure was created by presidential decree, and the proposed key holders were part of the executive branch, the provisions for release of the keys could be changed at a moment's notice by another presidential decree, which need not ever be made public. [ Yo, key escrow dude! Email your key database to wiretappers@fbi.gov, and don't tell anyone! ] See <http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/6095/articles/froomkin-metaphor/partIC.html#ToC29> for the following quote, and <http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/6095/articles/froomkin-metaphor/text.html> for the entire paper. (It's very long; but suprisingly readable, given that the author is a law professor ;-)
The security precautions introduced by NIST in late 1994 are complex. To the nonspecialist they appear sufficient to prevent security breaches at the time the keys are "burned in" and to prevent surreptitious copying or theft of the key list from the escrow agents. But no amount of technical ingenuity will suffice to protect the key fragments from a change in the legal rules governing the escrow agents. Thus, even if the technical procedures are sound, the President could direct the Attorney General to change her rules regarding the escrow procedures. Because these rules were issued without notice or comment, affect no private rights, and (like all procedural rules) can therefore be amended or rescinded at any time without public notice, there is no legal obstacle to a secret amendment or supplement to the existing rules permitting or requiring that the keys be released to whomever, or according to whatever, the President directs. Because the President's order would be lawful, none of the security precautions outlined by NIST would protect the users of the EES system from disclosure of the key segments by the escrow agents.
I -- Marshall Marshall Clow Aladdin Systems <mailto:mclow@mailhost2.csusm.edu> "The Singapore government isn't interested in controlling information, but wants a gradual phase-in of services to protect ourselves. It's not to control, but to protect the citizens of Singapore. In our society, you can state your views, but they have to be correct." - Ernie Hai, coordinator of the Singapore Government Internet
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On Wed, 16 Oct 1996, Marshall Clow wrote: [...]
In a paper about privacy and the original Clipper proposal (in 1994) ...Jan '95 actually... A. Michael Froomkin of the University of Miami School of Law pointed out that since the entire key-escrow infastructure was created by presidential decree, and the proposed key holders were part of the executive branch, the provisions for release of the keys could be changed at a moment's notice by another presidential decree, which need not ever be made public. [ Yo, key escrow dude! Email your key database to wiretappers@fbi.gov, and don't tell anyone! ]
I still think this is a major issue; it is one, however, that goes away if they pass a well-drafted statute.
See <http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/6095/articles/froomkin-metaphor/partIC.html#ToC29> for the following quote, and <http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/6095/articles/froomkin-metaphor/text.html> for the entire paper.
You can get a frames version that spearates text and footnotes at http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/clipper.htm
(It's very long; but suprisingly readable, given that the author is a law professor ;-)
Thanks, I think. A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law & Parent of David and Benjamin (9/13/96) U. Miami School of Law | froomkin@law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here. And wet. Very wet.
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Just a short question : What is the exportable maximum key length of RSA if use for encrypting session keys? My local Cylink VAR in Malaysia says it is 1024bit for encrypting the Omega algo. Comments and advice appreciated.
participants (4)
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jim bell
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Marshall Clow
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Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law
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peng-chiew low