Having seen Matt's paper, and having been asked by him not to distribute it, I feel somewhat obligated not to give any details. The complete method can actually be determined from the newspaper article (which was astonishingly lucid, all things considered) but having been "mentally contaminated" its not ethical for me to describe it. However, I'll say this. 1) He found a beautiful little defect -- it can be explained in a couple of lines, and it seems obvious, but somehow no one but Matt saw it. Its a classic -- he deserves lots of kudos. It permits full interoperability between a "rogue" Tessera user and a non-rogue user. 2) Its likely that a redesign of the EES (escrowed encryption standard) could avoid this defect. Whether it could avoid all defects is, of course, unknowable -- but the current design is simply flawed and does not truly achieve its stated goal. 3) If the NSA actually worked for years designing this thing, someone wasn't thinking. Perry