At 21:57 20/07/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote:

Fortunately, the goal of MAD was to not have to be used, and it appears now to have worked quite well (albeit at high cost).

My problem with applying game theory to complex situations like the competition between powerful nations is that it is too simplistic. IANAE, of course, though I have done some control theory, and know how complex the modelling of any system becomes if it contains non-linearities, delays, etc. In a closed-loop system, i.e. with feedback, trying to predict behaviour without the foggiest notion of how to quantify the impact of Kennedy's grandstanding on the Kruschev mind (for instance) is questionable. To suggest that MAD worked well on the basis of the limited tryout we gave it has little validity. If it hadn't, we wouldn't be here, would we? We are trying to draw general conclusions based on a biased sample of one. Reminds me of this committee of the British Royal Air Force, trying to find ways to protect its planes better against German anti-aircraft guns. Someone proposed putting an extra layer of armour on those areas that received the most shelling, and most people seemed to like the idea. One upstart suggested the exact opposite: putting extra armour on those areas which had received the least shelling. "Remember," he said, "we can only examine the planes that came back." I also have a problem with the cost you mention. What is "winning" in the context of nations? The arms race wiped out the Soviet Union, and arguably seriously hampered the competitiveness of American industry (which was No.1 at the end of the war), allowing countries like Japan and Germany, with far smaller defence budgets, to overtake industrially.

Useful sources:

Thank you for the tips: I will check them out. Game theory is fascinating -- I'm just not sure how applicable it is in formulating policy. Didn't work too well in Vietnam... Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta@cpsr.org http://www.cerfnet.com/~amehta/ finger amehta@cerfnet.com for public key