...

However, making the government a _required_ part of such plans implies a motive that is not at all the same as what companies wish (mostly, disaster recovery).

the distinction lies in the terminology. what does it mean, "required part of the plan". if it essentially amounts to nothing more than the government saying, "you must give us keys when we present you with a subpoena/warrant", then that's no different than the system we have today.

Hmm. The government sure is putting a lot of effort into moving us to a system that you say is "no different than the system we have today." As far as I can tell, you're the only one who thinks that. The government thinks that GAK is a big change, civil libertarians think GAK is a big change .. but you're welcome to call it "status quo" if it suits you. There's a world of difference between the government subpoena-ing something from me, where I can delay disclosure until I've exhausted my legal avenues to challenge disclosure, and the government demanding data from an at best disinterested third party who cares not at all if I get my day in court before they disclose. With the second scenario, I'm forced to try to "unring the bell", and somehow limit the spread of otherwise private/confidential data in a community (law enforcement) which is organized to collect and retain information. Ha, ha. Given today's Congress and Supreme Court, there's probably precious little chance that keys disclosed prematurely or erroneously won't be used to collect evidence which will be admissible despite the lack of meaningful opportunity to challenge the "recovery" of a key. -- Greg Broiles | "We pretend to be their friends, gbroiles@netbox.com | but they fuck with our heads." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | |