Re: key escrow idea from David Satelin of MIT Lincoln Labs

At 01:48 AM 8/14/96 -0400, Matt Blaze wrote:
Remember, since the phoneco has had no competition, they've never been at risk from being shunned by customers who object to this secret cooperation. A more "realistic" position, I think, would be to conclude that if there was true competition, customers would be able to negotiate varying levels of non-cooperation in order to win customers. I suspect that post-Ruby Ridge/post-Waco, there would be a substantial fraction of the public who would conclude that it cannot trust its own government.
Well, I don't know what went on before 1968, but these days phone companies don't keep wiretap orders secret because they are being nice to the police, they keep them secret because the court order for the weretap also orders them to. Perhaps you aren't aware of this, but when a third party is ordered to turn over records or access to something, the order often includes a provision that prohibits them from revealing the order to the subject. This is not unique to phone records; orders for bank records frequently have secrecy provisions as well.
Well, that's just the problem. These are clear violations of the 1st amendment. The law may authorize a search, but the Constitution is supposed to limits them to "reasonable" ones. And it says nothing about _secret_ ones, either. The effectiveness of the search itself can't possibly be compromised by releasing the fact of the search AFTER it occurs, which means that the inclusion of such a secrecy order can't even conceivably be supported under the US Constitution. Think of this as a two-pan balance: On the one side is the 1st amendment, a very important issue. One the other side is...nothing. Or, perhaps more accurately, no _constitutional_ issues. Remember, the Constitution does not guarantee the effectiveness of the entire investigative process; it merely addresses one portion of it, the search. (and even there, it doesn't guarantee a successful search!) If the government claims that the process is crippled by releasing the fact of the search, then I'm afraid that this is not an adequate reason to violate free-speech rights. (When the famous Miranda warning decision was made by the Supreme Court, cops said that it would cripple their investigations.) You may say, of course, "that's not how they currently interpet it," but my response is simple: Any talk of tolerating any sort of key-escrow (GAK) system must presume that the people running it are no more honest than they are today. If the cops (and the government in general) so generously misinterprets the government's "rights" with regard to wiretapping, there is simply no reason to believe that any restrictions they claim to be willing to respect now will actually be followed once such a plan is approved. Don't try to get out of this: You can't ignore past abuses. And if they were willing to do illegal taps before 1968, this tells you how inclined they are to obey the law. We've been handed an opportunity: The government wants to change its wiretap powers, and unlike previous times the public is actually aware of what's happening and can object. I think we must take this opportunity to entirely re-think the search-warrant/wiretap process. Rather than blindly accept the opinions of crooked judges who got where they are by demonstrating their willingness to "get along by going along," we should strip away all the decades of scheming, and delete the entire process. My opinion is that wiretaps are, inherently, unreasonable searches within the meaning of the Bill of Rights. Interestingly, support for this interpretation was shown when the media stated that Japan's Constitution prohibited wiretapping. This was portrayed as being somewhat of an oddity. But in reality, that Constitution was forced on Japan after WWII, by the US. Curiouser and curiouser, that happened during a time frame (pre 1968) in which wiretapping was illegal in the US, and probably believed to be unconstitutional as well. Since the US Constitution hasn't changed since then, at least with respect to searches, the only realistic conclusion is that the thing that's changed is the interpretation of the US Constitution, and not for any sound reasons either. (That Japanese Constitution, apparently not subject to such convenient re-interpretation, stands as it was when adopted, at least on this one issue.) In fact, the timing for this change is suspicious: 1968 was certainly a rather tumultuous year, what with anti-Vietnam war protests, assassinations and such. Not only in the US, but even more so in France, with the student riots. The motivation to adopt an unconstitutional wiretapping law must have been substantial. And given the fact that public polls on the concept of wiretaps repeatedly show it to be opposed by a majority of the population, I think the burden of proof is on the Denning-types to show that they're appropriate. Jim Bell jimbell@pacifier.com

You may say, of course, "that's not how they currently interpet it," but my response is simple: Any talk of tolerating any sort of key-escrow (GAK) system must presume that the people running it are no more honest than they are today. If the cops (and the government in general) so generously misinterprets the government's "rights" with regard to wiretapping, there is simply no reason to believe that any restrictions they claim to be willing to respect now will actually be followed once such a plan is approved. Don't try to get out of this: You can't ignore past abuses. And if they were willing to do illegal taps before 1968, this tells you how inclined they are to obey the law.
Slightly off topic: I haven't seen this horror of GAK discussed here, but this is (IMHO) as important as possible abuse by LEA's. Let's factor the LEA's out for a bit. The US government gets their mandatory key access, and keeps their keys in three databases in various locations. Most foreign powers would pay someone a handsome sum to hand over these keys. I would bet that France or Iran would offer a billion dollars to someone who would turn over the part of the database they preside over. I bet that France/Iran/etc. would be able to pool together 3 billion dollars and a nice getaway for the stooges who can grab a tape with the escrowed keys on it. Heck, Ames turned traitor for less. (I am assuming the keys as small, 1K bytes each... an 8mm Exabyte mammoth tape would be able to carry 30 million keys.) Even an "el cheapo" Travan TR3 tape would be able to snarf 1.6 million keys... and that's a lot of people compromised! Soon, you have the US's whole security structure totally compromised. Any business transactions, any communications are now subject to tapping by foreign agents, and all US crypto would be absolutely powerless. And you thought ITAR put companies at a disadvantage. US companies would be stomped on by competition which seems to have the same product just slightly earlier or slightly more refined, or they would move out of the US, so they can use strong crypto. Even if one assumes that the LEA's are incorruptable, there are always people who are willing to watch their country go down in flames for money.
participants (2)
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Douglas R. Floyd
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jim bell