-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In <01BC9D99.CD73D990.chrisd@loc201.tandem.com>, on 07/31/97 at 10:09 AM, Chris DiBona <chrisd@loc201.tandem.com> said:

This is all nice and good, but the question is who is Chris Lewis, what is his connection to northern telecom, what the hell do you mean by forgery, are you implying the technology that entrust has in it's secure kernal is stolen? Keeping in mind that using public domain algorithms is not theft, and also keeping in mind that they have a patent license from public key partners, which allows them to use the "rsa" patents, and keeping in mind that a fully featured certificate system is much more than just a cryptography product. Is the law being broken here? Is there a breach of ethics at Entrust?

To restate.....what's wrong with what entrust is doing? Everyone has had such a good time talking about spamming and cancels, but I'm really interested in how Nortel is somehow committing a forgery.

Also looking around the dejanews stuff about lewis, he seems to be a spam cancel freak yes, but no pedophile.

Dimitri, you seem to be a pretty smart guy...enlighten me on this whole thing. Do you mean that Nortel has a hand in the forging of spam cancels? Or do you mean that they have a hand in forging software?

Well Dimitri has his own unique way of putting things. :) This is my understanding of the issue that Dimitri has brought up: - -- Chris Lewis is activly persuing a cource of censorship by forging & canceling messages on USENET. - -- Because of this activity Chris Lewis has low reputation capital. - -- Nortel, by employing Chris Lewis, has reduced their reputation capital. - -- Because of Nortel's reduced reputation capital their security products are suspect. Now, myself would require more information as to Chris Lewis' envolvement with Nortel & their security products before I would be willing to come to the same conclution that Dimitri has. If Chris Lewis is only a janitor for Nortel I can not see how is reputation capital would affect Nortel's. On the other hand if he was activly involved with their security products or in a management position where he could influance desisions about thier security products then I would be apt to call into question just how secure their products were. Of cource if they released thier source code then one could check for themselfs the trustworthyness of their product. - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html - --------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: cp850 Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 iQCVAwUBM+DItY9Co1n+aLhhAQFwuAP/Zjoj2IKpfVFTR/h1Cb9AtMPECLO6Tb1w wVwE/DY/OBE8eNUs8XxVXNfvpeN3FvLChbH4qseuXjLD2BIx/WvJzQ9OqwBnpN8J cLmz/1RsQ1LXwHG1GTYM+sllGXcG203Un7SD4nF1avvID/LaC81DYL28XYo2KrDM CI0BwCLvANI= =5v7f -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----