If we accept the need for wiretapping, than the only problem is to find a way to make Clipper/DTII as protective of privacy as current analog-tapping laws; as inconvenient as current analog tapping. If we accept the need for wiretapping, we can find such ways. Variants of Micali's fair crypto; an open, publicly available no-trapdoor algorithm; a requirement that, as with primitive exchanges, DTII'd ones would still have to be visited by LEOs to work a tap, etc. We can then respond to the various (non-serious) calls from Freeh, Denning et al for an 'alternative'.

The problem is that the Genie of strong cryptography is out of the bag. A large part of the internet community is capable of implementing strong crypto. Given a publicly available no-trapdoor algorithm, requiring the 'source' be visited, denies wiretap capabilities. The LEO follows the flow of information further and further upstream/down stream, noting that encryption is used. Eventually one follows the communications media directly to someones office/residence/car/pocket (which implies bugs instead of wiretaps). On the pro-wiretap side this is unacceptable. On the anti-wiretap side, what we see is the result of haggling over the price, provisions for wire and control records, which provide for fishing expeditions in the event the traffic is not particularly enlightening. As a corallary, allowing wiretapping but making them extremely expensive and dangerous to use could be explored - again haggling over the price. One can imagine making the LEO requesting a tap personally at risk for draconian retribution in terms both civil and criminal. It is unclear whether the antis should be prepared to negotiate at all. There is historical precedence by the U.S. supreme court to suggest that the right to privacy is absolute. The problem is that contrary to the Radio Act of 1934 and various other statutes covering public utility provided communications, the right to privacy is not being respected for electronic forms of expression. Before negotiating to give anything away, this issue should be satisfied. Hence the direction of a lot of groups like EFF, etc. The arguments go that no one has an expectation of privacy on unprotected media. The answer to that is to use strong crypto. The second level argument is that this denies the 'traditional' monitoring for law enforcement purposes of communications that had no expectation of privacy. Well I expect privacy with strong encryption. Tough teat. But then criminals will have privacy! (It may be their constitutional right.) I'm not particularly shocked to hear that someone may commit a crime in private. There should be compelling proof to show the needs of society overide the rights of the individual (in a republic). The arguments put forth by the pro-wiretap sides are inadequate to that determination, relying instead of emotional appeals and other propaganda.