Message pools _are_ in use today!
At 4:37 PM 6/29/96, Hal wrote:
From: ichudov@algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
A nice, albeit quite expensive, way of pretection from traffic analysis is to create a mailing list (or a newsgroup) and forward all messages to all users of that mailing list or newsgroup. Of course, since messages are encrypted, only the recipients will be able to decrypt them.
This was discussed here several years ago, under the name "anonymous message pools". Myron Cuperman, the operator of the extropia remailer implemented one, although I don't know if it is still running (I haven't gotten any mail from it for years). It was basically just a mailing list specifically for this purpose, that you would use as your anonymous return address. Of course a problem is that there may not be enough people signed up to provide much privacy protection.
The newsgroup "alt.anonymous.messages" has existed for a year or two, and serves to be working reasonably well as a message pool. Check it out. One will find numerous messages of the sort copied below. Having browsed some of the less common newsgroups (and trolled, in my my earlier days), I surmise that messages to nyms like "TheBear" are related to "support and recovery" sorts of topics. (I mention this because this is a compelling example of where anonymity is often sought; that people are using remailers and message pools to communicate is interesting. When Louis Freeh claims that remailers are only being used by hackers and Russian mafia arms exporters, this is a counterexample.) Here's just one such message, of several I saw this morning in "alt.anonymous.messages". (Note that anonymous message pool sorts of messages also appear directly from time to time in groups like "alt.abuse.recovery" and that ilk.) --begin copied message-- From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Newsgroups: alt.anonymous.messages Subject: TheBear Date: 15 Jun 1996 14:26:12 +0200 Organization: Replay and Company UnLimited Lines: 14 Sender: replay@basement.replay.com Message-ID: <4pua54$gt6@basement.replay.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: basement.replay.com X-XS4ALL-Date: Sat, 15 Jun 1996 14:26:17 MET DST XComm: Replay may or may not approve of the content of this posting XComm: Report misuse of this automated service to <abuse@REPLAY.COM> -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.4, an Emacs/PGP interface hIwDrINEDTBBpVEBA/4sKOcgI33fdk6Pz5V27OIX0KiVfb4YDwgNLDpf6Wy0uvix 4oQ9p+vmtsZ32dPBoG4aF7bvh5ejqwZSpvuKOpgt1M8SKbA+Nma+EclMzQ3us3Ey OX5aFKo3TwB1Ck8tZPhpF8b/fI8gqz5v2FJhnon6NdktjFBVo3SBXya8AdlgUaYA AABsOTd6WOMH8PWnKHuP7PMCflH2p+halmCDsn9ytmoG6uzrINHH/B8c7aW6c7xw 9nXbB+99xLldhAqyg1M/oKi4pjfJ8cuSonDxMPTP8rr49XTCFaiOuQ7JUe3MEaop NIppnoBMrBvGRkKOgrYy =lYbJ -----END PGP MESSAGE----- --end copied message-- --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
In article <adfab86806021004c248@[205.199.118.202]>, Timothy C. May <tcmay@got.net> wrote:
The newsgroup "alt.anonymous.messages" has existed for a year or two, and serves to be working reasonably well as a message pool. Check it out.
alt.anonymous.messages is not an ideal message pool-- it is a hack. (Granted, it *is* a really cool, clever, and practically useful hack.) Ian and I talked about this at some length. alt.anonymous.messages has certain unfortunate shortcomings. Someone sniffing the Berkeley 'net can tell when I receive an alt.anonymous.messages message by when I download an article from the NNTP server; they can tell when I send such an article by when I upload an article to the NNTP server; they can list all the ``subversive'' Berkeley folks who have read alt.anonymous.messages lately. The local NNTP server must be trusted. Furthermore, even if you run a trusted NNTP server on your local machine, there are still vulnerabilities. Someone sniffing on your subnet can tell when you inject a new message onto alt.anonymous.messages, as can your neighboring NNTP servers. Then there are all the standard message length and timing threats from traffic analysis. And there is no perfect forward secrecy when using alpha nymservers to redirect email to alt.anonymous.messages. There are also second-order threats, arising from the fact that an attacker can selectively and remotely delete messages from some spools by using cancel messages, without compromising any NNTP servers. Ian's post detailed a proposal for implementing a message pool with better security properties: link encryption, constant size messages, randomized flooding, perfect forward secrecy, etc. This mechanism is intended to provide recipient anonymity. Sender anonymity must still be achieved by standard chaining methods. If folks have better ideas for how to achieve really good recipient anonymity, I hope they'll speak up! Take care, -- Dave
On 1 Jul 1996, David Wagner wrote:
Someone sniffing the Berkeley 'net can tell when I receive an alt.anonymous.messages message by when I download an article from the NNTP server
So, download every message, all the time, and junk posts that don't interest you offline. You betray yourself as an Evil Anonymous Communicator, but somehow I think they might already know. You give no information about which messages you're actually interested in unless your local workstation is compromised.
Furthermore, even if you run a trusted NNTP server on your local machine, there are still vulnerabilities. Someone sniffing on your subnet can tell when you inject a new message onto alt.anonymous.messages, as can your neighboring NNTP servers.
This is true. You'd have to generate white noise, again betraying yourself, but only in general. "They" would need to track every message. To make it more interesting, encrypt a bunch of messages for bogus PGP keys created for the purpose. -rich
participants (3)
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daw＠cs.berkeley.edu -
Rich Graves -
tcmay＠got.net