British Telecom merger with MCI
Has anyone figured out how this merger can work, particularly when British Telecom will be the surviving party, when those MCI employees concerned with the security of communications will not be able to disclose any cryptographic software or technical data to their employer, or to their ``foreign'' bosses and colleagues, without first getting permission from the Office of Defense Trade Controls under the ITAR? -- Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH Internet: junger@pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu URL: http://samsara.law.cwru.edu
BT/MCI aka Concert will have offices based in London and Washington. Technically Concert won't be a foreign company I guess. Zaid
On Mon, 4 Nov 1996, Peter D. Junger wrote:
Has anyone figured out how this merger can work, particularly when British Telecom will be the surviving party, when those MCI employees concerned with the security of communications will not be able to disclose any cryptographic software or technical data to their
It's reasonably trivial to get export licences from both countries for foreign subsidiaries. Also, British Telecom and GCHQ have a friendly working relationship, and any merger is unlikely to change these facts. Simon
Simon Spero wrote: | On Mon, 4 Nov 1996, Peter D. Junger wrote: | > Has anyone figured out how this merger can work, particularly when | > British Telecom will be the surviving party, when those MCI employees | > concerned with the security of communications will not be able to | > disclose any cryptographic software or technical data to their | | It's reasonably trivial to get export licences from both countries | for foreign subsidiaries. Also, British Telecom and GCHQ have a | friendly working relationship, and any merger is unlikely to change | these facts. Phil Karn failed to get an export license for 3des for foriegn offices of Qualcomm, staffed by Americans. See www.eff.org/pub/Crypto/ITAR_export/nsa_3des_export_denial_0396.letter Adam -- Celebrate Guy Fawkes day. Send a revolutionary to Congress.
Simon Spero sez:
On Mon, 4 Nov 1996, Adam Shostack wrote:
Phil Karn failed to get an export license for 3des for foriegn offices of Qualcomm, staffed by Americans. See www.eff.org/pub/Crypto/ITAR_export/nsa_3des_export_denial_0396.letter
That's unusual- certainly for the bigger companies
It is far worse. Every time Qualcomm wishes to send a bug fix to their Hong Kong switch, they must go through the entire song&dance re: NSA/Commerce/etc. Clearly harassment of The Enemy by Big Brother. -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433
On Mon, 4 Nov 1996, Adam Shostack wrote:
Phil Karn failed to get an export license for 3des for foriegn offices of Qualcomm, staffed by Americans. See www.eff.org/pub/Crypto/ITAR_export/nsa_3des_export_denial_0396.letter
[whoops] That's unusual - certainly, for the bigger companies it seems to be pretty automatic, especially for NATO countries. Of course, it could just be that Phil is "known to the authorities".
Can you offer up examples of 3des export? Demonstrating that the law is arbitrarily enforced would probably be a big, big win on the 1st ammendment grounds. They can't censor Phil and not censor Stew Baker for the same speech. Adam Simon Spero wrote: | > Phil Karn failed to get an export license for 3des for foriegn offices | > of Qualcomm, staffed by Americans. See | > www.eff.org/pub/Crypto/ITAR_export/nsa_3des_export_denial_0396.letter | | [whoops] | That's unusual - certainly, for the bigger companies it seems to be pretty | automatic, especially for NATO countries. Of course, it could just be that | Phil is "known to the authorities". | -- Celebrate Guy Fawkes day. Send a revolutionary to Congress.
On Mon, 4 Nov 1996, Adam Shostack wrote:
Phil Karn failed to get an export license for 3des for foriegn offices of Qualcomm, staffed by Americans. See www.eff.org/pub/Crypto/ITAR_export/nsa_3des_export_denial_0396.letter
[whoops] That's unusual - certainly, for the bigger companies it seems to be pretty automatic, especially for NATO countries. Of course, it could just be that Phil is "known to the authorities".
Sorry that the follow up is so late, but can anyone give me *any* examples where export of 3DES has been approved? Please be as specific as possible as to destination countries, use, etc. First hand knowledge is preferred. Thanks, Eric Blossom
On Mon, 4 Nov 1996, Peter D. Junger wrote:
Has anyone figured out how this merger can work, particularly when British Telecom will be the surviving party, when those MCI employees concerned with the security of communications will not be able to disclose any cryptographic software or technical data to their employer, or to their ``foreign'' bosses and colleagues, without first getting permission from the Office of Defense Trade Controls under the ITAR?
Crypto developed within a company can be revealed to other parts of the company, and GB is an ally of the US -- Nobody's going to say anything when they _do_ "violate" the ITAR --Deviant The world is not octal despite DEC.
participants (7)
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Adam Shostack -
David Lesher / hated by RBOC's in 5 states -
Eric Blossom -
Peter D. Junger -
ph93szh＠brunel.ac.uk -
Simon Spero -
The Deviant