(fwd) e$: PBS NewsHour, Path Dependency, IPSEC, Cyberdog, and the Melting of Mr.Bill.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - --- begin forwarded text Sender: e$@thumper.vmeng.com Reply-To: e$@thumper.vmeng.com Mime-Version: 1.0 From: rah@shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) Date: Mon, 22 Jan 1996 10:37:28 -0500 Precedence: Bulk To: Multiple recipients of <e$@thumper.vmeng.com> Subject: e$: PBS NewsHour, Path Dependency, IPSEC, Cyberdog, and the Melting of Mr. Bill. I thought I'd crank this out in light of Friday's NewsHour segment about Apple and the path-dependency of the microcomputer market. Contrary to what PBS would have us believe, ;-), the concept of path dependency in technology, and in economics, for that matter, is a proven fallacy. At the risk of sounding credentialist (*I'm* not an economist, either), the NewsHour's Mr. Solman seems to be proof that journalism isn't economics, no matter the journalist's academic credentials. Journalists have to get a story out, and sometimes there's no story in the actual economics of a situation. Certainly there's no story in the non-existance of path dependency. The most famous example of path dependency, the idea that our previous economic choices doom us to repeat those choices forever, is the QWERTY keyboard, which has been proven *not* to be significantly slower than the Dvorak keyboard, its supposedly more efficient alternative. Dvorak, the designer of the alternative keyboard, was also the same person who conducted the "ergonomic" studies (spending our WWII tax dollars, I might add) "proving" it's efficacy, and elevated his keyboard to the status of an urban legend. Dvorak was at worst a fraud and at best deluded with his own grandeur. Reviews of Dvorak's own data show some significant flaws in both research methdology and data handling. In addition, several independent studies since then have shown that randomly selected beginning typists, starting out on one keyboard or the other, have *never* shown any significant difference in typing speed. The Betamax/VHS videocassete war, another example of path dependence, was more one of Sony not having an open standard than anything else. Sony played dog-in-the-manger with it's own technology, and consequently ended up owning the most lucrative market on a profit-per-machine basis, the one in television broadcasting. It also means they were leaving big money on the table where the largest market was, in consumer electronics. Doesn't this sound familiar to Mac fans? Path dependence had nothing to do with it. Consumer Reports did comparisons at the time showing only a marginal difference between Betamax and JVC, and nowadays there is absolutely no percievable difference between the two. I now challenge anyone (including, unfortunately, Apple's own *psychologist*, quoted in the NewsHour piece) to *prove* path-dependence in the current market "hegemony" of Microsoft on the desktop. It ain't so. The reason that Microsoft has business computer market dominance today is *not* because of it's original *perceived* incompatibility with legacy mainframe equipment ("nobody ever got fired for buying IBM -- or Microsoft"). Technically, mainframe compatibility was a non-issue at the time. It certainly wasn't for the first 5 years of the Mac's life, anyway. Apple could have done something about the mainframe compatibility issue with simple marketing communications if they had paid any attention to it at all. Apple's heart was never in the business market. First of all, for all their lip service to business, they really weren't ever attracted to the idea of building better word-processing and spreadsheet boxes, even if they did have the best one, before Excel and Word moved to Windows, at the time of the big ramp up of the business microcomputer market. It showed in their attitude to most business people. Outside consultants and mavericks were always the heroes in Apple's commercials, and so outside consultants and mavericks were attracted to the Mac as a computing platform, but large businesses and conformists weren't. When compatibility with mainframes actually did become an issue, for the short time when people were offloading their mainframe data onto LANs, Apple didn't want to be there anyway. With the advent of LANs, Apple didn't build the technology to deal with LANs head on on their own turf, large corporations. Apple built peer-to-peer networks of collegial desktop machines. Unfortunately, they never paid attention to the bandwidth or the multitasking premia necessary for those networks to function properly from the high-volume user's point of view, and, so, when someone downloaded a file from your machine, and you printed something in the background at the same time, you suffered a performance hit if you tried to do anything else. Your mouse jerked around the screen, or your words wouldn't show up in a window as fast as you typed them. With PC file and print servers, this was less of a problem, because those two jobs were offloaded to a seperate machine, whose job it was to do nothing but run a printer, or to serve files. Since everyone had to be connected to these servers the local area network, or LAN, was born. On Apple networks, every machine is potentially a server for everyone else, and everyone is their own print server. Only after PC LANs became ubiquitous did Apple ever build servers of their own. Again, their hearts weren't in it, because they were more interested in the possiblities of more distributed, collegial, peer-to-peer networks. Fortunately, the first problem, network bandwidth, has been solved, because almost all Macs now come with ethernet, while the second problem, preemptive multitasking on faster processors, is being solved slowly. This is all very good for Apple, because peer-to-peer architecture is where the world's going to go anyway. The whole internet is a peer-to-peer, "geodesic" network, where each machine is optimized for it's own particular function, be it serving, or switching information. There is no central repository of anything. That has been Apple's view of networks since day one. If it's any consolation, we won't even need LANs to do business with, anyway. A couple months ago, I saw Netscape running in the bond trading room of this country's largest institutional trustee bank, of all places. In their case, Netscape beat Powerbuilder hands-down in a prototype development shootout. The prototype *was* the production version. Netscape can do anything from secure outside-the-firewall SQL calls to actually conducting cash commerce. Game over. By the way, Netscape is not special in this regard at all. So can any other sufficiently secure browser server combination. Either one, client or server, can be developed for a dime a dozen even now. This is especially true when compound document architectures come on-line, like Apple's Cyberdog, an internet implementation of their OpenDoc software object technology. The reason we won't need LANs is because the only real difference between a LAN and the internet is a firewall for security, and the need for clients to speak Novell's TCP/IP-incompatible proprietary network protocol. With internet-level encryption protocols like the IETF IPSEC standard, you won't even need a firewall anymore. The only people who can establish a server session with *any* machine connected to the net will be those issuing the digital signatures authorized to access that machine, no matter where those people are physically. When that happens, networks will need to be as public as possible, which means, of course, TCP/IP, and not Netware. It's like Heinlein's old joke about space, "once you're in Earth orbit, you're halfway to anywhere". So, once you've gotten *rid* of the firewall, you're everywhere. So much for the path dependence of the LAN market. What happens to the information concentrated behind those firewalls -- or proprietary software markets, for that matter -- when, because of strong cryptography, firewalls disappear? Remember what happened to those floating globs of grease in the detergent commercial? Surfacted away into little tiny bits. I can hear Bill Gates now: "I'm melting!, I'm melting!". Ding, dong, Mr. Bill is dead... Game over. Now you see why he's fighting so hard to be net-compatible all of the sudden. In this "decade of the internet", the [user interface, platform, desktop, LAN, whatever] is meat, and real life is on the net, to paraphrase William Gibson. For the time being, I have come to the conclusion that the Mac, at least as long as Apple makes most of them, is the computer for the "best of us", and, unfortunately, not "the rest of us". I've learned to live with that. I no more worry about Apple's prospects than I do about Porsche's. I expect that Apple management, like Herr Doktor Porsche, is just waking up to the fact that even though they designed the Volkswagen, they can't possibly mass produce them efficiently at a decent enough profit to advance the state of the art, which is really where their hearts have been all along. Sooner or later, Apple will go back to cranking out 917s, to demonstrate the power of the technology, 911s, for a more affordable version of that power, and 928s, for those of us who only want to look the part. ;-). Fortunately, there are lots of companies, like Power Computing, to produce those Volkswagens for those of us who can't afford Porches, and "Macintosh" won't mean just "Apple" anymore. So, for developers, and for me, a fully-credentialled Mac Bigot and camp-follower, the future for Apple means Cyberdog, because Cyberdog means breaking down large "glops" of information and software "grease" and surfacting them, fractally, into little bitty bits out into the net, where *all machines*, not just dumb Java-terminals, can use them better. It also means developing cryptographically strong internet-level security, so that anyone can talk to any machine from anywhere if they have permission to do so, and *nobody* with out permission can either get in or see what those authorized people are doing, with a packet sniffer, or worse, with a key-cracker. It means building into all network applications the ability to do digital commerce. That is, the ability to handle digital bearer certificates, like Digicash's ecash, and the ability to handle micropayments, like the MicroMint protocol or it's successor technologies. Imagine if your code could send you money in the mail, or if a router did real-time load balancing by changing it's micropayment price-per-thru-packet when traffic got too high or too low. The future of the net's going to be a strange place, indeed. Until that happens, I suppose Porsche parts is still a lucrative business, as long as developers keep in mind what business they're really in. Cheers, Bob Hettinga - -------------------------------------------------- The e$ lists are brought to you by: Making Commerce Convenient (tm) - Oki Advanced Products - Marlboro, MA Value-Checker(tm) smart card reader= http://www.oki.com/products/vc.html Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion http://www.hyperion.co.uk info@hyperion.co.uk See your name here. Be a charter sponsor for e$pam, e$, and Ne$ws! See http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/ or e-mail rah@shipwright.com for details... - ------------------------------------------------- - --- end forwarded text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQO/sPgyLN8bw6ZVAQGuSgP/fkKrI6aTSmPIGOu+LOxRzO5Ptt7QZNxh 48+b7975jIfUMgovphKBWdWtO+jGMCyUWxUVqjVbN8nmwfLT1RZFckOdLK0iM4nD Fgl5+s9yoI0OllHS+oOMcAIyuLIkzazUgtQojm8qBFGSGulW0Keq2dIRNsThGLrk Kk7K3oGMrQs= =71fv -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah@shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The NEW(!) e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

rah@shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) writes: [interesting article about the future, which includes..]
The reason we won't need LANs is because the only real difference between a LAN and the internet is a firewall for security, and the need for clients to speak Novell's TCP/IP-incompatible proprietary network protocol. With internet-level encryption protocols like the IETF IPSEC standard, you won't even need a firewall anymore. The only people who can establish a server session with *any* machine connected to the net will be those issuing the digital signatures authorized to access that machine, no matter where those people are physically. When that happens, networks will need to be as public as possible, which means, of course, TCP/IP, and not Netware.
I'm all for the end of ridiculous non-TCP/IP protocols, but does anyone believe this point about encrypted IP traffic eliminating the need for firewalls? I guess I don't trust the ability for people to keep secrets secret. Nothing like refusing to pass packets at all..

Nelson Minar writes:
I'm all for the end of ridiculous non-TCP/IP protocols, but does anyone believe this point about encrypted IP traffic eliminating the need for firewalls?
There is division in the IETF community on this point. Phil Karn (who I have the greatest respect for) thinks IPSEC means we can get rid of the firewalls. I, for one, don't -- they are there largely because people don't trust that their networking software is free of security holes, and cryptography doesn't fix security holes for the most part. Perry

Perry writes...
can get rid of the firewalls. I, for one, don't -- they are there largely because people don't trust that their networking software is free of security holes, and cryptography doesn't fix security holes for the most part.
Perhaps I'm nieve, but I've always understood that one of the primary functions firewalls accomplish is insulating from most easy attacks large numbers of random machines in an organization that may not be all perfectly administered, 100% under control of competant security wise users, and configured correctly for maximum security with all the latest rev's of stuff. Seems unclear that IP level security and authentication will totally eliminate the problems caused by buggy software and clueless or careless users, or overloaded security staffs who don't have time to update everybody and check everything immediately on networks with thousands of machines. Having one or two machines to keep secure instead of thousands seems like a big win. Dave Emery

I tend to oscillate between the two positions; at the moment I think that firewalls are still needed with IPSEC. Firewalls cannot be removed if 1) You need to control outbound as well as inbound traffic 2) There are still non IPSEC machines on the network. 3) There are network services on IPSEC machines that do not understand IPSEC security, and which cannot be easily secured through IPSEC aware wrappers. I can't see anyway to cope with the first problem- however the latter two are legacy headaches, which tend to clear up given time. What I do see happening is more and more IPSEC machines moving out into a quasi-DMZ as it becomes much easier to make ordinary machines secure enough to go over-the-top; however, it'll take more than just IPSEC to make this fool-proof enough to move everybody out there. One worry I do have is that if such a machine is misconfigured it could cause more damage as that machine is trusted more because it's using IPSEC. Simon (defun modexpt (x y n) "computes (x^y) mod n" (cond ((= y 0) 1) ((= y 1) (mod x n)) ((evenp y) (mod (expt (modexpt x (/ y 2) n) 2) n)) (t (mod (* x (modexpt x (1- y) n)) n))))

IPsec will not change the role of firewalls. It will change some technical details about them. Firewalls do a couple of things: Enforce a policy boundary between us & them. Reduce the number of systems to be 'well secured' (This is because really securing a machine is tough, and often involves sacrifices of useability.) Provide job security/ass covering (see also, satisfy auditors.) The fact that some traffic passing through is encrypted will not change any of this. Only allowing traffic to people who provide a signature is only useful for some things. Besides, there will always be shitty protocols, like NFS, yp, SMTP, etc that need a firewall to protect them. Legacy systems are with us forever. (I was in a meeting last Thursday where we discussed how to handle a Sun3 that needs to be a router in a CIDR environment. No option to upgrade this box for complex reasons. I bring it up to illustrate the persistance of legacy systems.) Nelson Minar wrote: | rah@shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) writes: | [interesting article about the future, which includes..] | | >The reason we won't need LANs is because the only real difference between a | >LAN and the internet is a firewall for security, and the need for clients | >to speak Novell's TCP/IP-incompatible proprietary network protocol. With | >internet-level encryption protocols like the IETF IPSEC standard, you won't | >even need a firewall anymore. The only people who can establish a server | >session with *any* machine connected to the net will be those issuing the | >digital signatures authorized to access that machine, no matter where those | >people are physically. When that happens, networks will need to be as | >public as possible, which means, of course, TCP/IP, and not Netware. | | I'm all for the end of ridiculous non-TCP/IP protocols, but does | anyone believe this point about encrypted IP traffic eliminating the | need for firewalls? -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

reply from attila: I agree there will be "universal" secrecy --there will always someone who manages to decode one or two "signatures" including handshakes, and spoofs them, after burying the sucker machine in response commands so it has a chance to grab the handshaking. a little group effort, a couple of fast machines to coordinate the attack, and rest just might be history. seems to me both Netscape and the abominable creature from the Pacific Northwest said they could not be broken.... Personally, I think NSA has figured out how to break PGP -- enough specialized DSPs and prime factoring tables on magneto- optical disks can go along way. If you have traffic both ways, you have the hash as well. dropping Phil accomplished two basic things: a cheap give- away to look good in public; and, they avoided defending ITAR in court --and the ninth circuit can be pretty cranky on the Bill of Rights --they don't follow Washington's line too well. On Mon, 22 Jan 1996, Nelson Minar wrote:
rah@shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) writes: [interesting article about the future, which includes..]
The reason we won't need LANs is because the only real difference between a LAN and the internet is a firewall for security, and the need for clients to speak Novell's TCP/IP-incompatible proprietary network protocol. With internet-level encryption protocols like the IETF IPSEC standard, you won't even need a firewall anymore. The only people who can establish a server session with *any* machine connected to the net will be those issuing the digital signatures authorized to access that machine, no matter where those people are physically. When that happens, networks will need to be as public as possible, which means, of course, TCP/IP, and not Netware.
I'm all for the end of ridiculous non-TCP/IP protocols, but does anyone believe this point about encrypted IP traffic eliminating the need for firewalls?
I guess I don't trust the ability for people to keep secrets secret. Nothing like refusing to pass packets at all..
__________________________________________________________________________ go not unto usenet for advice, for the inhabitants thereof will say: yes, and no, and maybe, and I don't know, and fuck-off. _________________________________________________________________ attila__ To be a ruler of men, you need at least 12 inches.... There is no safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be.
participants (7)
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Adam Shostack
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attila
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Dave Emery
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Nelson Minar
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Perry E. Metzger
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rah@shipwright.com
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Simon Spero