Spoofing Nuclear Weapons and PGP
Responding to msg by dichro@tartarus.uwa.edu.au (Mikolaj Habryn) on Thu, 25 Aug 5:51 PM
not really certain. *shrug* sorry. Read some books on it - the amount of literature which should be classified but is freely available is mind-boggling.
To tie this back to crypto and technology: Under a sub-sub-sub-contract I once worked on some phony CAD drawings for the nuclear weapons production process, plotting false info that still appears in popular books, some of which has been posted here. The docs were then encrypted and stegonagraphied for authenticity. We were told that they were turned loose on the market for this product in other countries. I don't know if the USG was involved, there no security clearances. It may have been a commercial scam. Also, growing up not to far from LANL, I was told that kids of staff were encouraged to chat about B-this and W-that by the security people there as part of the fog around that outfit. This supports the suggestion for profligate use of PGP as a stratagem, to make it harder to tell the trivial from the other. Or is public encryption a stratagem to focus on software rather than hardware? Anybody hear anything about covert ID in new-generation CPUs, like done with supercomps? John
John Young says:
Under a sub-sub-sub-contract I once worked on some phony CAD drawings for the nuclear weapons production process, plotting false info that still appears in popular books, some of which has been posted here.
The docs were then encrypted and stegonagraphied for authenticity. We were told that they were turned loose on the market for this product in other countries.
Its been a long time coming. *Plonk*. Perry
participants (2)
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John Young -
Perry E. Metzger